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Abstract 
 
At its most fundamental level, the First World War in northern Europe was fought 
between two competing industrial systems. The efficient production and delivery of materials 
from the factory to the front lines played a critical role in deciding the outcome of the conflict. 
This thesis examines the management of the second of those factors, the provision of a flexible, 
effective logistics organization in the rear of the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] on the 
Western Front. The thesis draws upon war diaries generated by the administrative departments, 
and the personal papers of individuals concerned with maintaining the supply lines of the BEF 
and ensuring that the BEF’s ‘tail’ continued to wag. It reverses historiographical trends which 
have stressed the influence of the war upon the societies which fought it, to instead emphasize 
the manner in which highly-skilled experts from some of Britain’s largest and most complex 
businesses were able to contribute recognizable industrial techniques and working methods to 
improve the efficiency of the BEF’s transportation infrastructure and the operations systems 
employed upon it. 
This thesis rejects post-war claims, most vociferously asserted by David Lloyd George, 
as to the obstinacy and insularity of the British Army as an institution. The administrative 
success of the BEF was the result of civil-military combination and cooperation. The most 
famous manifestation of this process, the appointment by Lloyd George of Sir Eric Geddes to 
the position of Director-General of Military Railways during the Battle of the Somme, was not 
unique. This thesis argues that the British Army actively sought out and engaged with transport 
experts both prior to and during the war, a practice which consolidated a longstanding, 
triangular, working relationship between the British Army, the State, and the prominent railway 
companies of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain. 
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Introduction 
 
I have to show how the professional soldiers who fought so valiantly in the stricken 
area also found themselves unable to cope with the vast problem of Movement which 
this unprecedented war set before them, and how here again disaster was narrowly 
averted by the aid of the civilian expert. I am not arraigning the professional soldier, 
but only the supercilious folly miles behind the shell area which stigmatized all civilian 
aid in the construction or direction of the war machine as unwarranted interference by 
ignorant amateurs.
1
 
David Lloyd George 
 
At its most fundamental level within its most significant theatre of combat, the First 
World War was a contest between two competing military-industrial systems. In such a dispute, 
the efficient production and delivery of matériel from factory to front line would play a critical 
role in determining the outcome. This study will assess claims made by the wartime Prime 
Minister David Lloyd George that the British Expeditionary Force [BEF] was handicapped in its 
operations by the predominance of insular, incompetent ‘inexperts’ within its senior ranks;2 that 
the British Army was incapable of understanding the implications of modern warfare, and was 
both unable to offer solutions to the problems it faced, and unwilling to accept the advice of 
those who possessed skills and experience in avenues with a clear and demonstrable utility in 
the prosecution of an industrial war. This thesis examines the coordination and management of 
the logistics network on the Western Front, emphasizing the importance of the ‘science of 
transportation’ to the conduct of the First World War,3 and analysing the validity of Lloyd 
George’s assertion that it was only through his ‘forcing’ of ‘unwanted civilians’ upon the army 
in the summer of 1916 that the BEF reluctantly agreed to engage with the myriad talents and 
abilities prevalent within an industrialized society such as pre-war Britain.
4
 
At its peak strength, the BEF contained far more ‘employees’ than even the largest 
firms in pre-war Britain. Sir Douglas Haig, later to become the personification of callous, 
                                                 
1
 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 2 vols. (London: Odham’s Press, 1938), I, p. 
470. 
2
 Lloyd George, I, pp. v–vi. 
3
 The phrase ‘science of transportation’ is introduced in M.G. Taylor, ‘Land Transportation in the Late 
War’, Royal United Services Institution [RUSI]. Journal, 66:464 (1921), 699–722 (p. 705). 
4
 Lloyd George, I, p. 474. 
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obstinate generalship,
5
 was at the time portrayed by the American journalist Isaac Marcosson as 
the ‘General Manager of the British Armies, Unlimited’.6 The BEF was, in the words of the 
Quartermaster-General’s [QMG] final report, ‘a mighty business undertaking’.7 Contemporaries 
also remarked upon the ‘business-like’ character of the force, stressing the importance of the 
‘Board of Directors’ at General Headquarters [GHQ] upon whose shoulders rested the daunting 
task of coordinating this colossal mass of men and machinery.
8
 Whilst previous studies have 
engaged with the ‘workers’ of the Western Front, discussing tactical improvements on the 
battlefield and how the ‘tools’ of the army were enhanced (or invented) during the conflict,9 far 
less is known about the processes and structures which were created and maintained in order to 
deliver those workers and their tools to the front line in sufficient quantities, and with sufficient 
rapidity, for them to effectively carry out their responsibilities. 
The vitriolic ‘battle of the memoirs’ played out by the leading soldiers and statesmen in 
the British war effort during the 1920s and ‘30s – typified by the works of Lloyd George and Sir 
William Robertson – in which both ‘frocks’ and ‘brass hats’ sought to apportion the ‘blame’ for 
mismanaging the campaign upon their rivals,
10
 has succeeded in overshadowing the myriad 
logistical issues facing the BEF.
11
 These were challenges which offered a clear area in which 
civilian experts could offer technical assistance to the military. Utilizing documents created both 
by the BEF and by the multitude of civilians who contributed to the operations of the British 
forces within and without the established hierarchy of the army, this thesis seeks to supplement 
                                                 
5
 K. Simpson, ‘The Reputation of Sir Douglas Haig’, in The First World War and British Military History, 
ed. by B. Bond (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 141–62 (p. 141). 
6
 I.F. Marcosson, A Visit to Sir Douglas Haig (New York: George H. Doran, 1917), p. 6. 
7
 London, The National Archives [TNA]: Public Record Office [PRO] WO 107/69 Work of the QMG’s 
branch of the staff: and directorates controlled, British Armies in France and Flanders 1914-1918: Report, 
p. 1. 
8
 ‘G.S.O.’, G.H.Q. (Montreuil-Sur-Mer) (London: Philip Allan & Co., 1920), pp. 2, 30–5. 
9
 P. Griffith, Battle Tactics on the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of Attack, 1916-18 (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 1994); S. Bidwell and D. Graham, Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and 
Theories of War, 1904-1945 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2004); J.P. Harris, Men, Ideas and Tanks: British 
Military Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); 
A.J. Saunders, ‘A Muse of Fire: British Trench Warfare Munitions, Their Invention, Manufacture and 
Tactical Employment on the Western Front, 1914-18’ (unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of Exeter, 
2008). 
10
 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, 2 vols. (London: Odham’s Press, 1938); W.R. 
Robertson, Soldiers and Statesmen, 1914-1918, 2 vols. (London: Cassell & Co., 1926). 
11
 It is particularly noticeable that two of the most enduring histories of the conflict pay scant attention to 
logistics. See B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the First World War (London: Cassell, 1970); A.J.P. Taylor, 
The First World War: An Illustrated History (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1963). 
3 
 
the work of Andrew Suttie in dismissing the validity of the War Memoirs. The memoirs, Suttie 
argues, ‘tapped successfully into a popular mood of disillusionment and disenchantment, and in 
turn helped reinforce some of the central myths of the First World War’.12 Whereas Suttie 
concentrated his text upon ‘what were unarguably both major episodes in the history of the 
Great War and in Lloyd George’s wartime career’,13 this thesis covers ground which lay outside 
Lloyd George’s direct supervision except for during the period between June and December 
1916 when he held the role of Secretary of State for War. Through an examination of the British 
Army’s logistical considerations both in the preparations for, and conduct of, the First World 
War, this thesis tests the legitimacy of Lloyd George’s claims that the army was institutionally 
‘handicapped by ingrained distrust, misunderstanding and contempt’ for all businessmen.14 
As Proença and Duarte have illustrated: 
Logistics accounts for all activities in war that are pre-conditional to the use of the 
fighting forces. It is the condition of possibility for the conduct of war, and becomes a 
tactical or strategic concern to the exact extent that it affects the engagement or the use 
of (the results of) engagements in war.
15
 
 
Despite their recognized importance as a foundation for the prosecution of war, however, the 
intricacies of logistics have, as experience of the First World War receded, taken a back seat to 
more glamorous (and controversial) debates over the tactics and strategy of the BEF.
16
 
Transport, as contemporary observers understood, was ‘so inextricably interwoven with modern 
commerce and industry’ that it could not be separated from the history of such matters.17 The 
history of warfare, particularly in the colossal engagements of the twentieth century, is no 
different. The multitude of administrative tasks collected under the umbrella of ‘general routine’ 
in the war diaries of the units involved have yet to be the subject of thorough investigation, 
                                                 
12
 A. Suttie, Rewriting the First World War: Lloyd George, Politics and Strategy, 1914-1918 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 8. 
13
 Suttie, p. 5. 
14
 Lloyd George, I, p. 83. 
15
 D. Proença and E.E. Duarte, ‘The Concept of Logistics Derived from Clausewitz: All That Is Required 
so That the Fighting Force Can Be Taken as a Given’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 28:4 (2005), 645–77 
(pp. 645–6). Emphasis in original. 
16
 J. Thompson, The Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict (Oxford: Brassey’s, 1991), p. 3. 
17
 C. Travis, ‘The Science of Railroading. A Further Plea for the Establishment of a Transport Institute’, 
Great Central Railway Journal, 13:3 (1917), 40–42 (p. 40). 
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despite their critical importance as the lifeline upon which the vast armies of the First World 
War were dependent.
18
 This thesis aims to amend this deficiency. 
In this respect the historiography of the First World War is not unique, despite the 
pioneering work of Martin van Creveld in underlining the importance of logistical support as a 
precursor to successful military operations. Demonstrating that it was logistical factors which 
fixed the parameters of what an army could, or could not, achieve on the battlefield,
19
 van 
Creveld highlights that whilst the amount of food and fodder to be transported remained largely 
unchanged from previous eras, the impedimenta of the industrial army – the guns, aeroplanes, 
machinery and other equipment – significantly increased the quantities of ammunition, spare 
parts and other tools required in the zone of military operations.
20
 As David Edgerton has noted, 
the subjects of maintenance and repair, both central to the continued operation of an efficient 
transport network and therefore fundamental to the continuation of a ‘material war’, have been 
‘largely left in the margins’ of historical writing.21 Unfortunately, van Creveld’s text does not 
materially alter this prognosis: rather than providing a comprehensive evaluation of the supply 
challenges facing the armies on the Western Front, the text merely examines the logistical 
feasibility of the so-called Schlieffen Plan before moving on to 1933.
22
 Paul Harris’ account of 
the final hundred days of the war exemplifies the prevailing trend; despite the author’s 
recognition of the ‘essential’ importance of logistics and military engineering, he devotes just 
over one page of the text to a discussion of these topics.
23
 
                                                 
18
 See, for example, the daily entries recorded in Canberra, Australian War Memorial [AWM], 
AWM4/25/49/1 K Ammunition Park, 1
st
 ANZAC Corps, February 1917. 
19
 M. Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1977); K. Neilson, ‘Total War: Total History’, Military Affairs, 51:1 (1987), 17–21 (p. 
18). 
20
 Van Creveld’s calculations are based upon the quantities of food and fodder consumed per man or 
animal. The absolute quantities of both items required during the First World War were, of course, 
unprecedented in volume. See Van Creveld, p. 110. 
21
 D. Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History since 1900 (London: Profile, 2006), 
p. 77. 
22
 Van Creveld, p. 141. Van Creveld’s conclusion that the Schlieffen Plan failed as the ‘old methods were 
inadequate to handle the demands of modern war’ merely amplifies the absence of any attempt to 
investigate how the Allies eventually did solve this conundrum. 
23
 J.P. Harris, Amiens to the Armistice: The BEF in the Hundred Days’ Campaign, 8 August-11 November 
1918 (London: Brassey’s, 1998), pp. 54–5. 
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The historiography of the First World War has placed a great deal of emphasis upon 
investigating the impact of the conflict upon the societies and peoples that lived through it in the 
past fifty years.
24
 This thesis will invert this now familiar framework, to illustrate that those 
societies were not passive recipients of the violence of the war. They were integral components, 
making deliberate choices which shaped the character and conduct of the conflict. The 
investigation of these choices is paramount to further understanding both of how the war was 
fought, and also why it was able to be sustained for over four years. It seeks to build on work by 
John Bourne, examining the impact that the products of an industrialized society were able to 
have upon the character of the war.
25
 Whereas Bourne’s essay looks at the manner in which 
soldiers were able to adapt familiar working practices to the unfamiliar surroundings of the 
combat regiment, this thesis will instead focus upon men who contributed – for the most part – 
on the fringes of the army; officials in quasi-military, quasi-civilian functions for which their 
pre-war careers in some of Britain’s largest and most complex private enterprises acted as 
highly relevant apprenticeships. These were men who adapted their managerial practices to the 
unprecedented (but not necessarily unfamiliar) demands of industrialized conflict in the service 
of their nation. 
Both before and during the war, and in the historical analysis of the period which has 
followed, these members of Britain’s industrial elite have been largely denigrated in comparison 
to their contemporaries both in the United States and in Germany, Britain’s direct opponent on 
the Western Front. As Searle notes, ‘Germany assumed the dual role of model and enemy’ in 
pre-war debates over Britain’s competitiveness,26 whilst Lloyd George’s words of 3 June 1915 
are also illustrative of the contemporary mind set: 
We are fighting against the best organized community in the world, the best organized 
whether for war or peace, and we have been employing too much the haphazard, 
                                                 
24
 A. Marwick, The Deluge. British Society and the First World War (London: Bodley Head, 1965); J.M. 
Winter, The Great War and the British People (London: Macmillan, 1986) are just two examples which 
focus upon the British experience. 
25
 J. Bourne, ‘The British Working Man in Arms’, in Facing Armageddon: The First World War 
Experienced, ed. by H. Cecil and P.H. Liddle (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), pp. 336–50 (p. 336). 
26
 G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-
1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), pp. 54–7. 
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leisurely, go-as-you-please methods, which, believe me, would not have enabled us to 
maintain our place as a nation even in peace very much longer.
27
 
 
Examples of ‘a civil servant being ignorant of technology, a businessman not investing in a 
modern machine, or a soldier doubting the efficacy of new weapons’ have been used to create 
an image of British business, and indeed the entire British ruling class, as having been 
‘congenitally short-sighted’ and incapable of responding to the spread of new techniques, 
equipment and working methods across the globe.
28
 Contemporary admirers of US-German 
‘dynamism’ and critics of perceived British deficiencies have been held up as illustrations of 
unheeded prescience, heralding the predictable consequences for Britain’s status as a ‘Great 
Power’.29 
 Correlli Barnett’s 1986 study The Audit of War typifies such material. Barnett’s 
Edwardian Britain comprised a workforce of unskilled ‘coolies’ and a managerial class hostile 
towards professional education. The result was a low output of graduate scientists and 
engineers,
30
 and a ‘crisis of British industry’ exemplified by an over-reliance upon ‘rule-of-
thumb’ methods as opposed to the rigorous sponsorship and application of scientific knowledge 
in Germany and the emergence of standardization and mechanization in the United States.
31
 The 
South African War, with its mass rejection of volunteers from major urban centres due to their 
lack of physical fitness, embodied British ‘decline’ and, although her industrial lead ensured she 
would remain a Great Power, the Britain depicted in this ‘declinist’ literature was, if not the sick 
man of Europe, then undoubtedly a ‘weary titan’ at the outbreak of the First World War. 
Such a pessimistic outlook raises a series of difficult questions however. Were Britain 
in such a relatively weak position in 1914 – populated by an unfit, uneducated, unskilled 
                                                 
27
 D. Lloyd George, Through Terror to Triumph: Speeches and Pronouncements of the Right Hon. David 
Lloyd George, M.P., since the Beginning of the War, ed. by F.L. Stevenson (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1915), p. 104. 
28
 D. Edgerton, ‘The Prophet Militant and Industrial: The Peculiarities of Correlli Barnett’, Twentieth 
Century British History, 2:3 (1991), 360–79 (p. 366). 
29
 A survey of the ‘mountain of apparently damning evidence on the [abilities of the] British businessman’ 
can be found in D.C. Coleman and C. Macleod, ‘Attitudes to New Techniques: British Businessmen, 
1800-1950’, The Economic History Review, 39:4 (1986), 588–611. 
30
 C. Barnett, The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), pp. 187, 206–7. 
31
 Barnett, p. 208; H.L. Gantt, Industrial Leadership (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1916), p. 
15; S.B. Saul, ‘The American Impact on British Industry 1895-1914’, Business History, 2:1 (1960), 19–
38 (pp. 19, 24). 
7 
 
workforce, and led by an elite more concerned with ‘rural romanticism’ than the latest 
technological advances – how then was she able to organize the largest, most wide-ranging, 
most ‘total’, war effort in British military history?32 How were the complexities and scales of 
industrial warfare not only recognized, but also coordinated with such success against the 
apparent ‘model’ of industrial efficiency, Germany?33 And how was all of this achieved despite 
the frequent requirements for negotiation and compromise understood as an essential 
prerequisite for the maintenance of a successful coalition?
34
 As the Russo-Japanese War had 
ably demonstrated in 1904-1905, it was not simply enough to have a larger resource base than 
one’s opponents.35 Those assets had to be physically moved to the battlefield and, if necessary, 
produced quickly, efficiently and of a sufficient quality to be of benefit to the fighting troops. In 
short, therefore, Allied success on the battlefields of the Western Front was dependent upon the 
creation, coordination and effective management of an immense, integrated production and 
distribution network. As the effects of attrition (both human and material) eroded the strength 
and capacity of France to service the armies fighting on her soil, British workers, and British 
managers, became increasingly essential to the maintenance and direction of the BEF and the 
Franco-British alliance. How was it possible for a nation populated by transport managers, 
                                                 
32
 On the lure of ‘rural mythology’, centred on the idea of an ‘unchanging England’, see M.J. Wiener, 
English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), pp. 49–63. 
33
 F.K. Puckle, Lectures on Supply Organization and Transportation (Washington, DC: Army War 
College, 1918), p. 15. The German ‘model’ was not merely restricted to industrial efficiency. Certain 
commentators, such as F.N. Maude and Colonel Seely, also felt that ‘as the German Army now stands, I 
believe it to be the most perfect engine of war ever yet put together’. Maude, quoted in H. Bailes, 
‘Patterns of Thought in the Late Victorian Army’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 4:1 (1981), 29–45 (p. 33); 
J.E.B. Seely, Adventure (London: William Heinemann, 1930), p. 124. Henry Wilson would also compare 
the efficiencies of the British and German armies and states in lectures delivered at Camberley, with 
conclusions which were broadly unfavourable to Britain. See London, Imperial War Museum [IWM], 
Papers of Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, HHW 3/3/5 Lecture: ‘Standards of Efficiency. Lecture I’, i-vii. 
34
 J. Hughes and J. Weiss, ‘Simple Rules for Making Alliances Work’, Harvard Business Review, 85:11 
(2007), 122–31 (p. 123); G. Sheffield, ‘Introduction’, in Britain and France in Two World Wars: Truth, 
Myth and Memory, ed. by R. Tombs and E. Chabal (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), pp. 19–28 emphasizes 
the significance of the ‘endless meetings’ attended by senior military and political figures in the 
sustenance of the Franco-British ‘business arrangement’ during the war. 
35
 The difficulties experienced by the Russians during that conflict in bringing their strength to the 
battlefield are discussed in F. Patrikeeff and H. Shukman, Railways and the Russo-Japanese War: 
Transporting War (London: Routledge, 2007). 
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perceived at the time as being ‘content to go on working by the antiquated methods’ of the 
1870s,
36
 to be able to respond successfully to these unprecedented logistical concerns? 
That the ethos, workforce and, crucially, a pool of managerial talent capable of meeting 
this challenge existed in Britain has been central to the arguments forwarded by David Edgerton. 
In the opening decades of the twentieth century, Edgerton identifies Britain as ‘a military-
industrial-scientific complex which was… second to none’.37 Whilst Warfare State covers the 
period 1920-1970, this thesis provides a chronological precursor to Edgerton’s work, seeking to 
establish whether Britain’s defence capabilities and plans prior to and during the First World 
War were shaped by supposedly ‘untechnically minded’ professional soldiers, 38  or whether 
Britain’s preparations and operations were carried out by a far more wide-ranging cadre of 
bureaucrats, technicians and management experts, both civil and military in background. 
An investigation of this nature is overdue. In the historiography of British logistics in 
the First World War, the only member of the British managerial pool to benefit from detailed 
historical study is Lloyd George’s ‘blue-eyed boy’, Sir Eric Geddes. 39  The work of other 
civilians, and the vast majority of professional soldiers employed in ‘Q and A’ rather than ‘G’ 
duties, both before and after Geddes ‘showed what transportation meant’ on the Western 
Front,
40
 is yet to receive similar attention. Pope and Wheal’s Dictionary of the First World War 
is indicative. Whilst Geddes receives an entry, his successor as Director-General of 
Transportation in France, Sir Philip Nash, does not. In addition, the only soldier to hold the 
position of QMG during the war to merit inclusion is Sir William Robertson, who went on to 
become Chief of the Imperial General Staff [CIGS] and a vital component of civil-military 
relations at the strategic level.
41
 Contrary to the picture painted by Lloyd George’s memoirs, 
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37
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University Press, 1989). For a discussion focused upon Geddes’ political career during this period, see 
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40
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Geddes was not the first civilian to attempt to apply distinctly ‘civilian business methods’ to the 
administration and logistical support of the BEF. The political, material, organizational and 
strategic factors which impacted upon the success of such schemes has yet to be thoroughly 
discussed, and will be a key aim of this thesis.
42
 
Since the war, the British logistics effort has been the subject of just two full-length 
studies. The first, by Colonel A.M. Henniker, appeared in 1937 as part of the Official History 
series produced under the editorship of Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds.
43
 It remains the 
largest review of the BEF’s logistical operations during the conflict, and is a vital source of 
organizational and hierarchical details alongside narrative descriptions of the challenges 
experienced by the transport staff on the Western Front. The text is unashamedly ‘pro-military’ 
in outlook. Rather than any latent deficiencies in the army’s command structure, Henniker 
argues that a lack of foresight on the part of the government, coupled with a lack of faith in the 
ability of the soldiers to effectively discharge their duties, were responsible for many of the 
difficulties experienced at the front prior to Geddes’ arrival in the summer of 1916. Geddes is 
also central to the more recent study, Ian M. Brown’s British Logistics on the Western Front.44 
Brown argues, building upon ‘learning curve’ assessments of the war such as those articulated 
by Gary Sheffield, that the BEF’s evolution in combat tactics and battlefield command could 
not have occurred without superb leadership in the fields of logistics and administration.
45
 
‘Administrative excellence’ from mid-1917 onwards, built upon a foundation provided by 
Geddes, freed the BEF’s ‘teeth’ from having to concern themselves with questions of supply, 
their material requirements being satisfied by an increasingly efficient ‘tail’.46 However, Geddes’ 
mission was by no means a unique manifestation of the BEF’s attempts to synthesize civilian 
                                                 
42
 It is also worth noting that a number of articles investigating the utilization of modern management 
practices in Britain choose to use 1914 as a ‘full stop’ rather than examining the application of such 
techniques in the prosecution of the war effort. See, for example, Saul; K. Whitston, ‘The Reception of 
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46
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and military expertise on the Western Front. Brown’s superficial treatment of the contributions 
of those operating both on the fringes of, and within, the extant military hierarchy during the 
war will be rectified in this thesis.  
A further corollary of the personalized memoir battle in Britain after the war has been to 
overshadow understanding of developments between the constituent parts of the Allied coalition. 
The relationship between the French and British armies was not static either before or during the 
First World War. The association of the two forces, and of the wider political union between the 
two nations, was subject to numerous negotiations and reassessments as the fighting progressed. 
The influences of key variables: the relative strengths of the two armies; the remaining material 
and human resources of the empires engaged; the impact of enemy action and the introduction 
of allies or associated powers; all factored into the outcome of multilateral negotiations 
involving subtle compromises over short-term difficulties to assist the long-term realization of 
the overall strategic goal of victory. As Lloyd George acknowledged in November 1917, ‘it was 
national prejudice and susceptibility, prestige and delicacy’ that prevented the formation of an 
Allied War Council prior to the final twelve months of hostilities.
47
 Understanding the 
influences of these elements is at an embryonic stage, and this thesis will locate logistical 
considerations within this slowly developing field.
48
 
As yet, only William Philpott and Elizabeth Greenhalgh have addressed the 
development of the ‘tempestuous’ Franco-British relationship in monographs, placing the 
entente’s political, military and civil-military relations at their centre.49 Both emphasize the 
divergent priorities, strategies and outlooks at work within France and Britain during the course 
of the war, and the difficulties experienced by those tasked with maintaining a balance between 
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national sovereignty and the wider interests of the coalition.
50
 As such, both authors 
demonstrate how the entente suffered from many of the problems associated with the formation 
of corporate alliances.
51
 The mechanisms and procedures of modern, industrialized warfare were 
a novel civil-military – and increasingly international civil-military – concern, requiring 
diplomacy and conciliation, but also creating a unique environment for the implementation of 
innovative managerial solutions to exceptional administrative challenges.
52
 In no place was this 
more evident than in the provision and maintenance of adequate transport facilities where, for 
example, the demands of the Belgian state required far more consideration from its coalition 
partners than Belgium’s relatively small force (at least once the BEF had increased in size) 
received in terms of the military decision-making process.
53
 The question of supplying the BEF, 
therefore, was not solely of great concern to British administrators, but was also subject to the 
political, military and technical considerations of the French Army and state, engaged as they 
were in war of national survival on their own territory. 
The number of troops mobilized by each army ensured that ‘living off the land’ was 
impossible for an extended period of time. The transport network in the Franco-Belgian 
borderland was therefore responsible for the provision of almost everything that the armies 
required in order to fight and survive on the Western Front. Table 0.1 gives some small 
indication of the scale of the task involved in moving supplies inland from the coast, and of the 
implications inherent in the BEF’s expansion during the war. The extant road and rail systems 
were essential to the sustenance of the troops, the maintenance of their equipment, and to the 
evolution of the material-intensive combat methodologies which characterize the second half of 
                                                 
50
 R. Grattan, ‘The Entente in World War I: A Case Study in Strategy Formulation in an Alliance’, 
Journal of Management History, 15:2 (2009), 147–58. 
51
 Hughes and Weiss. 
52
 The British management consultant, Lyndall Urwick, described the armies of 1918 as ‘the most 
efficient human machines the world has ever seen. There was less waste of effort, less friction in their 
working, better adaptation to the end in view, than can be discovered in any other form of human 
organization’. See Henley-on-Thames, Greenlands Academic Resource Centre, Papers of Lyndall Urwick, 
1/2/9 The Soldier, the Worker, and the Citizen, lecture to the Fabian Society, 1919, p. 3. 
53
 Henniker, pp. 93–101; W. Philpott, ‘Britain, France and the Belgian Army’, in ‘Look to Your Front!’ 
Studies in the First World War by the British Commission for Military History, ed. by B. Bond et al 
(Staplehurst: Spellmount, 1999), pp. 121–35. 
12 
 
the conflict in particular.
54
 The supply units which utilized those systems also relied upon a 
juxtaposition of technologies. The BEF in 1914 was equipped with modern lorries, but was also 
dependent upon some 55,000 horses; whilst the ‘iron horse’ of the railways would be 
responsible for the bulk transportation of the vast majority of stores, the dense canal networks of 
France and Belgium would also be pressed into action. This thesis will investigate the manner in 
which ‘civilianization’ assisted the BEF to integrate these networks in the pursuit of an efficient 
and reliable connection between the factories of Britain (and the world) and the front line.
55
 
The thesis consists of three sections. The first discusses the period before the war. It 
will investigate the manner in which the language, culture and principles of ‘big business’ 
infused the debate over British military reorganization in the wake of the South African War, 
within a political atmosphere charged with calls for ‘national efficiency’ and economy in 
military expenditure. Utilizing documents generated by political and military figures, this 
section will illustrate that the expeditionary force which ultimately went to war in 1914 was far 
from the product of an ‘insular’ army, operating within a ‘bubble’ beyond the control and 
oversight of the government.
56
 Instead, it was a force whose organizational structure and 
preparations for war were developed by a combination of military and civilian figures. 
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Highest Daily Feeding 
Strength 
Highest Monthly Issues 
Frozen Meat (lbs.) Bread (lbs.) 
1914 65,919 1,022,396 1,598,944 
1915 311,242 6,826,306 7,950,682 
1916 381,620 9,201,062 10,694,650 
1917 692,423 17,346,498 12,776,070 
1918 670,266 21,658,847 15,875,667 
Table 0.1 Highest Monthly Issues from the Port of Boulogne to the BEF, 1914-1918 
Source: WO 107/69 Work of the QMG’s branch, p. 30. 
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Furthermore, this section emphasizes that the mobilization scheme which ultimately despatched 
the BEF to the continent in August 1914 was not the consequence of a military diktat forced 
upon an unwilling Cabinet, but the outcome of a collegiate, collaborative process which took 
advantage of Britain’s latent expertise in moving men and goods over long distances, and was 
restricted by the nature of Britain’s diplomatic relations with her eventual allies, France and 
Belgium, alongside the logistical considerations attached to the transport of an armed force from 
the British isles. 
The second section of the thesis concentrates upon the first half of Britain’s war on the 
Western Front, a period of remarkable expansion from roughly 150,000 men in August 1914 to 
over one million prior to the opening of the Battle of the Somme. In this period of 
unprecedented human and material growth, the war diaries and reports created by the BEF are 
analysed in order to assess the validity of Lloyd George’s claim that the army was both 
incapable of reacting to the logistical challenges brought about by modern warfare among 
industrialized nations, and unwilling to seek assistance from those outside the military 
profession. It will demonstrate that the BEF did interact with civilian experts during this period, 
and addresses the factors both organizational and inter-Allied which influenced the varying 
degrees of success experienced by such men. Finally, the section concludes with a dissection of 
the logistical preparations for the Battle of the Somme, the BEF’s first attempt at a major 
offensive on the Western Front and the catalyst behind the despatch of Sir Eric Geddes to 
France in late August 1916. 
The third and final section addresses three key questions relating to the transportation 
mission led by Geddes in 1916 and its aftermath. Firstly, why was it Sir Eric Geddes that Lloyd 
George chose for the job in the first instance? Secondly, to what extent did the transport mission, 
and the directorates established as a result of Geddes’ findings, suffer from the intransigence 
and self-preservation of the soldiers which Lloyd George promoted so vociferously in his post-
war writing? And finally, how did the BEF’s logistical operations actually benefit from the 
influx of civilians and the business methods of Britain’s transport industry in the final two years 
of the conflict? Evaluating the records and reports produced by the BEF both during and 
14 
 
immediately after the war, this section will examine why, despite the colossal demands of the 
Materialschlacht, the British would not again experience a transportation ‘crisis’ on the scale of 
that encountered during the latter half of 1916.
57
 
Reliable logistics were the bedrock upon which the BEF fought the ‘rich man’s war’ 
from the Battle of Arras onwards,
58
 consuming ammunition in prodigious quantities, and the 
conduit for allowing the Franco-British coalition to make effective use of their resource 
advantage over the Central Powers as the war continued.
59
 The efficient, dependable 
exploitation of the transport networks of France and Belgium was therefore fundamental to the 
supply and sustenance of the armies which gradually overthrew the German forces opposing 
them. In a conflict on such a global scale, and of unprecedented intensity and complexity, these 
networks could not be operated by purely military means. This thesis will seek to relocate 
discussions on civil-military relations away from the prevalent, narrowly-focused perspective 
founded on the vituperative, personalized arguments of Britain’s highest ranking soldiers and 
statesmen. Instead, it will place them within a more holistic consideration of Britain’s role 
within an international coalition on the Western Front. It was a contribution dependent upon 
effective organizations, systems, planning and management;
60
 each built upon elements familiar 
to the industrialists and businessmen of the period. Diagrams, graphs, and formulae were key 
components of eventual battlefield success.
61
 The First World War on the Western Front was a 
modern, industrial war, demanding the input and insight of all manner of expertise and technical 
skills. Whilst the introduction of emerging managerial and scientific techniques into the wartime 
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economy has been acknowledged in recent years,
62
 this thesis sheds new light on just a fraction 
of the myriad abilities and skills that were drawn into the service of the army over the course of 
the twentieth century’s first great conflagration. 
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Part 1: Preparing for Armageddon 
 
If there were no military plans made beforehand we should be unable to come to the 
assistance of France in time, however strongly public opinion in Britain might desire 
it.
1
 
Sir Edward Grey 
 
War is a matter of business, and the results of good organization and political foresight, 
coupled with professional capacity, will infallibly produce their effect and secure the 
victory.
2
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Edward May 
 
On 5 August 1914, the British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith, accompanied by 
prominent figures both political and military, chaired the first gathering of the War Council. The 
discussions focused upon the strategy to be pursued by Britain following the expiration of the 
ultimatum to Germany the previous night. The primary conclusion of that meeting, modified 
following further consultations the next day, was that troops of the BEF were to be sent as soon 
as possible to link up with French troops already mobilizing across the Channel.
3
 The eventual 
location of deployment, the size, and the character of this ‘continental commitment’, further 
debated between the Allies before Sir John French first led his troops into battle, was the 
outcome of a decade-long process of Franco-British, and even longer civil-military, preparation. 
The culmination of these developments was the despatch of the ‘best trained, best organized, 
and best equipped British Army that ever went forth to war’.4 
British military planning in the early twentieth century did not take place within a 
vacuum. Discussions over defence policies took place concurrent with a wide-ranging debate 
over the direction of national economic strategies and within the cut-and-thrust of domestic 
politics.
5
 The structure of the army that ‘went forth’ from Southampton in early August 1914 
was a direct result of politician-led reforms and military reorganizations in response to Britain’s 
last major war, in South Africa between 1899 and 1902. The most famous of the civilian 
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reforms, those of Lord Esher and Richard Haldane, have been the subject of intense scrutiny in 
the historiography of the pre-war British Army.
6
 Simultaneously, the reformation of the army in 
the wake of the embarrassments of South Africa into a professional, well-trained, efficient 
fighting force, has also garnered recent attention from historians.
7
 It was within the tactical and 
administrative environment engendered by these two processes, inextricably linked to the 
longstanding, fractious relationship between the state and the army,
8
 that Britain’s response to 
war in August 1914 would be mapped out. 
Unlike in France and Germany, instinctively wedded to ‘Plan XVII’ and the ‘Schlieffen 
Plan’ respectively, Britain was not committed to any ‘war by timetable’ in the opening days of a 
European war.
9
 The decision to go to war, and the nature of the contribution which followed, 
were reached by governmental resolve rather than the rigidity of railway schedules.
10
 That said, 
the scheme which would ultimately place the BEF on the Western Front incorporated in its 
logistical preparations the most thorough example of civil-military cooperation in British 
military history. Although the hierarchical structure of the Franco-British alliance itself was a 
‘work in progress’ when war broke out,11  the newly created Directorate of Military Operations 
[DMO] was able to complete a comprehensive mobilization scheme for the BEF prior to August 
1914. That this was the case was, in large part, thanks to the exertions and technical expertise of 
Britain’s transport industries. 
The evolution of modern, matériel-intensive, industrial warfare brought with it the 
establishment of an army requiring quantities of men, munitions, and equipment incomparable 
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in previous British military experience, all of which necessitated the provision of transport on 
both land and sea. For the most part airbrushed from the process of military preparation, the 
contribution of Britain’s largest transport companies to the development of a workable 
mobilization scheme emphasizes the critical role played by transportation in the opening phase 
of the First World War. Operating in a period during which the dominant military ideology of 
the time stressed the importance of a swift, potentially decisive battle,
12
 the BEF was mobilized, 
sent to the relevant coastal ports, and transferred to France in what appeared to be ‘a model of 
railway organization’. 13  The previous over-concentration upon the political and military 
dimensions of Britain’s entry into the war has overshadowed the pre-existence of a particularly 
fruitful tripartite relationship in Britain; between the government, the larger railway companies, 
and the British Army. It was the investigations, processes and procedures that these groups 
contributed to and collaborated upon which propelled the BEF to war in August 1914. 
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1.1: The ‘greatest single business concern in the country’: National 
efficiency and the political reorganization of the British Army, 1900-
1914 
On 23 January 1900, Lord Rosebery opened a new town hall and municipal office 
building in Chatham. As the local dignitaries gathered for lunch in the great hall, the former 
Prime Minister rose to speak on a matter ‘near to his heart’,14 the war in South Africa. The 
impact of the ongoing Boer War was felt far beyond the confines of the army which fought it. 
The embarrassments of Ladysmith and Nicholson’s Nek in late October 1899 had shocked and 
dismayed the British public; the confidence placed in the ability of the army to defeat the 
‘strange, grotesque’ civilian militia opposing it was severely dented.15 The ‘humiliation’ of 
Black Week in December 1899 exacerbated the sense of public despondency, fuelling fears of 
invasion and focusing attentions upon the wide disparity between Britain’s position among the 
Great Powers and her ability to ‘fight hard’ for that status.16 
To Rosebery, however, the ‘warning’ of the South African War was not merely to be 
heeded by the military. Lessons were required to be learned not just in imperial defence, but in 
education and the administration of public affairs as well.
17
 No longer could Britain afford to 
simply ‘muddle through’, there was a clear need for 
examining the condition of the defences of the Empire, and their administration by the 
public offices charged therewith, and... the need for conducting the business of the 
country, as administered by all the various Departments of State, upon ordinary 
business principles and methods.
18
 
 
Although Britain would eventually bring the war in South Africa to a successful conclusion, the 
memories of Colenso, Magersfontein and Stormberg fed into perceptions of an ongoing British 
‘decline’ that went beyond the battlefield to the heart of British society.19 The deficiencies in 
British civil-military management of the army were emphatically underlined by Black Week, 
                                                 
14
 ‘Lord Rosebery on the Lessons of the War’, The Times, 24 January 1900, p. 7. 
15
 Quotation from A. Conan Doyle, The Great Boer War (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1900), p. 124. 
16
 Searle, pp. 35–42. 
17
 A. White, Efficiency and Empire (London: Methuen & Co., 1901), p. vii. 
18
 Hamer, p. 180. 
19
 J. Tomlinson, ‘Thrice Denied: “Declinism” as a Recurrent Theme in British History in the Long 
Twentieth Century’, Twentieth Century British History, 20:2 (2009), 227–51 (p. 229); D. Steele, 
‘Salisbury and the Soldiers’, in The Boer War: Direction, Experience and Image, ed. by J. Gooch 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 3–20 (pp. 9, 16). 
20 
 
and contributed greatly to the clamour for an intensive parliamentary review of all aspects of the 
army’s performance in the conflict. Rosebery himself followed up his speech in Chatham by 
‘calling for a statement in Parliament as to the sufficiency of the military policy of the 
government’.20 
Rosebery’s comments summed up the mood of reform campaigners. The ‘patch up and 
botch up’ amendments which had characterized previous War Office reorganizations amidst the 
political priorities of the moment would no longer suffice; any administrative changes would 
need to be placed on a ‘scientific’, ‘methodical’ foundation.21 If Britain wished to remain a 
global power, the ‘tortoise of investigation, method and preparation’ had to replace the ‘hare 
which leaves everything to the inspiration and effort of the moment’. Following comprehensive 
investigations of her organizations, structures and working practices (a central pillar of the 
systematic management ideology beginning to gain a foothold in the United States),
22
 Rosebery 
believed that Britain would be in possession of an ‘Empire on a business footing’. Over the 
course of the next decade, a series of civilian-led committees would sequentially help first to 
shape the War Office into a more recognizably ‘business-like’ department, and then to overhaul 
the organization of the army itself. They would create the environment in which the British 
Army of the pre-war era was to be forged, and therefore played a vital role in ensuring that 
Britain possessed a military force capable of intervening in a continental conflict. 
 
The Dawkins committee and the Elgin commission: Establishing the causes of inefficiency 
The first of the ‘tortoises’ commissioned to investigate the conduct of the South African 
War was appointed in December 1900, a result of the intensifying political pressure on the 
government to act. Primarily interested in questions regarding procurement and financial 
controls within the army, and explicitly requested not to consider any ‘organic changes in the 
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constitution of the War Office’,23  the Dawkins committee did however raise a number of 
concerns over the constitution of the army’s head office. These issues would be expanded upon 
by Lord Esher in his wide-ranging commission after the war. Although referred to by Searle as 
‘a committee of business men’,24 and chaired by a member of Lord Rosebery’s Administrative 
Reform Association, the Dawkins committee was in fact a civil-military composite. Alongside 
the chairman, Clinton Dawkins,
25
 sat two military figures: the Commandant of the Staff College 
at Camberley, Herbert Miles; and the former secretary of the Colonial Defence Committee, Sir 
George Clarke.
26
 Four others made up the committee. Three were Members of Parliament: 
Ernest Beckett, a banker who was also a captain in the Yeomanry Cavalry; Sir Charles Welby, 
former Private Secretary to Lord Lansdowne at the War Office;
27
 and William Mather, chairman 
of the engineering firm Mather and Platt. Mather’s appointment ensured that the committee 
received the input of a man with considerable experience of utilizing scientific methods in 
industrial organizations, and a keen interest – as demonstrated by his campaigning to increase 
funding for, and access to, technical education – in the promotion of innovative working 
practices.
28
 The final member, George Gibb, General Manager of the North-Eastern Railway 
[NER], contributed a similar enthusiasm for modern business methods and, like Mather, had 
extensive knowledge of the latest management and administrative concepts being experimented 
with in the United States.
29
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Both Mather and Gibb were the heads of large business undertakings, the systems of 
which it was desired to replicate in the closest manner possible within the War Office.
30
 In May 
1901, even whilst the fighting continued in South Africa, the committee reported that: 
The general structure of the War Office organization has been built up piecemeal as the 
result of constant changes and compromises. Principles of administration and of 
business have been too frequently subordinated to temporary exigencies, or to personal 
and political considerations.
31
 
 
Alongside evidence from senior military and political figures with obvious links to the 
machinations of the department, the committee also obtained the views of those at the 
Admiralty with regard to the extant practices of the Royal Navy. Furthermore, and 
demonstrating the committee’s adherence to the terms of reference issued prior to the beginning 
of their investigations, ‘information was also obtained from railway companies, from important 
manufacturing companies, and from large cooperative societies with reference to their business 
procedure’.32 It was upon these foundations that the remodelled War Office would be shaped. 
Dawkins’ private shock ‘at the chaos he had uncovered and... the ineptitude of the War 
Office generals’ bears resemblance to Lloyd George’s attacks on the military administrators 
tasked with overseeing the prosecution of the First World War.
33
 The committee’s public 
conclusions, however, were a stark condemnation of the organization of the War Office as a 
whole, and were viewed as a clear victory for the Commander-in-Chief [C-in-C], Lord 
Wolesley, in his ongoing dispute with the government over the administration of the army.
34
 
Constant changes and compromises based on temporary, fluctuating priorities rather than upon 
established principles of sound administration had created an environment in which each 
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department lacked a thorough comprehension of its own duties.
35
 The result was confusion. A 
‘mass of unnecessary routine work’ created an overburdened staff reluctant to use their own 
initiative, and high officials unavoidably became engrossed in everyday tasks rather than 
devoting their time to matters of future policy and ‘questions of real importance’.36 Overall, 
several ‘well-defined principles of management’ were judged to be ‘conspicuously absent’ from 
the War Office, most notably: the division of work into well-defined sections; the definition of 
duties and responsibilities accompanied by the requisite delegation of powers; adequate 
machinery for coordinating the civil and military work of the office under the authority of the 
Secretary of State; and, fundamental to the developments of the next decade, ‘adequate 
provision for dealing with questions of policy and military preparation, unhampered by 
administrative routine work’.37 
Put simply, the British Army of the late nineteenth century lacked both the 
administrative foundations to promote efficiency and to encourage future planning, and a 
‘central coordinating authority under the Secretary of State’.38 The ‘poisonous’ relationship 
between the principal civilian and military figures at the head of the army, Lords Lansdowne 
and Wolesley respectively,
39
 merely exacerbated the disconnect between British defence policy 
and the information upon which that policy was founded both within the War Office and, by 
extension, throughout the Empire. As Hamer notes, the personal animosity of the two men 
meant that Lansdowne was first officially informed of documents outlining the military 
preparations of the Boers through the Colonial Office rather than the C-in-C. As a consequence 
of personal animosities, divorcing the civil and military elements of army administration, 
coupled with the War Office’s absorption in a routine of ‘directing local affairs’ rather than the 
‘consideration of questions of general policy’,40 there existed a deficiency of what Lisa Bud-
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Frierman has referred to as ‘information acumen’ at the highest level of authority.41 Data which 
had been collected had not been adequately disseminated and discussed by those responsible for 
the implementation of policies based on that information. The result was a ‘glaring weakness’ in 
Britain’s ability to plan for war in the years immediately preceding the South African War.42 
The simile chosen to indicate the committee’s recommendation for a coordinating 
authority to resolve this divide between knowledge and policy is indicative of the wider 
preoccupations of the period. A ‘Board of Directors’ was promoted as a forum in which 
intelligence could be discussed, and one in which ‘a clearly defined and rational division of 
business responsibility is maintained among the departments with close association and union 
for a common object’.43 Rather than increasing the profitability of a firm, that common object 
would be ensuring the establishment and constant revision of the defence policy of the British 
Empire. There was, according to Dawkins, ‘no reason to doubt that the methods adopted... for 
securing economy and efficiency [in a large business] could be effectively employed’ in the 
higher administration of the War Office.
44
 Of the civil and military ‘business groups’ identified 
by Dawkins, the extant War Office was full of overlapping jurisdictions; lacking in systematic 
coordination to separate administrative and executive functions; and, due to the C-in-C being 
‘overweighted with other duties more properly appertaining to him’, devoid of a coherent 
planning department to study ‘questions of Imperial and Colonial defence, the study of 
problems of military organization, intelligence, mobilization and the strategic use of railways’.45 
Although the Dawkins committee was primarily tasked with investigating issues related 
to procurement and financial controls, it is clear from the report of May 1901 that far more 
substantial changes in the organization of the War Office were deemed to be desirable. However, 
rather than build upon the recommendations made by Dawkins to create a framework for a new 
                                                 
41
 Although primarily interested in business organization, Bud-Frierman’s central conclusion is worthy of 
note, and will be returned to in part three: ‘Success or failure is often determined by the presence or 
absence of keen insight and skill in generating, handling and interpreting information’. See L. Bud-
Frierman, ‘Information Acumen’, in Information Acumen, ed. by Bud-Frierman, pp. 7–25 (p. 24). 
42
 Fergusson, p. 109. 
43
 Dawkins Committee, p. 21. 
44
 Dawkins Committee, p. 20. 
45
 Dawkins Committee, pp. 20-1. 
25 
 
War Office, the Royal Commission established in 1902 under the chairmanship of Lord Elgin 
declared that the object of its appointment was limited to the discovery of ‘inefficiency or 
defects in the administration of the army, where disclosed by the facts of the war in South 
Africa, and to indicate their causes wherever possible’. 46  Neither the ‘detail’ of the wider 
military management system nor an elaborate scheme for the reorganization of the army lay 
within the province of the commission. As a consequence, although it did uncover some of the 
deficiencies present in the War Office during the campaign, the ‘report of the Elgin 
commissioners was chiefly valuable as a military history of the war’.47 
It would be left to one member of the commission, Lord Esher, to return to the ideas 
first promulgated by Dawkins in 1901. In a widely publicized note appended to the Elgin report, 
Esher repeated the judgment that administration by ‘Board’ was ‘the only practical remedy’ for 
the organizational defects of the War Office.
48
 Such establishments had ‘been found to work 
successfully in every great commercial enterprise, in the Government of India, at the Admiralty, 
and – if the Cabinet may not inaptly be designated a Board – in the Government of the United 
Kingdom’. Littered throughout the note were the same themes as those raised by Dawkins three 
years earlier: decentralization of responsibility; the promotion of efficiency; the division of 
labour; and the separation of administrative and executive functions. All feature in the brief 
addendum.
49
 In his wider case for the installation of a Board to act as a directing force in army 
affairs, Esher was tapping into an argument, which had been sporadically raised prior to the 
South African War, most notably by the Hartington Commission of 1890.
50
 The difference, 
however, was that the war had now demonstrated beyond doubt the desperate need for change. 
The war in South Africa not only illuminated deficiencies in military training to be remedied by 
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the professional soldier,
51
 it highlighted the increasing importance of ensuring that the 
administrative machinery of the nation as a whole was made ready for the implications of 
modern war. In Lord Esher, the new Prime Minister Arthur Balfour had a man convinced he 
could ‘take the War Office administration right through, from top to bottom, and endeavour to 
make it a first-class business machine’.52 
 
Esher’s ‘triumvirate’ and the establishment of the General Staff 
The conclusion of hostilities in Pretoria in May 1902 created a military environment in 
which the reorganization of the War Office could be transformed from paper to practice. The 
replacement of Lord Salisbury by Balfour just over a month later added political will to the 
process. Balfour was more concerned with the problems of organization and strategic planning, 
and in the unique challenges of imperial defence, than his predecessor had been.
53
 These 
interests, acting in concert with the ‘incompetencies being uncovered by the Elgin 
commission’,54 helped bring about the creation of the Committee of Imperial Defence [CID] in 
December 1902. It was a body in which Balfour would take an active role prior to the fall of his 
government three years later.
55
 By providing, for the first time, an interdepartmental forum for 
the discussion of strategic questions, the CID was an attempt, ‘in the contemporary spirit of 
“national efficiency”, to apply a broader and more systematic approach to defence planning’,56 
in line with the path recommended by Dawkins. Its influence on the direction of strategic 
defence planning was, however, to be somewhat limited in the years prior to the First World 
War. Far more control over Britain’s eventual deployment in France would be vested in the 
hands of Esher’s other most significant recommendation, the creation of a General Staff. 
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The early history of the British General Staff has been the subject of comprehensive 
examination over the last forty years,
57
 therefore this study will concentrate largely upon the 
department within the General Staff with responsibility for military intelligence and, of 
particular interest to this thesis, ‘for the development of strategic plans for the defence of Britain 
and the Empire’;58 the DMO. Although Esher would explicitly stress that the General Staff 
established in Britain was not, as a result of the different conditions preponderant in military-
focused Germany and the predominantly naval power of Britain, to function in the same manner 
as ‘the Great General Staff at Berlin’,59 the DMO was to become the department of the British 
General Staff responsible for: the collection of information about the military capabilities of the 
British Empire; collating intelligence on Britain’s possible opponents in a future war; and 
preparing the mobilization schemes required to meet potential threats.
60
 The directorate, 
therefore, would be intrinsically linked with the tasks of ensuring that Britain’s political leaders 
knew the identity and strength of her most likely opponent in a future war, and that the army 
would be ready to respond to external threats effectively. 
Esher was attempting to infuse the War Office with a ‘planning department’ to match 
those of the largest corporations of the time,
61
 demonstrating an acknowledgement of the 
importance of thorough planning and coordination to an enterprise containing various specialists 
engaged on divided, but inter-related tasks.
62
 Yet in a foreshadowing of the fractious 
relationship between the ‘brass hats’ and their political leaders during the war, the 
implementation of the new organization did not proceed smoothly. The military figures to be 
replaced in the reformed War Office were, according to the future Field-Marshal and central 
figure in the post-war ‘soldiers versus statesmen’ battle, William Robertson, treated with 
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nothing more than ‘scant courtesy’ in the reshuffle. 63  Lord Roberts, the outgoing C-in-C, 
complained to the Secretary of State for War, H.O. Arnold-Forster, about the ‘disgraceful 
treatment’ being meted out to the soldiers by the ‘triumvirate’ of Esher and fellow committee 
members, Admiral Sir John Fisher and Sir George Clarke, having been informed by letter on a 
Sunday afternoon that he had been relieved of his duties.
64
 In a further example of the disastrous 
management of civil-military relations, the incumbent Director-General of Mobilization and 
Intelligence, Sir William Nicholson, was replaced without warning on 11 February 1904.
65
 
Despite being broadly sympathetic to Esher’s objectives, the future head of the DMO, Henry 
Wilson, encapsulated attitudes in the War Office at the time, describing the ‘triumvirate’ as 
‘carrying on like madmen’ and proceeding with the reorganization in a ‘bull-headed way’.66 The 
‘clean sweep’ of soldiers connected to the previous system of administration was insisted upon 
by Esher in order to promote ‘fresh minds’ and the smooth inauguration of modern principles, 
unimpeded by the prejudices of those ‘connected with existing methods’. 67  However, the 
absence of a serving officer on the Esher committee also fuelled a sense of imposition within 
the army.
68
  
It was not only the soldiers who felt disconnected from the new organization, however. 
In line with the other appointments decided upon by the ‘triumvirate’, Colonel James Grierson 
was selected and installed as the first Director of Military Operations without Arnold-Forster 
having been consulted.
69
 Not only did such actions lead to Arnold-Forster holding Esher partly 
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responsible for the failure of his own reforms whilst at the War Office;
70
 the fact that Esher’s 
reforms did not go before Parliament for debate also restricted the opportunity for Members to 
object to aspects of his far-reaching reorganization of army administration.
71
 As one 
commentator noted, as well as being insulated from the self-interests of deposed military figures, 
the ‘triumvirate also ‘stood outside the parliamentary chaos’ of party politics.72 Yet despite the 
rushing through of Esher’s reforms and the re-population of the War Office with ‘fresh minds’, 
a combination of Treasury interference, constitutional wrangling over demarcations of 
responsibility, and the continuation of politico-military clashes between the Army Council and 
the Secretary of State over Arnold-Forster’s own attempted reforms meant that the process of 
creating the General Staff was, much to Esher’s frustration, slow and incomplete by the time 
Balfour’s government fell in December 1905. 
The Esher committee had created a blueprint for the reorganization of the War Office 
and the establishment of a General Staff. In doing so, the ‘triumvirate’ had exercised ‘careless 
indifference’ towards those in the military profession who were to be replaced,73 and further 
entrenched the separation of the department from the authority of its political head, the 
Secretary of State for War.
74
 The net result was that the contractor charged with turning Esher’s 
blueprints into an organizational reality would need to both piece together the framework of the 
General Staff from the existing fragments built over the preceding years, and re-establish a 
working relationship between the Secretary of State and the army’s senior officers. In addition, 
the new Secretary would, like those operating in the years prior to the South African War, yet 
again face constraints imposed by the short-term priorities of an incoming government over the 
long-term considerations of Britain’s defence policy.   
The fall of Balfour meant that the creation of the General Staff as a working 
organization and the ‘brains of the army’ would either have to be taken on by the incoming 
Liberal government headed by Henry Campbell-Bannerman, or abandoned. The prospects for 
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the former appeared gloomy, particularly as the Liberals’ election manifesto had criticized 
Balfour’s ‘costly and confused experiments’ upon the army.75 The cost of maintaining the army 
had profoundly dissatisfied the public, and there was great support within the Liberal Party for a 
policy of reduced spending at the War Office.
76
 Within the Army Council itself there was a 
strong suspicion that a Liberal retrenchment would lead to a weakening of the army and the 
dissolution of the CID; feelings exacerbated both by Campbell-Bannerman’s public 
confirmation of a policy of social reforms at the expense of the military budget and by his 
historic objections to army reform.
77
 The man who would face the prospect of balancing his 
party’s demands for fiscal consolidation with the fulfilment of Esher’s vision for a British Army 
in the mould of a ‘first-class business machine’ was Richard Haldane. 
 
Haldane and the creation of the British Expeditionary Force 
Haldane was not the obvious choice to take over the War Office from Arnold-Forster. 
Yet, despite having entered the political arena through a university education in Philosophy and 
a career at the Bar, Haldane, although he claimed to have no preconceived ideas, had read 
widely on military theory and the foundations upon which the vast continental armies of Europe 
had been grounded.
78
 Upon entering the ‘kailyard’ Haldane immediately sought to abandon the 
‘piecemeal’, political expediency-dominated reforms which had dogged military administration 
in the late nineteenth century, and replace them with a holistic consideration of the most 
efficient organization of the British Army as a whole.
79
 Unlike Esher, however, Haldane would 
not establish his vision of an economic, but effective, fighting force over the heads of the 
soldiers, but with their input and support.
80
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Although Haldane would later claim that the BEF was formed as a direct response to 
the strategic problem of how best to aid France militarily in the event of war with Germany,
81
 it 
was the rather more prosaic influence of financial concerns and domestic pressures for frugality 
which acted as the principal driver of Haldane’s reforms.82 Charged with responsibility for 
reducing the Army Estimates, Haldane adopted the language of efficiency as the basis for his 
alterations. To ensure the removal of ‘waste’, redundant formations with no conceivable role to 
play in a likely engagement were ‘lopped off’,83  whilst those which remained were to be 
equipped strictly on the principle of organization for war. With the CID having judged in 1903 
that an invasion of Britain was unlikely to achieve success,
84
 and in acknowledgement of the 
global responsibilities attached to the security of a vast empire, Haldane concluded that the 
rationale of the army should be to prepare in peacetime a ‘highly organized and well equipped 
force’ which could be transported ‘with the least possible delay to any part of the world’.85 
Consequently, ‘superfluous London defences and... useless coastal guns’ could be removed; 
their funding redirected into upgrading the forces destined for service overseas.
86
 
Yet despite complaints over insufficient funding having been a constant theme of army 
grievances throughout the nineteenth century, the rapid increase in military expenditure during 
the 1890s and into the South African War itself ensured that not all failures linked to the 
conduct of that campaign could be attributed to a lack of financial support from the Treasury.
87
 
Responsibility for the manner in which those funds were spent, however, lay with civilian 
administrators rather than the military; officers were not held accountable for the character of 
their spending. Rather, civilian scrutinizers obsessed over the ‘smallest details’ and the 
‘authority of spending’ instead of focusing upon the efficiency with which the allocated funds 
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were being used.
88
 As had been emphasized by the Esher committee,
89
 and repeated by 
Haldane’s Military Secretary upon Haldane’s arrival at the War Office, the blame for wasteful 
military expenditure lay with the ‘civilians [who had] complete control of all matters dealing 
with finance and accounting’, which allowed the soldiers to absolve themselves from 
deficiencies in the army’s preparedness for war.90 
The ‘scientific expediency’, by which the reform of the army was carried out through a 
process of ‘rational calculation’,91 was the product not of an extension of civilian administration 
but of the reverse. The fiscal responsibility for the management of army expenditure was 
devolved upon those most keenly placed to exercise it, the army itself. Haldane’s reforms 
involved the administrative branches of the army taking on the form of several large businesses, 
all under the supervision of their own dedicated manager. Each officer was personally 
responsible for ensuring the economic working of their department and answerable to the 
Secretary of State. They would also be expected to carry out their duties with the same regard 
for fiscal economy as any civilian businessman.
92
 By increasing the role of the military within 
the army’s financial decision-making process, Haldane encouraged each department to take 
more care over its internal spending and reduced the amount of expenditure on ‘unnecessary’ 
items. 
The pursuit of economy through reductions and the removal of ‘waste’ was not all 
Haldane attempted to bring to the War Office, however. As he noted in an early speech, the 
promotion of military efficiency was a fundamental aspect of the Secretary of State’s 
responsibility.
93
 Providing a cost-effective army meant concentrating on both cost and 
effectiveness. The manner in which Haldane sought to achieve this goal involved the 
dissemination of ‘business principles’ throughout the army. In this sense, his actions yet again 
                                                 
88
 W. Funnell, ‘Social Reform, Military Accounting and the Pursuit of Economy during the Liberal 
Apotheosis, 1906–1912’, Accounting History Review, 21:1 (2011), 69–93 (pp. 80–5). 
89
 Esher Committee, Part II, pp. 15-20. 
90
 Funnell, ‘Social Reform’, pp. 81–2; H.A. Young, ‘Practical Economy in the Army’, RUSI. Journal, 
50:344 (1906), 1281–85 (p. 1281). 
91
 Funnell, ‘Social Reform’, p. 71. 
92
 Funnell, ‘Social Reform’, p. 79. 
93
 Spiers, pp. 48–9. 
33 
 
reflected the concept of national efficiency as expounded by Lord Rosebery at the height of the 
South African War. 
Although the range and nature of Britain’s potential enemies lay in stark contrast to the 
singular concern of Franco-Russian encirclement which dominated German strategic thinking, it 
was to Germany that Haldane looked, as he had already in terms of educational and industrial 
efficiency,
94
 for inspiration and guidance in the creation of the new, more efficient army. The 
success of Bismarck’s ‘efficient army, organized and modelled on scientific principles’, 
demonstrated to Haldane that modern warfare required qualities above and beyond the 
‘traditional’ values of individual heroism and military genius; industrial armies demanded 
technical knowledge and scientific, methodical organization, business skills suited to the 
‘manipulation of material resources’ in order to unleash the absolute power of the forces under 
command.
95
 A trip to Berlin during his first year in office gave Haldane the chance to study the 
organization of the German General Staff in detail, and exposed him to an army he considered 
to be ‘as near perfection as possible, and at a cost proportionately much less than ours’.96 In 
particular, Haldane was struck by the degree of specialization in the German Army, where the 
General Staff took no part in the administration and supply of the forces, leaving the ‘army in 
the field free from the embarrassment of having to look after its transport and supplies’. 
It was a separation which Haldane, in accordance with Esher’s recommendations,97 
wished to implement within the British Army. Such a ‘divorce’ would allow the General Staff 
to concentrate on the requirements of preparing the army for war: increased training and 
education for all ranks; and an improvement to the collection, dissemination and utilization of 
intelligence reports necessary to ensure Britain’s strategic plans were based upon the most up-
                                                 
94
 R.B. Haldane, Education and Empire: Addresses on Certain Topics of the Day (London: John Murray, 
1902), pp. 1–38. 
95
 Funnell, ‘National Efficiency’, pp. 723–4. 
96
 Haldane’s own account of this trip is given in R.B. Haldane, Richard Burdon Haldane: An 
Autobiography (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1929), pp. 200–9. Unless otherwise stated, all quotes in 
this passage are taken from this source. Haldane’s admiration for the German Army was also expressed in 
the CID meeting of 23 August 1911, when he referred to it as ‘a perfect machine’. See TNA: CAB 2/2 
Action to be taken in the event of intervention in a European War, 23 August 1911, p. 7. 
97
 Esher Committee, Part II, pp. 22-3. 
34 
 
to-date information.
98
 Yet Haldane had further ambitions, and also envisaged a thorough 
reorganization of the administrative staff which would provide the logistical support to this 
reformed army.
99
 His goal was the creation of an administrative organization composed of 
highly skilled experts, ‘a thinking school of officers’ with a thorough knowledge of business 
methods – men ‘who desire to see the full efficiency which comes from the new 
organization’.100 
It was to be an organization based on the recognizable civilian business values of 
technical expertise, professional competence, and a commitment to economic and efficient 
working practices. Indeed, such was his commitment to the promotion of efficiency that one 
observer suggested that Haldane had invented the word.
101
 His longstanding advocacy of 
national efficiency, shared with colleagues across the political spectrum, had been demonstrated 
by Haldane’s becoming a founder member of a small and exclusive dining club founded by 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb in November 1902. The Co-Efficient Club provided an environment 
in which Haldane could immerse some of the ‘new school of officers’, those who had risen to 
prominence since South Africa, within the debate surrounding the ‘scientific problem’ which 
the reorganization of a modern army had generated.
102
 Prominent among them would be the 
future C-in-C of the BEF, Sir Douglas Haig.
103
 Despite the club not blossoming into the political 
entity its founders desired, some of the group’s members would play a considerable role in the 
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development of the British Army prior to August 1914.
104
 The work of Clinton Dawkins’ civil-
military committee towards the reorganization of the War Office along ‘business lines’ has been 
covered above, and the Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey’s decision to authorize closer 
relations between the French and British armies has generated a colossal literature.
105
 The 
contribution of the polymath, and co-founder of the London School of Economics [LSE] 
Halford Mackinder, however, has received comparatively little attention.
106
 
 
The ‘Mackindergarten’ 
By the time Haldane entered the War Office, Mackinder had become Director of the 
LSE and both the man and the institution would assist in bringing Haldane’s vision of an 
efficient, business-like administrative staff into being.
107
 Mackinder, like Haldane a man 
committed to educational reform, also shared the Secretary of State’s belief in the coincidental 
intent of both military and civilian ‘business’. In Mackinder’s view, ‘power’ replaced profit as 
the objective output of the army, and he suggested that the goal of military reform should be to 
create an army capable of producing 
the necessary amount of power [to achieve victory] at the least possible cost, and one of 
the main elements in a city business tending to produce profits is the saving of working 
expenses... It is obvious that if you are to spend and yet be economical, you must spend 
with knowledge, and in accordance with a policy, in other words your expenditure must 
be efficient.
108
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To achieve this, Mackinder would establish a special course of instruction for officers at the 
LSE,
109
 designed to teach a new generation of officers the skills required to operate ‘a vast 
business organization – a huge factory’.110 Those who passed through the course would become, 
it was hoped, officers proficient in the ‘business’ of soldiering.111 
 Focus upon the quality of military education in the years before the First World War has 
predominantly rested upon the graduates of the Staff College at Camberley, responsible for 
turning out the officers expected to become future leaders of the British Army.
112
 This is 
understandable, as Camberley was the establishment at which the BEF’s senior commanders 
acquired their military education. The ‘Course for the training of officers for the Higher 
Appointments in the Administrative Staff of the Army’ at the LSE had an equally important aim; 
to create a pool of officers for the administrative branches of the army with a thorough, modern 
understanding of the principles required to run what Mackinder termed the ‘greatest single 
business concern in the country’.113 In time, as the graduates of the course obtained promotions 
to senior positions within the supply and logistics departments of the army, Mackinder hoped 
that the course would develop a ‘tradition’ of its own, placing its graduates on a similar footing 
to those of Camberley.
114
 
The importance attached to the establishment of such a training course is evident in the 
speed with which it was created. The first cohort of thirty-one students was enrolled in January 
1907, just a year after Haldane took office.
115
 The course they studied aimed to disseminate the 
lessons learned in the ‘practical experience of recent campaigns, which had demonstrated the 
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need for specialized administrative officers whose training should include financial, commercial 
and legal qualifications’.116 The experimental nature of the programme was acknowledged in the 
first advisory report issued by Mackinder, with an understanding that modifications would take 
place in future years based on feedback from the students who were referred to as ‘collaborators 
in what... appeared to be a very difficult problem’ (that being the adequate coverage of a wide 
range of subjects within the confines of military requirements).
117
 The syllabus provided 
instruction in topics such as accounting and business methods, economic theory and geography, 
statistics, and ‘carriage by sea and land’, each taught by prominent academics or men with 
significant practical experience. 
Staff who contributed to the delivery of modules prior to the war included: the 
statistician Arthur Bowley; the University of Birmingham’s former Professor of Accounting, 
Lawrence Dicksee (who provided a colossal sixty lectures in the first year of the course);
118
 
Douglas Owen, of the Alliance Marine Assurance Company; and the railway expert Wilfred 
Tetley-Stephenson, former employee of the NER.
119
 However, despite the lack of military 
figures on the teaching staff, the course was by no means removed from army supervision. Nor 
was it subject to the supposed prejudices of military ‘insularity’. In fact, an advisory board 
consisting of both civilian and military figures oversaw the first year’s teaching and concluded 
that:
120
 
We desire to say that we are convinced that the results which have been achieved by 
this first class fully warrant the continuance of this experiment. The experience which 
has now been gained does not make it necessary to reorganize the scheme in any 
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essential respects, but some minor changes and modifications in the original syllabus 
will be made.
121
 
 
These modifications included the replacement of portions on banking statistics, public 
administration and Geography, perceived as being of ‘less immediate practical bearing’, with 
lectures on ‘business organization’.122 The regular syllabus was also enhanced with lectures 
from specially-invited business leaders, referred to as ‘practical men’. Emphasizing the 
interaction of civil and military prior to the war, and demolishing the idea of an insular army, 
distrustful of outside influence, the students also participated in ‘observation visits’ to railway 
workshops and dockyards, and were actively encouraged to discuss matters with the academic 
staff and other officers to ensure that the course taught material would continue to be of ‘direct 
utility’ to the forces.123 By 1909 this symbiotic process had created a syllabus adjudged by the 
advisory board to be of such value to the army that they would ‘strongly recommend that the 
course be made a permanent annual institution, in order gradually to create a body of officers 
well fitted to undertake the varied administrative duties that may fall upon them’.124 The only 
significant change to the syllabus after 1909 was to increase the importance of business 
organization, a module which ‘emphasized the importance of process and the elimination of 
waste’ and, following its publication in 1911, included the study of Frederick Winslow Taylor’s 
Principles of Scientific Management.
125
  
The ‘Mackindergarten’ created a forum for the exchange of business knowledge which 
would otherwise have been absent in the professional training offered to soldiers destined for 
the administrative branches of the army. This was particularly important due to the character of 
                                                 
121
 Mackinder Report 1907, p. 6. 
122
 Army. Report of the Advisory Board, London School of Economics, on the Fourth Course at the 
London School of Economics, October 1909, to March 1910, for the Training of Officers for the Higher 
Appointments on the Administrative Staff of the Army and for the Charge of Departmental Services 
(hereafter Mackinder Report 1910), Cd. 5213, 1910, IX.227, p. 3. 
123
 Grant, p. 105; Sloan, pp. 334–5. 
124
 Report of the Advisory Board, London School of Economics, on the Third Course at the London 
School of Economics, October, 1908, to March, 1909, for the Training of Officers for the Higher 
Appointments on the Administrative Staff of the Army and for the Charge of Departmental Services, Cd. 
4610, 1909, X.355, p. 3. Haig, as Director of Staff Duties at the War Office, was among the soldiers on 
the advisory board in 1908 and 1909. 
125
 Grant, p. 106; F.W. Taylor, The Principles of Scientific Management (New York: Harper & Brothers, 
1911). 
39 
 
the British officer corps. Without compulsion, the British Army was entirely reliant upon 
voluntary enlistment to provide suitable men for the scientifically organized force Haldane 
wished to establish. The LSE course was an attempt to infuse largely junior officers with 
business methods and mentalities mostly absent from the typical upbringings of such men, as a 
result of the army’s continuing reliance for officer material upon the landed classes ‘for whom 
the bourgeois ethic of business was anathema’.126 It is important, however, not to overstate the 
effect that the ‘Mackindergarten’ would have on the efficiency of the BEF’s supply organization 
during the First World War.  
Over the period 1907-1914, only 243 officers would successfully pass the course (see 
Table 1.1), entitling them to the suffix ‘e’ in the Army List and a certificate from the LSE.127 In 
light of the vast quantity of men who would occupy administrative posts during the conflict, 
such a tiny number having passed the course necessarily meant that only a minute proportion of 
the BEF’s supply needs were handled by men with an ‘e’ after their names. Furthermore, such 
officers were destined for roles which demanded proficiency in the execution of largely routine, 
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Course Dates run No. of officers 
1 January – June 1907 31 
2 October 1907 – March 1908 30 
3 October 1908 – March 1909 31 
4 October 1909 – March 1910 29 
5 October 1910 – March 1911 31 
6 October 1911 – March 1912 30 
7 October 1912 – March 1913 29 
8 October 1913 – March 1914 32 
Total 243* 
* Number of officers from each rank upon completion of the course: 12 lieutenants; 162 
captains; 64 majors; 4 lieutenant-colonels; 1 colonel. 
Table 1.1 Number of officers to successfully pass the administrative training course at the LSE, 
1907-1914 
Source: Mackinder Reports 1907-1914. 
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‘everyday’ tasks, rather than the planning of the complex network of inter-connected systems 
which would maintain the army. The graduates of the LSE maintained the blood flow around 
the body of the BEF, in ‘junior management’ positions such as that of Major C.D.R. Watts, who 
crossed to France as commander of No. 1 Company, Army Ordnance Depot; by 1914 none were 
in a position of adequate seniority to ensure that the force possessed adequate arteries to direct 
that blood to the BEF’s vital organs. The promotion of Colonel E.E. Carter to the role of 
Director of Supplies at GHQ in 1915 represented the only instance of an LSE ‘graduate’ 
attaining a position of relative seniority in the BEF’s administrative hierarchy.128 
Although cut short by the outbreak of war in August 1914, the establishment of the 
administrative class at the LSE illustrated the blossoming professional relationship between 
army and industry in pre-war Britain. Taught entirely by specialists from outside the military, 
the ‘Mackindergarten’ inculcated a new group of army officers with the theoretical grounding 
required to operate a modern, industrial army.  It was a process overseen and approved by some 
of the most senior military authorities in the country, and a useful supplement to the 
professional education provided at Camberley. The development of the LSE course between 
1907 and 1914, much like the wider Haldane reforms, demonstrates that the British Army was 
not resistant to the influence of external agents on the organizational structure of the force, 
provided those actors operated in a spirit of collegiality rather than imposition.
129
 Beyond the 
classroom, this same attitude would exist throughout the pre-war period. As a result, technical 
experts were also to have a significant impact over the army’s practical preparations. Whilst the 
mixture of politicians and military figures has been widely acknowledged as providing the 
catalyst for the reorganization of that army prior to the First World War, the process under 
which it would be brought into action has received far less balanced coverage. 
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1.2: Readying the rapier: Producing the mobilization scheme of the 
British Expeditionary Force 
In 1912 a contributor to the staff magazine of the NER, reflecting the ‘invasion 
literature’ of the time, mused upon the potential trauma that would result on the railway in the 
event of a German incursion on the Yorkshire coast: 
What an enormous strain would be thrown upon the NER and its officials! All ordinary 
traffic within the effected (sic) area would, for the time being, be suspended, and all 
resources taxed to the utmost... Supplies and all the necessary accoutrements, 
inseparable from an army on active service, would be rushed through in the wake of the 
troops. The railway line would have to be guarded throughout, together with all the 
bridges and tunnels – a most essential thing in time of war!130 
 
In order to meet such a challenge, the author acknowledged, it would be necessary to plan in 
advance the myriad details and orders required to ensure that the fluidity of the network was not 
compromised by the sudden onslaught of impromptu traffic. ‘It is probably safe to assume’, he 
concluded, ‘that the NER management have in their possession a secret timetable which could 
be put into operation at short notice in the event of mobilization’.131 This assumption, as would 
be proven two years later, was not substantially inaccurate. 
Aside from a laudatory statement from Kitchener following the deployment of the 
BEF,
132
 the contribution of ‘civilians’ to the mobilization process was largely glossed over by 
contemporaneous military figures. Lord Roberts, Henry Wilson’s friend and mentor, recognized 
the latter’s importance as early as 7 August 1914, writing of Britain’s ‘indebtedness to you for 
all you have done as the head of the Military Operations section at the War Office’.133 Percy 
Radcliffe, speaking shortly after the war, would claim that ‘it was only the ardent spirit of Sir 
Henry Wilson, his tireless energy, wide vision and dauntless perseverance’ that turned 
hypothetical projections into the practical arrangements of August 1914.
134
 Lloyd George’s 
memoirs, perhaps as a result of his own ignorance of many of the highly confidential plans, 
made little reference to the mobilization arrangements of the BEF in 1914. Consequently, the 
preparations for the movement of the BEF have been treated as almost being Wilson’s personal 
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possession. John Bourne, exemplifying the historical approach to the ‘With France’ scheme, 
referred to it as Wilson’s ‘administrative Rolls-Royce’.135 
Such one-sided accounts of the creation of Britain’s mobilization scheme insinuate that 
Britain’s actions on the outbreak of war were a military-led response to the ‘unaccountable 
disbelief of the authorities’ which had retarded a nationwide system of preparation for war.136 
However, the successful development and implementation of the ‘W.F.’ scheme was not the 
result of one man’s efforts, nor was it a spontaneous reaction to French and Belgian requests for 
aid; it was a thoroughly prepared example of civil-military cooperation, and absolutely 
dependent upon the input of Britain’s transport industries. The NER, along with the other major 
railway companies in Britain, played a critical role in the mobilization of the BEF. These 
companies were part of a longstanding, tripartite working relationship with the state and the 
military during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was this relationship, further 
ignored by Lloyd George in his post-war criticisms of Britain’s readiness for war,137 which 
ensured that the ‘passage of the Expeditionary Force to France went remarkably smoothly’.138 
 
A close relationship – the pre-war British Army and the railways 
A link between the military, the government and the railways in Britain was established 
as early as 15 September 1830 at the opening of the Liverpool and Manchester Railway. Among 
the dignitaries in attendance were the hero of Waterloo, the Duke of Wellington, and the 
Member of Parliament for Liverpool, William Huskisson. It was an inauspicious start. 
Huskisson was fatally injured by a locomotive whilst the duke was pelted with vegetables by a 
hostile crowd. However, the link was established, and with the spread of the railways over the 
next decade it was solidified by the Railway Regulation Act of 1840. Incorporated within the 
act, which was further enhanced in 1844, was the establishment of a Railway Inspectorate to 
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approve new lines and certify passenger transport on behalf of the government.
139
 To combat 
accusations of conflicted interests, employees of the railway companies were initially banned 
from holding positions as inspectors, therefore appointments were made from the technical 
branch of the British Army; the Royal Engineers.
140
 Between 1840 and the outbreak of the First 
World War, every Chief Inspector of Railways in Britain would be drawn from its ranks. 
Although relations between the inspectors and ‘practical men’ were not always 
smooth,
141
 by 1860 the relationship between the army and the railways was sufficiently robust to 
allow for a proposal to further increase working contact between the two. Against a backdrop of 
deteriorating Anglo-French relations the Honorary Secretary of the Institute of Civil Engineers 
[ICE], Charles Manby, suggested the formation of a voluntary body of engineers and railway 
officials to discuss the necessary arrangements for the transport of troops and stores in the event 
of a French invasion.
142
 Alongside civil engineers, Manby proposed that ‘the general managers 
of leading lines of railway and the principal railway contractors’ should also contribute their 
expertise to the War Office to ensure the efficient operation of the railways to meet a foreign 
threat.
143
 In a reversal of the ‘Lloyd-Georgian’ narrative, the War Office welcomed Manby’s 
proposal only for the idea to be shelved as ‘the railway companies could not be brought to 
understand the necessity for, or the advantages of, the proposed system and several members of 
the Council of the Institution [of Civil Engineers] offered tacit opposition or gave unwilling 
consent to join’.144 
Through Manby’s persistence, however, on 4 January 1865 the Engineer and Railway 
Staff Corps [ERSC] was brought into being, comprising of twelve civil engineers and nine 
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general managers.
145
 All members provided technical expertise to the military on an ad hoc 
basis and received no salary (as continues to be the case today).
146
 The new corps was pressed 
into action almost immediately, being presented with a detailed exercise involving the 
production of railway movements for 280,000 men from locations all over Britain to 
concentration points in southern England. Demonstrating the already thoroughly developed 
recognition of the critical importance of the railway network in industrializing mid-Victorian 
Britain, the timetables were to be arranged ‘with the utmost rapidity and certainty and special 
consideration was to be given to maintaining the supply of food for the population of London 
and other large towns which were wholly dependent on the railways for their daily supply’.147 
Such were the complexities of railway operation involved in this novel exercise that the work 
was delegated to nine geographically demarcated sub-committees consisting of the general 
managers of the principal lines in each area alongside their contemporaries from smaller firms. 
Within a year, the ERSC provided an answer to the exercise which comprised a 
schedule for the movement of 962 trains over a period of just eighty hours, the printing of which 
took up 311 octavo pages.
148
 It would be followed over the next twenty years by a further four 
exercises, each requiring the transportation of varying numbers of troops to different locations, 
but retaining the basic theme that the ERSC was to consider preparations for a hostile invasion 
of Britain, rather than the concentration of troops for offensive action overseas. The periods of 
gestation between the setting of exercises and the submission of answers increased over the 
course of the years, a consequence of the continuing growth and evolving intricacy of the 
railways. Meanwhile the number of men with commissions in the ERSC also ballooned. By 
November 1907, the official establishment of the corps had swollen to 110, and had expanded to 
include railway engineers, civil contractors and the managers of Britain’s commercial docks in 
addition to the holders of the originally attached occupations. In practice, however, rarely more 
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than half the available commissions were occupied, and the ERSC was reduced to an 
establishment of sixty as part of the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act introduced by Haldane 
in August 1907.
149
 
By this point, the ERSC had largely diminished in importance, and by the 1910s the 
corps existed on paper rather than as a vibrant civil-military exchange. The reduced threat of 
invasion, officially acknowledged by the CID under Balfour in 1903, ultimately tempered the 
primary reason for the corps’ existence. As the General Manager of the Great Central, Sam Fay 
(commissioned to the ERSC in 1902) would remark, by the time war was declared in August 
1914 the only function for which the ERSC met was an annual dinner at the War Office.
150
 Yet 
the guest list at the dinner of 1913 emphasizes both the perceived importance of the ERSC 
within the military, and the desire to retain the social link between the civilian experts and the 
army despite the reduced practical contribution of the corps in the preceding years. The military 
guests at the dinner included: Sir John French, the first commander of the BEF; Sir Charles 
Douglas, the CIGS in August 1914; Sir John Cowans, QMG at the War Office; Sir Horatio 
Yorke, the Chief Inspector of Railways; and Herbert Mance, a staff captain in the War Office 
who acted as a liaison between the army and the railway companies prior to August 1914, and 
would later go to France as military advisor to Geddes’ transportation mission in the summer of 
1916.
151
 However, despite the latent expertise of its members, the ERSC would not be mobilized 
during the war. Instead, a significant number of them would make contributions to the war 
effort (in both civilian and military capacities) as a result of the establishment of another civil-
military exchange, the Railway Executive Committee [REC].
152
 
If the ERSC had been established in anticipation of invasion during the 1860s, the REC 
owed its formation in large part to the ‘war clouds’ descending over Europe in the summer of 
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1911.
153
 The Agadir crisis, which took place against a backdrop of internal labour disputes 
which culminated in a railway strike in Britain, illustrated two things: firstly, the precarious 
nature of peace in Europe and the necessity for Britain to ensure that a cohesive strategy was in 
place should negotiations between France and Germany fail; and secondly, the vital role of the 
railway network in making the rapid concentration of British troops a possibility. There was not, 
however, any coordinating system in place to facilitate the harmonious operations of Britain’s 
hundred-plus railway companies under war conditions. Furthermore, the railways would not 
simply be called upon to transport men from their peace stations upon mobilization. In fact, they 
could theoretically be required to take on extra freight duties in addition to their daily workload, 
alongside ensuring that the navy was provided with coal at short notice,
154
 particularly if the 
naval situation brought about the closure of certain ports in Britain. For example, the quantity of 
coal brought into Greater London by rail in 1908 was around 8.1 million tons.
155
 The quantity 
arriving by water was just over eight million tons. Therefore, should the Thames estuary be 
closed to traffic during a war, Britain’s railways would be required to double the capacity 
available for the transport of coal, or London’s factories and homes would soon face the 
prospect of an energy crisis. 
The ship owner and former chairman of Lloyd’s, Sir Frederick Bolton, who had spent 
eighteen months examining the most suitable means by which Britain could safeguard the 
distribution of food and raw materials in wartime, doubted the ability of the railways to cope 
with the extra traffic should such a situation arise.
156
 As a result, a sub-committee of the CID 
was formed to ascertain, given the scenario that all ports from Hull in the north, past the Thames 
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and as far west along the south coast as Portsmouth, were closed to goods traffic, whether the 
railways of Britain would be able to ensure London received adequate supplies of food and raw 
materials.
157
 The question was handed over to the managers of some of Britain’s largest railway 
companies, those intrinsically linked with transport in and around the capital, or to and from the 
docks in question. Fay was part of the committee, and discussed the challenges involved in 
addressing the problem: 
We had to take into consideration the fact that the closing of ports on the eastern coast 
would greatly increase the demands on the Liverpool and Manchester Docks in dealing 
with foodstuffs normally supplied through Hull and Grimsby to the populous districts of 
the North-East of England. We calculated that the situation could be met by the terminal 
facilities of Southampton, Bristol, Liverpool, Birkenhead and Manchester, but pointed 
out that if large movements of troops and material took place concurrently with the 
demand for the conveyance of increased provisions to London [as would inevitably be 
the case were the BEF to be despatched to the continent], congestion would occur.
158
 
 
Although the fear of invasion had receded in the opening years of the twentieth century, the 
findings of the sub-committee demonstrated that the need for a coordinating organization to 
handle the specific technical requirements of a national railway network in times of war was 
stronger than ever. The final report stated unequivocally that ‘we have been impressed by the 
desirability of having some central body at which matters from time to time referred to railway 
companies by various government departments may be considered as a whole... We are 
accordingly of opinion that some permanent consultative body should be formed’, consisting of 
the managers involved in the creation of the report, and those of the other major railway 
companies in Britain.
159
 The result, which the British public would not be made aware of until 
the First World War was under way, was constituted in November 1912 as the REC. Its most 
significant contribution would be the production of the ‘secret timetable’ which guided the 
BEF’s mobilization in August 1914. 
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Henry Wilson and the development of the ‘With France’ scheme, 1910-1914 
In August 1910, Henry Wilson became head of the DMO at the War Office. This small 
and isolated directorate was responsible for planning the mobilization scheme to be employed 
by the BEF in the event of war. Over the previous six years, following the conclusion of the 
Entente Cordiale between France and Britain, successive directors had developed mobilization 
schemes within the narrow confines of the military; however, the creation of such proposals 
could not remain a solely military concern if a practicable plan was to be produced. Although 
Wilson’s predecessors, Sir James Grierson and Spencer Ewart, had gained government 
permission to establish and foster contact with the French General Staff, Wilson would later 
report that ‘they had not had time’ to investigate the challenge of how the BEF would be 
transported to France.
160
 This remark was inaccurate. In fact, Wilson’s predecessors had been 
explicitly forbidden from discussing mobilization plans outside of the War Office.
161
 This meant 
that, as Wilson acknowledged, ‘the old scheme’ in place upon his appointment as director ‘had 
not been worked out in sufficient detail to admit of its being carried out’.162 
Although understandable on grounds of diplomacy and national secrecy, the decision to 
detach the railway companies from the planning process severely restricted both the quantity 
and quality of work the DMO could achieve in relation to the mobilization scheme.
163
 Despite 
the critical importance of the efficient use of railways for facilitating the swift mobilization of 
the BEF, the army did not possess officers with the technical expertise required to ensure that 
the railways would be operated in the most effective manner on the outbreak of war. This lack 
of specialist knowledge fed into a perception within the railway industry that the army 
underestimated the capacity of the railways to handle the exceptional burden expected to be 
placed upon them at the outbreak of war.
164
 Such fears were not alleviated by the production of 
CID reports which expressed doubts as to the ‘ability of the railway companies to cope with the 
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extra strain that would be thrown upon them in time of war’.165 Such judgments were made in 
spite of the fact that the railways and the military enjoyed a close working relationship during 
peacetime. As Wilson’s papers from 1909 illustrate, he had discussed the hypothetical situation 
of mobilizing a division with traffic managers of the Great Eastern and South-Eastern and 
Chatham [SECR] railway companies in connection with a Staff Tour being planned at 
Camberley,
166
 whilst the annual army manoeuvres demanded the movement of large bodies of 
troops by rail each summer. In many cases these exercises were handled under ‘war conditions’, 
in which orders were not communicated until the last minute to simulate the stresses to be 
expected at the outset of an actual campaign. In 1910, the London and South-Western Railway 
[LSWR] was responsible for the movement of: 26,000 officers and men; 8,000 horses; 70 guns; 
and 1,200 transport vehicles, a task which necessitated the running of 137 special trains in the 
manoeuvre area.
167
 
Furthermore, due to the rising social status of railway managers in the early years of the 
twentieth century,
168
 amicable relations between the British Army’s officer class and the senior 
executives of British railways were not uncommon prior to the First World War. Deeper still 
was the professional bond between the railways and the political elite. With the interests of 
railway companies stretching for hundreds of miles along the entire length of their lines, men 
selected for directorships were frequently those possessing ‘positions of local power and 
authority through business, landownership or politics, sometimes all three’. 169 The railways 
were the most highly regulated industrial sector in Britain, therefore the cultivation of ‘close and 
enduring links’ with local and nationally influential political figures was an understandable and 
                                                 
165
 Mottistone Papers, Mottistone 11/6 Sub-committee, p. 3. 
166
 Wilson Papers, HHW 3/3/11 Appendix D – Movement of Troops by Rail, October 1909. The level of 
technical detail contained within this paper illustrates that Wilson was thoroughly conversant with the 
complexities of railway mobilization prior to his appointment as Director of Military Operations the 
following summer. 
167
 ‘Railways and Military Operations’, p. 174. The LNWR, Britain’s largest pre-war railway company, 
also recorded its work in relation to the army manoeuvres within the pages of the company magazine. See, 
for example, ‘Manoeuvres in East Anglia’, London and North-Western Railway Gazette, January 1912, 
pp. 6-9. 
168
 T.R. Gourvish, ‘A British Business Elite: The Chief Executive Managers of the Railway Industry, 
1850-1922’, The Business History Review, 47:3 (1973), 289–316. 
169
 G. Channon, Railways in Britain and the United States, 1830-1940: Studies in Economic and Business 
History (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), p. 167. 
50 
 
logical approach for the railways to take in order to maintain influence with the legislature. 
Between 1896 and 1915, the Commons and the Lords contributed over forty-four per cent of the 
Great Western Railway’s [GWR] directors, with a further twenty-two percent engaged in local 
politics.
170
 The Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, had been elected as a director of the NER 
in 1898 and acted as chairman of the board in 1905 until his return to government following the 
election of Campbell-Bannerman.
171
 In his memoirs Grey would recall the ‘exceedingly 
pleasant and congenial’ atmosphere in which the board discussed matters, professing that ‘the 
work was interesting’ and that his year spent as chairman had been ‘one of the happiest’ of his 
life.
172
 Despite his personal interest, however, Grey would act alongside Haldane to limit 
contact between the railway companies and the DMO until 23 January 1911. On this date 
Wilson successfully lobbied the Secretary of State for War to have the restrictive decree 
overturned,
173
 having elaborated his reasoning in a letter to the CIGS a fortnight previously: 
As far as I am a judge no tables drawn up in this office are of practical value until they 
have been submitted to and worked out in detail by the Railway Companies concerned, 
and I submit that we have ample material on which to approach the railway companies 
as a preliminary to a detailed timetable being drawn up… I am of course ready to 
discuss this question at any time, and to give any further information and assistance 
which it is in my power to give, but I hope no unnecessary delay may occur in having 
detailed timetables worked out by the W[ar] O[ffice] in conjunction with the railway 
companies, as until this has been done it is impossible to claim that our Expeditionary 
Force is ready to take the field.
174
 
 
Wilson was not the only figure making overtures to senior politicians at this time. Colonel Seely, 
in conjunction with the sub-committee formed as a result of Sir Frederick Bolton’s gloomy 
prognoses on the railways’ ability to cope with the stresses of war, wrote to the Prime Minister 
highlighting that the ‘specially valuable information’ only available from the principal railway 
companies would significantly increase ‘the number of persons cognizant of the objects of [the] 
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enquiry’.175 In accord with his Secretary of State for War, Asquith raised no objection to the 
involvement of the ‘General Managers of the principle (sic) railways’, but emphasized ‘that the 
conditions of secrecy which have hitherto prevailed should, so far as possible, be preserved’.176  
With permission to conduct conversations with the railway companies secured, Wilson 
set about the task of producing timetables for the despatch of the BEF, and the necessary 
accoutrements, to the ports earmarked for the embarkation of the force. The preparation of 
timetables was handled through a system of consultation between either the QMG’s department 
or the individual Home Commands and a selected railway company, depending on the nature of 
the intended move.
177
 The railways would receive from the military authorities a programme 
containing the details of each and every unit to be moved, such details including: what the unit 
would consist of in terms of men and equipment; from which station it would commence 
mobilization; the day after general mobilization on which the move was to begin; and the time 
at which it should arrive at the destination port. The railway companies then arranged all the 
technical aspects of the move: the provision of rolling stock; the times for passing stations and 
junctions en route; the working up of a complete timetable; and the necessary steps to ensure 
that locomotives and crews would be available and run to time whenever the need for them may 
arise.
178
 Wherever potential clashes arose, the matter would be referred back to the DMO, who 
would decide on priority.
179
 
As the port of Southampton, earmarked for the despatch of the main body of troops, 
was operated by the LSWR, that company would become intimately connected to the 
development of the ‘W.F.’ scheme over the next three years.180 Throughout the development of 
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the plan, the LSWR acted as the ‘secretary railway’, a designated point of contact for all 
correspondence regarding the scheme both for the War Office and the other railway companies 
involved.
181
 The desired time of arrival for each train at Southampton was delivered to a 
specialist staff working exclusively on the mobilization timetable for the LSWR, and from this 
projection the route for each individual train could be traced back to the point at which it would 
be required to enter the LSWR’s system. The company over whose lines the train would pass 
immediately prior to entering the LSWR network would then be notified of the time they were 
expected to hand the train over. From this information that company then plotted the journey 
further back, either to the station of departure or to the next ‘handover’ location on its route.182 
Once each journey had been traced back to the station of departure, the time of 
entrainment was entered into the unit’s individual mobilization scheme.183 However, as the war 
establishments of certain units were amended each year by the Army Council, the timetables 
demanded constant revision to take into account the possibility of extra rolling stock or 
specialist equipment being required. Such changes could also raise the prospect of the unit being 
sent to a different port of embarkation, or adjustment being made to the priority of its departure. 
Given the numerous factors involved, amending the timetable became a time-consuming 
process, both for the DMO and the larger railway companies.
184
 In December 1913, despite 
those involved in the process having obtained over two years’ experience by that point, it was 
found that amendments handed down from the Army Council took four months to be 
synthesized into the existing timetables.
185
 Adding to the difficulties, Wilson found that a lack 
of communication within the War Office itself frequently led to information which impacted 
upon the mobilization of the BEF not being relayed to the DMO.
186
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Yet the period which followed the Wilson-Haldane conversation of January 1911 was 
not simply characterized by hard work at the DMO and among the prominent railway 
companies. It was a time of increasing interdepartmental cooperation between those which 
existed ‘solely for the purpose of war’, and those whose primary responsibilities lay in the 
governance and administration of peacetime Britain.
187
 This cooperation was manifest in the 
creation of the War Book,
188
 a series of instructions to be followed by the appropriate 
government departments and industrial concerns upon the declaration of a precautionary period 
and subsequent order to mobilize. Created in 1912, and updated in 1913 and 1914, the book 
acted as a step-by-step guide for officials in areas as wide-ranging as the provision of policemen 
for the protection of vital railway junctions and the despatch of mobilization telegrams to 
soldiers. From 1913 onwards, the book was arranged in chapters by department, so that each 
could obtain the instructions relevant to their actions without having to concern themselves with 
orders only applicable to others. 
The Foreign Office, responsible for giving notice of the possibility of war to the other 
departments concerned, appeared first in the book. Next came the War Office and Admiralty, 
whose chief duties were the security of the nation and the mobilization of the army and navy 
respectively, followed by the Colonial and Indian Offices, in charge of Britain’s overseas 
territories. The Privy Council and Treasury, responsible for issuing the proclamation of war and 
the authorization of war measures followed, along with the Home Office and Local Government 
Board who were to oversee internal order and the relief of distress. The final chapters of the 
book dealt with the Board of Trade, through which the railway companies received their 
instructions; the Customs and Excise Board, with their duties in relation to supply and blockade; 
and the Post Office, responsible for the gargantuan task of delivering mobilization telegrams 
and disseminating official information.
189
 By crystallizing the commands in print, the War Book 
effectively acted as a standard operating procedure for the British Empire, ensuring that 
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regardless of turnover in personnel between the creation and the implementation of the 
instructions contained within, Britain’s response to the outbreak of war would be systematic, 
coherent and organized.
190
 In short, the War Book was the embodiment of Frederick Winslow 
Taylor’s maxim: ‘In the past, the man has been first; in the future the system must be first’.191 
Employees at the Board of Trade or the general managers of railway companies, people whose 
daily focus was upon their peacetime occupations rather than preparing for war, could simply 
consult the book in order to establish ‘best practice’ upon receiving the signal to mobilize.192 
Concurrent with the production of the War Book and the railway timetables, action also 
took place to address the challenge of transporting the BEF across the sea. On the British side of 
the Channel, the LSWR undertook significant railway construction to bring the total length of 
track within Southampton docks up to thirty-seven miles,
193
 whilst bespoke diagram boards 
charting the special facilities required by individual units were also set up to allow port 
authorities to keep visual track of the BEF’s complex demands.194 On the French side, four 
shipping experts were invited by Colonel Seely to investigate the problems to be tackled in 
landing the BEF upon the European mainland.
195
 Sir Thomas Royden and Sir Lionel Fletcher, 
together with officers from the naval and military staffs of both Britain and France, made a 
thorough reconnaissance of the Channel ports earmarked for the disembarkation of the BEF and 
devoted six months to the production of a comprehensive report on the BEF’s shipping 
requirements.
196
 The recommendations of the Royden-Fletcher report, handed over to the 
Admiralty in February 1913, were adopted as the foundation for the disembarkation instructions 
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issued to the troops the following year, and were built into the mobilization timetables created 
by the DMO.
197
 
Royden and Fletcher identified that the crane facilities at each of the ports earmarked to 
receive the BEF (Le Havre, Rouen, and Boulogne) were inadequate for the task of handling the 
volume of supplies required to make the BEF an effective fighting force. In order to prevent 
backlogs occurring, therefore, it was decided that the mechanical transport accompanying the 
force should be divided and sent to all three ports rather than, as in the case of Avonmouth in 
Britain, being concentrated on one facility.
198
 Such recommendations inevitably led to further 
revisions to the mobilization timetable in Britain. In light of the vast quantities of data being 
received, processed, and acted upon by the DMO in conjunction with the scheme, the number of 
officers dedicated purely to ‘W.F.’ duties rose during Wilson’s tenure as director.199 In order to 
keep track of the various activities and discussions taking place across the numerous 
departments involved, and with an eye to satisfying himself that existing deficiencies were in 
the process of being rectified, Wilson demanded regular service updates on the condition of the 
scheme.
200
 
The procurement of horses for the use of the BEF offers an example of the practice. The 
peacetime establishment of the BEF was approximately 19,000 horses. Upon mobilization, the 
BEF required 55,000 horses, the Territorial Force a further 86,000.
201
 Nine months after 
becoming Director of Military Operations, Wilson viewed the army to be ‘lamentably short of 
horses’.202 Four months later, in the middle of the Agadir crisis with the potential deployment of 
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the BEF perilously close to becoming a reality, Wilson would again bemoan the fact that, 
although he had asked for the information the previous October, the QMG’s department still had 
not furnished the DMO with the information as to ‘exactly when and where the horses required 
on mobilization will be handed over to the units’.203 Clearly, a system for the recruitment of 
animals was desperately required. Over the following two years an organization for the 
impressments of horses was developed, with regular updates on its progress being fed back to 
Wilson’s office. Once again, the level of civil-military cooperation involved undermines both 
Lloyd George’s post-war claims, and the image of a nation living in splendid isolation from the 
state evoked by A.J.P. Taylor.
204
 
Beginning in 1912 with the ‘Memorandum on Impressment’, a census of horses was 
compiled in each of the Home Commands, based on previously compiled police records which 
confirmed that enough suitable horses existed.
205
 The list was handed over to the War Office, 
where ‘purchaser’s lists’ for the entire country were drawn up.206 Upon the call for mobilization 
the lists would be handed over to ‘prominent local gentlemen of suitable knowledge and status’ 
for collection.
207
 Having received the animals, these civilian volunteers were to take the 
purchased horses to pre-determined collecting stations where the rolling stock to transport them 
to their concentration areas would be made available.
208
 Following initial misgivings and the 
need to train personnel in the duties required of them, by April 1914 the timetables had been 
printed for the movement of horses, and by August there were some fourteen hundred civilian 
purchasers on the War Office’s rolls.209 Furthermore, as a report submitted to Wilson on the 
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progress of the scheme in April 1913 confirmed, the ‘various horsebrows, slings and stores 
required by the home ports’ for the embarkation of the animals had been purchased.210 
These ‘board meetings’ represented Wilson’s ‘search for order and integration’ within 
the DMO,
211
 and afforded Wilson’s subordinates the opportunity to reflect on the progress of 
particular tasks with their director. They also provided the evidence which Wilson would use in 
regular letters to the CIGS on the development of the scheme, the tone of which doubtless added 
to contemporary attitudes regarding Wilson’s personal contribution to Britain’s mobilization. 
Between 1911 and 1914 Wilson relentlessly emphasized how ‘anxious’ he was to keep his 
superiors appraised of the condition of the BEF, this anxiety frequently being combined with a 
list of the existing deficiencies which rendered the BEF ‘unprepared for war’. At the end of 
1911, as European defence spending began to accelerate, particularly in Germany,
212
 Wilson 
wrote that: 
All the great powers and many of the smaller ones are straining every nerve to increase 
the numbers and the efficiency of their armies: we alone are doing nothing to increase 
our numbers and but little, and that slowly, to increase our efficiency.
213
 
 
And upon the appointment of a new CIGS in March 1912, Wilson would not miss the 
opportunity to place on record that ‘as we stand today, we cannot claim that the E[xpeditionary] 
F[orce] is either ready to take the field, or capable of keeping the field as a thoroughly efficient 
fighting machine’.214 
Yet through careful liaison with suitably qualified civilian experts and the cooperation 
of British industry, wedded to Wilson’s determination to complete the project and be capable of 
rendering support to the French upon the outbreak of war, by the summer of 1914 Seely was 
able to assert in Parliament that the BEF ‘was ready to go on expedition’, and that wherever it 
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went it would fight well.
215
 A complete set of timetables had been printed and issued to the 
relevant units detailing their peace station, place of mobilization and the location of their 
equipment, and a series of tables had been delivered to each Command indicating the day after 
general mobilization on which the units had to be ready to move.
216
 Each unit, or part thereof, 
was assigned to a train, whose projected time of arrival was recorded alongside their departure 
time from the mobilization camp. At the embarkation ports, troops or supplies were allocated to 
a cross-Channel transport and the serial number of the ship telegrammed to the destination port, 
ensuring that the French authorities were aware of the contents of each ship and could direct it 
to the most suitable berth for disembarkation.
217
 Finally, following an enforced rest period at 
base camps outside the French ports, the units would be arranged into trainloads on the French 
pattern and transported to the area of concentration.
218
 
As a French artillery officer noted in an article translated for the RUSI Journal, ‘the 
intervention on the Continent of the British Army is a diplomatic and military act too serious for 
its execution to be left to an eleventh hour inspiration’.219 The character of modern warfare 
among European powers demanded that the effective contribution of a British force would 
require detailed planning and thorough preparation. Thanks in large part to the efforts of the 
DMO, concealed from Parliament and even from a significant proportion of the army during the 
years prior to the First World War,
220
 Britain would enter that conflict on the basis of a coherent, 
comprehensively mapped out schedule. ‘W.F.’ was a scheme founded upon Britain’s status as 
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one of the world’s foremost industrial powers, possessing an abundance of technical specialists 
in myriad fields of business and commerce alongside a dense and robust logistics network. The 
mobilization of the BEF may have been a military manoeuvre more complex than anything 
previously attempted by a British force, but unlike the German Army’s ‘Schlieffen Plan’ it 
would not contain elements which were logistically ‘a gamble’.221 
Although one unnamed contributor to the sub-committee investigating the supply of 
food and raw materials to London would complain that it was a ‘damn nonsense wasting time 
over something that will never happen’,222 the existence of the ‘W.F.’ scheme in August 1914 is 
ample evidence that the majority of Britain’s transport experts did not share this opinion. In fact, 
in the case of Sir Guy Granet, General Manager of the Midland Railway, the developing links 
between the army and the railways created an almost militaristic suspicion of German intentions. 
Upon receipt of a request from the Saxony State Railways to send a surveyor and their goods 
manager to study the systems of train despatch and goods conveyance on the Midland in July 
1912, Granet immediately forwarded the request to Seely, adamant that ‘they are merely coming 
to spy’.223 Although the advice given to Granet is not recorded (he was asked to call upon Seely 
to discuss matters in person a week later),
224
 the fact that Seely thought enough of Granet’s 
letter to show it to the Foreign Secretary demonstrates the high regard in which the senior 
executives of the railway companies were held in both the government and the army.
225
 
Keith Jeffery has suggested that Wilson’s ‘larger than life’ persona may have made him 
appear more of a driving force behind the scheme than he actually was.
226
 Yet the scale of the 
work undertaken by the DMO under Wilson’s leadership in the four years from August 1910 is 
evidence enough to support the position that Wilson’s personal drive and energy in the role of 
‘project manager’ was a significant contributor to the completion of the BEF’s mobilization 
scheme. But this conclusion should not understate the significant investment of time and 
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resources provided to the army by the managers and employees of Britain’s largest transport 
concerns. For more than three years the general managers of Britain’s most prominent railway 
companies provided labour, ‘greatly in excess of what had previously been necessary’, to fulfil 
the requirements of the army.
227
 For Sir Lionel Fletcher, such was his desire to ensure the 
scheme met the high standards of efficiency that he demanded of the White Star Line, that he 
would continue to immerse himself in questions regarding the machinery of coordination 
between the Admiralty and War Office from the comfortable surroundings of the Junior Carlton 
Club long after the submission of the Royden-Fletcher report.
228
 For those at the ‘sharp end’, 
however, the sacrifice could be far more tragic. With the preservation of secrecy entailing that 
as few employees as possible within the railway companies were cognizant of the scheme, for 
one timetabling expert the ‘strenuous and exhausting toil’ involved in working out the details of 
the mobilization programme was directly linked to their early death.
229
 
Lloyd George’s rejoinder to ‘those who taunt the Liberal Government with being quite 
unprepared’ in August 1914 completely ignores this combination of civil and military agencies 
working in harmonious and productive cooperation over the final four years of peace.
230
 Instead, 
the War Memoirs focus upon the work of various political figures: Balfour; Asquith; Haldane; 
and Churchill chief among them, in readying the nation for war. Between this politically 
motivated oversight, and the military-driven concentration on the role of Wilson, the truly 
collaborative nature of Britain’s pre-war planning has been undervalued. William Philpott has 
even gone so far as to suggest that ‘the importance of Wilson’s timetables has been 
overemphasized’.231 This conclusion is based on a political rather than logistical reading of the 
situation Britain found herself in during the first week of August 1914, and ignores the transport 
implications linked to the movement of an industrial army, however ‘contemptible’ in size, 
without incident or delay. It was thanks to the technical expertise of a highly skilled industrial 
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society, working in conjunction with an efficiently administered professional army, that the 
BEF’s mobilization scheme was created. This civil-military collaboration would ensure that 
when the time came the BEF would be ready to mobilize quickly and efficiently. In August 
1914, however, under the pressures of coalition politics, the limits of civil-military strategic 
harmony constructed over the previous decade would come to the fore. At the centre of it all, 
yet again, was Henry Wilson. 
  
62 
 
1.3: From paper to practice: The deployment of the British 
Expeditionary Force 
On 2 August 1914, France’s former military attaché to Britain wrote to Wilson to advise 
him that French mobilization had been ordered, and that ‘great hopes are entertained in France 
concerning British assistance. Should you not join us, it would be a great disappointment 
here’.232 A committed Francophile from his youth,233 Wilson would have wished for nothing 
more than to see the BEF immediately mobilized and sent to the aid of the French. Indeed, since 
his appointment as Director of Military Operations Wilson had on a number of occasions 
stressed the importance of Britain’s swift mobilization in the event of war, claiming that ‘the 
early intervention of our six divisions would be more effective than the tardy presence of double 
their numbers’. Therefore, he concluded, ‘we must mobilize the same day as the French’.234 As 
Wilson was all too painfully aware, Britain’s commitment to entering a war on the continent 
would be governed by Cabinet decision rather than by the entreaties of her military chiefs. The 
character that Britain’s commitment would assume following that decision, however, was one in 
which the armies of both France and Britain, and the DMO in particular, would play a 
prominent role in shaping. In this too, logistical considerations loomed large. 
 
The Directorate of Military Operations and the development of the continental 
commitment 
The DMO’s investigation of Britain’s potential role in a European war began within 
months of the conclusion of the entente, and was instigated by the department’s first director, 
Major-General James Grierson. If any officer in the British Army possessed the ‘expert 
knowledge’ to pilot the directorate concerned with the study of foreign armies and the 
development of a British military response to war – something to which Esher’s ‘triumvirate’ 
attached ‘extreme importance’ – it was Grierson.235 A Glaswegian by birth, Grierson entered the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence having already ‘established a reputation... as a sound and 
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brilliant staff officer with a wide range of knowledge on military affairs’. 236  Grierson had 
accompanied the Austrian armies during the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, observed the 
Russian manoeuvres, served in Egypt and Sudan, and passed the Staff College at Camberley 
with honours in French and Russian. He had also published numerous articles in military 
journals alongside highly detailed analyses of the organizations of the Russian, Japanese and 
German armies.
237
 His knowledge of foreign armies was, according to Robertson, ‘unrivalled’, 
and doubtless enhanced by his good relations with officers on the German General Staff, 
fostered during his early military career.
238
 
These connections had made Grierson the obvious candidate to become military attaché 
in Berlin in 1896. However, the four years spent in Germany were to engender a complete 
reversal in Grierson’s feelings towards his hosts. Friendship turned to suspicion, fuelled by the 
‘atmosphere of intrigue, falsehood and malice’ prevalent in Berlin, and stoked by a German 
press perceived as being ‘violently anti-English’ in London.239 Reflecting upon the Kaiser’s 
expansionist policies, in 1898 Grierson would write, ‘we must go for the Germans... right soon 
or they will go for us later’.240 This sea change in attitude was confirmed in 1900-1901 when 
Grierson, acting as British liaison on the staff of Count von Waldersee during the Boxer 
uprising, sent home letters containing numerous remarks displaying contempt towards the 
German officers and their ‘jealousy’ of Great Britain. 241  Along with carrying the news of 
Nicholson’s removal from the post of Director of Military Intelligence in February 1904, 
Grierson entered the War Office with ‘little doubt that Germany would one day embroil Europe  
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in war’. 242  The signature of the Entente Cordiale, although primarily founded upon the 
‘demarcation’ of colonial interests in North Africa rather than upon the construction of a 
Franco-British power bloc in Europe,
243
 created the environment in which Grierson could 
develop plans to confront the German menace. Yet the changed diplomatic situation brought 
about by the signing of the entente did not immediately alter the strategic preparations of the 
General Staff. In late 1904, well after the Anglo-French agreement had been signed, 
‘amphibious operations against French colonies were still being perfected by the War Office’.244 
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Figure 1.1 Map of the Belgian railway network, 1914 
Source: M. Laffut, ‘Belgium’, in Railways and the Economic Development of Western Europe, 
1830-1914, ed. by P. O’Brien (London: Macmillan in association with St Antony’s College, 
1983), pp. 203–26, (p. 208). 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright 
reasons. 
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Early in 1905, however, the entente did provide the context for a war game played out 
within the DMO, predicated on the assumption that Germany had violated Belgian neutrality 
whilst engaged in a war with France.
245
 Despite Prussia being a guarantor of Belgian 
independence since the 1867 Treaty of London, the line of the Oise Valley, Meuse Valley and 
Cologne was the easiest route from Berlin to Paris, and would avoid a series of fortifications on 
the Franco-German frontier.
246
 Furthermore, since gaining independence in the 1830s, the 
Belgian railway network had been constructed with a firm eye on the maintenance of cross-
European trade (see Figure 1.1). The ‘cardinal points’ of the Belgian network were pointed 
towards the industrial powerhouses of Europe: Germany; France; and Britain.
247
 By 1906, nine 
trunk routes were in operation, linking Germany and France across Belgian territory as part of a 
wider rail, road, and waterborne communications network widely acknowledged to be among 
the best in Europe.
248
 The implications of such abundant cross-border integration for the rapid 
deployment of armed forces across frontiers and into neutral territory were obvious, and would 
prove a preoccupation for French, British, and Belgian defence experts throughout the pre-war 
period.
249
 
Despite the quality of the Belgian transport system, however, Grierson’s report 
suggested that the tactical advantages to be accrued by the Germans in an outflanking 
manoeuvre would be significantly offset by the difficulties likely to be experienced on Belgian 
soil. Even were the Belgian government to acquiesce in German requests to use the railway 
network, ‘careful calculations’ demonstrated that only 138 trains per day could be run through 
Belgium, as opposed to the 400-plus which could be operated on the German side of the border. 
The German Army would therefore be forced to dissipate its strength; both facing the French 
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across the common Franco-German border and in terms of the number of troops able to cross 
the Belgian frontier with adequate supplies. Any possibility of the Germans attempting to 
invade Belgium via a sea route was, as the Royal Navy would be involved, dismissed as being 
‘obviously impossible’.250 Following a detailed examination of the logistical challenges to be 
overcome, Grierson was ‘forced to the conclusion that a violation of Belgian territory is by no 
means a sound policy on the part of the Germans’.251 
Yet if there were logistical problems to be overcome by an invading army, then equally 
significant challenges arose in the path of any British force to be despatched to the continent. 
On the North Sea coast, Belgium was found to be ‘singularly wanting in harbours or places 
where the disembarkation of troops could be carried out’, with only the port of Ostend 
possessing adequate accommodation and facilities for the discharge of supplies into railway 
trucks alongside the quays.
252
 To reach Antwerp, the proposed concentration area for British 
troops, a long railway journey across northern Belgium would be necessary, with significant 
quantities of rolling stock required at Ostend to facilitate the movement. Any interruption to the 
operation of the line, either accidental or otherwise, would cause delays which might prove 
fatal.
253
 Furthermore, despite the highly-developed state of the Belgian railway network as a 
whole, the system was unsuited to the type of large-scale moves being projected. As the Belgian 
Army had no demand for long railway journeys upon mobilization, no machinery existed for the 
feeding of troops en route. Therefore any British soldiers would be compelled to carry a large 
number of days’ rations with them from Britain.254 
Logistically therefore, a concentration at Antwerp would best be achieved by 
despatching troops directly to the port of Antwerp. However, such a manoeuvre would 
unavoidably involve the traversal of a considerable stretch of the River Scheldt which belonged 
to the Netherlands. The Dutch government had ‘always displayed the greatest reserve’ on the 
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question of permitting foreign vessels to navigate the waterway on behalf of the Belgian 
Army.
255
 Although Wilson would later remark that ‘the waters of the Scheldt can be closed by a 
schoolboy’, when dismissing the value of Antwerp as a possible base of operations for the 
BEF,
256
 Grierson’s belief was that: ‘All things considered, if it is decided to send a considerable 
military force to the assistance of the Belgians, it would appear the best course to send it to 
Antwerp, via the Scheldt, and run any infinitesimal risk there may be of Dutch opposition’.257 
Logistical concerns, on this hypothetical occasion, outweighed the possible diplomatic 
repercussions of disregarding territorial neutrality in a way unmatched by the realities of the 
situation in August 1914. 
Political considerations did, however, inform Grierson’s observations on the utility of 
the British force disembarking in northern France. Although the ports of Calais, Boulogne, 
Dieppe and Havre were all made available to ‘facilitate disembarkation’, Grierson argued that 
this course of action would 
simply prolong the French front. Politically, such an indirect method of protecting 
Belgian territory might embarrass the British government. Belgium, therefore, appears 
to be the most advantageous theatre strategically, and the most expedient politically. 
Antwerp, once reached, is the best port of disembarkation, and base of operations.
258
 
 
Among those who read the report, that final remark would have a significant and long-lasting 
impact upon the man who would lead the BEF into battle, Sir John French.
259
 
Taking 2 March as the first day of mobilization, the war game concluded that it would 
take at least five days for troops to mobilize and begin embarkation. Assuming that the Royal 
Navy retained control of the seas and that the required transports were ready, it would be either 
8 or 9 March before any British soldiers reached Antwerp. The arrangement of units into 
formations, the provision of staffs and the ‘settlement of other multitudinous details’ led 
Grierson to conclude that it would be 12 March at the earliest before a British Army could take 
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to the field. Based on the relative strengths of the Belgian and German armies, the war game 
offered a dismal prognosis; the operations undertaken left the German Army in a ‘favourable 
position’ to continue its westward movement through Belgium, one which could not have been 
‘materially interfered with’ until a greater number of British troops arrived.260 
Such assumptions were also based on the most optimistic scenario. ‘In reality’, Grierson 
noted, ‘an Army Corps cannot be concentrated before 20 March, so... it will be three weeks 
before the Belgians can prudently calculate on British support’.261 That assistance would, in the 
first instance, consist of just 30,000 men. Admiralty plans, drawn up under the assumption that 
thirteen transports per day could be used to deliver men and up to 2,000 tons of supplies, 
predicted that 50,000 men could be available in the first month after mobilization. For a further 
50,000 troops to arrive, a further six weeks would be required.
262
 Compared to the colossal 
forces France and Germany were likely to put into the field at the outbreak of war, Britain’s 
contribution would be largely negligible until a significant force was available. 
If the South African War had illustrated weaknesses in the organization of the British 
Army, the war game highlighted the scale and complexity of the preparations required to 
mobilize a British force for war in Europe. The problems of the direction and size of the 
German offensive, the location and employment of the British force, the speed with which 
mobilization could be effected, and the question of Belgium’s capacity (and inclination) to 
defend itself; all would require prolonged study by the DMO in the development of a 
practicable solution to the mobilization challenge.
263
 The first Moroccan crisis, and the fall of 
the Balfour government, would combine to take these outstanding questions away from the 
confined environment of Grierson’s small directorate and its ‘theoretical musings’, and out into 
the wider discussions surrounding the military dimensions of the Entente Cordiale.
264
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The Moroccan crisis not only consolidated Grierson’s suspicions as to the most likely 
arena for future British intervention in a European war; it also drew attention to the type of army 
Britain would require in order to make a telling contribution to that war. The prevalent view in 
the War Office was that swift mobilization was fundamental to the successful deployment of an 
expeditionary force,
265
 to ensure that troops were available to fight immediately rather than 
being part of a larger force which might potentially arrive after the decisive engagement had 
taken place. In both France and Germany, the railway networks had been developed with 
military needs in mind (and indeed, with military voices prominent in expressing those needs) in 
order to increase the rapidity with which their forces could be concentrated upon the outbreak of 
war.
266
 If Britain were to be of assistance in the event of German aggression, it would be 
required to provide a fighting force far more quickly than the war game suggested was possible. 
Furthermore, as Haldane noted upon arrival at the War Office, there existed 
not... a single division that was a reality. Moreover, the brigades, such as they were, 
wholly lacked accessories without which they could not sustain the strains of war. Their 
transport was deficient and so were their medical organizations... Only forty-two 
batteries could be put into the field, a number which a proper General Staff would have 
pronounced to be ludicrously inadequate for the Expeditionary Force required.
267
 
 
Events in North Africa (as they would do again in 1911 with regard to the mobilization 
timetable) exacerbated the need to rectify the army’s state of preparation, with the lack of 
precautions in place should the Algeciras conference break down the subject of bitter complaint 
within the CID.
268
 
Determined to rectify matters, and to improve coordination between the army and navy, 
on 19 December 1905 an informal conference was held to discuss the options available to 
Britain in the event of a Franco-German war. Yet despite being the officer responsible for 
military planning, Grierson was not present. Nor were the conclusions of the war game raised 
despite Sir John’s attendance and awareness of the logistical difficulties uncovered by the game. 
As a result, the conference consisted of little more than the raising of various possibilities for 
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British action, and a conclusion that further detailed assessment of the practicalities was 
required. In addition to discussing inter-service arrangements for the embarkation of a ‘striking 
force’ for action overseas, the committee also recommended that: 
If our naval and military attachés could obtain any information as to the measures 
contemplated by the French in the event of an emergency, it would be a great advantage. 
Information as to the mobilization scheme of Belgium and the means available for the 
defence of the Meuse positions would also be favourable.
269
 
 
Unbeknown to those gathered at Whitehall Gardens, Grierson was already engaging in a process 
which would begin the evolution of the entente into the quasi-military alliance it would become 
by August 1914. 
Grierson met with the French military attaché, Colonel Huguet, before Christmas, and 
shortly after instructed Britain’s military attaché in Brussels, Lieutenant-Colonel Nathaniel 
Barnardiston, to ascertain ‘the manner in which, in case of need, British assistance could be 
most effectually afforded to Belgium for the defence of her neutrality’.270 The Chief of the 
Belgian General Staff, Major-General Ducarne, preferred the British to sail directly to Antwerp, 
allowing the force to join the Belgian Army at Brussels in a combined attack on the German 
flank. However, this option was discounted by Barnardiston as a result of the war game and, 
crucially, by the Admiralty’s insistence that it would not guarantee the safety of naval transports 
north of the Dover Straits until the German fleet had been destroyed.
271
 This meant that British 
troops would be required to disembark at the Channel ports in northern France before being 
railed to the Belgian frontier and concentrated within Belgium.
272
  
Between January and April 1906 both Grierson and Barnardiston worked on 
mobilization schemes with French and Belgian representatives, Grierson visiting the continent 
on several occasions to visit the likely ports of disembarkation for British troops.
273
 Yet their 
efforts to develop a workable scheme were hindered both by the reluctance of the Admiralty to 
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supply timetables for the transport of the BEF to France,
274
 and by the level of secrecy attached 
to the discussions. As Barnardiston noted, it was impossible for Ducarne to collate the necessary 
technical information without consulting relevant government departments, such as those 
responsible for operating the railways. However, such was the Belgian concern for preserving 
confidentiality, that only five people in Belgium had been made aware of the nature of the 
conversations taking place between the two General Staffs.
275
 Despite these difficulties, by the 
end of March 1906 Ducarne was able to produce a timetable for the transport of a British force 
from the French ports to detraining stations in the region of Brussels-Aerschot-Louvain.
276
 On 
the basis that each army corps would require 175 trains in order to be transported in full to the 
concentration zone, it was calculated that the entire force could not be in place near Louvain 
before the sixteenth day of mobilization.
277
 By the tenth day, adjudged by Grierson to be critical 
in terms of obstructing the German advance, the British Army in the field would consist of just 
two divisions and a cavalry brigade.
278
 As Grierson believed wholeheartedly in the importance 
of the entire force being available ‘at once’ in the event of war, two divisions was deemed to be 
totally inadequate. Such a force was liable to be simply ‘rounded up and defeated’ by superior 
German numbers.
279
 
The predicted failure of the Belgian scheme, allied to the possibility that Germany 
would not violate Belgian neutrality in the event of a war with France, led Grierson to a 
conclusion which would characterize the philosophy of the DMO until 1914. This ethos was 
accentuated by his successor, Major-General Spencer Ewart, in a 1908 memorandum: 
Direct support to the French Army offers a better prospect of a useful result. Our army 
is small, but its presence in the field side by side with the French troops would, it is 
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believed, infuse into the latter that moral confidence which they so suddenly and 
completely lost in 1870. For the same reason it is necessary that our aid should be 
forthcoming in the earliest stage of the war, for it is most important that the issue of the 
first serious engagements should be favourable to France. Prompt and direct assistance 
by the British Army may then mean all the difference between defeat and victory.
280
 
 
Ewart’s memorandum illustrates that by the end of November 1908, the idea of transporting the 
BEF directly to Belgium had been entirely discounted by the DMO, with the Belgians likely to 
be a ‘beaten or dispirited force’ following their initial encounters with the German Army.281 
However, as Philpott has demonstrated, the decision by the British General Staff to 
concentrate upon Franco-British arrangements in the period before the First World War was not 
merely based upon the logistical and diplomatic difficulties attached to a landing in Antwerp. 
Instead, ‘before 1914 a close and mutually beneficial relationship developed between the 
[French and British] armies, which was intended to prepare them for the war they might soon 
have to fight’.282 The DMO exemplified this relationship under Ewart’s tenure, frustrating all 
efforts from the Admiralty to propose alternative uses for the BEF in the event of a European 
war. Upon receiving requests to investigate the feasibility of operations outside the northern 
European theatre, Ewart assured the Directorate of Naval Intelligence of cooperation and 
responded to enquiries, whilst simultaneously emphasizing the dangers of following such 
strategies.
283
 Ewart was recalcitrant when it came to the creation of a naval operational strategy 
which threatened the concentration of military force in France, with each proposal received 
from the Admiralty being unequivocally rejected as imprudent, as in the case of support for 
Denmark: ‘the conclusion is that a British military expedition to Zealand... would be exposed to 
serious risk on the journey to Zealand, could accomplish nothing when it got there, and might 
not improbably end in total disaster’.284 Like Grierson before him, and Wilson after, Ewart 
followed the principle that ‘soldiers charged with the duty of preparation for war’ should aim 
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primarily at ‘making ready for the greatest and most probable war in which their army may 
become engaged’.285 This meant concentration on the ‘W.F.’ scheme. 
Over the winter of 1907 Ewart and Huguet worked to construct a modified timetable for 
the BEF’s transportation once on French soil. The scheme was submitted to the Foreign Office 
for approval on 26 July 1907, and continued to be adjusted throughout Ewart’s tenure as 
Director of Military Operations.
286
 Despite this effort, however, the preparations remained 
incomplete due to an ongoing disagreement between the War Office and the Admiralty as to the 
best method by which the army could be employed in a future war. The naval staffs continued 
to investigate amphibious operations to which the army had no intention of contributing,
287
 
whilst the DMO persisted with the ‘W.F.’ scheme despite receiving no indication that the navy 
would be willing to transport the troops across the Channel. Meanwhile the civilian body 
responsible for coordinating British strategy, the CID, was rendered impotent as it was wholly 
ignored by both sides.
288
 
The net result of the failure of the CID to coordinate naval and military planning was a 
divergence in strategy between the War Office and the Admiralty. Haldane’s refusal to allow 
discussions between the DMO and the railway companies, allied to the ineffectiveness in 
enforcing cooperation displayed by the CID, both under Campbell-Bannerman and during the 
first part of Asquith’s term as Prime Minister, denied Ewart the opportunity to complement the 
existing timetables for rail movements in France with schedules for movement within Britain 
and across the sea. As an example of the Admiralty’s consistent failure to comply with CID 
requests, in December 1908 the First Lord of the Admiralty, Reginald McKenna, promised to 
compose timetables for the movement of the BEF to France. However, a full year later the plans 
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had yet to be received in the DMO’s office. 289  Ewart’s inability to make further progress 
disappointed Huguet to such an extent that he would minimize Ewart’s role in preparing the 
BEF for war.
290
 At Camberley however, Henry Wilson was actively promoting the concept of 
close Franco-British cooperation to the next generation of army leaders. 
 
Henry Wilson and Franco-British cooperation, 1907-1914 
Wilson became Commandant of the Staff College eager to establish ‘a coherent system 
of higher education and training for the army’.291 Of vital importance to this ambition was the 
development of professional skills in the officers who would go on to command the British 
Army. Wilson’s vision sought the creation of a corps of officers ‘imbued with uniform methods 
of work and a common approach of staff problems’; a managerial class instilled with a shared 
ethos and attitude to the challenges of running a vast business organization.
292
 As Wilson 
himself summed up in an address given to students at the conclusion of the two-year course: ‘As 
far as can humanly be done, we think alike, work alike, and teach alike’.293 However, whilst 
Keith Jeffery has emphasized the separation in Wilson’s writings between the promotion of a 
‘school of thought’ and his advocacy of a closer union with France against Germany,294 and 
Hew Strachan has demonstrated that ‘the application of common methods’ did not filter down 
from Camberley to individual units,
295
 Wilson’s unique position as head of the Staff College 
afforded him ample opportunity to promote specific policy preferences at the expense of a 
holistic approach to strategic considerations. At times, those policy preferences, and the 
guidance espoused by Wilson, were explicit: 
I would like to give you one final piece of advice. Take Germany as being a possible, 
not to say a probable enemy. Thus devote much of your time to that language, or if you 
are not a linguist, to that people and army. Add to this a most careful study of Belgium... 
and add to that an intimate knowledge... of the French Army and people.
296
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Over four years Wilson would augment his beliefs through the adoption of French teaching 
methods within the Camberley curriculum, and would measure students’ performance through 
continual assessment of practical tasks rather than through a multitude of examinations.
297
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Figure 1.2 Map of Henry Wilson’s tours of the Franco-German-Belgian borderlands, 1908-
1911 
Source: Jeffery, p. 106. 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright 
reasons. 
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One of these tasks demonstrated Wilson’s ‘pro-French’ position unequivocally. A group 
assignment set for senior students in November 1908, entitled ‘The Belgian Scheme’, took as its 
backdrop the idea that relations between France and Germany had ‘suddenly become strained’, 
that Germany ‘was the aggressor and her object was to break up the understanding between 
France and England’.298 The students were asked to produce a memorandum, illustrating the 
views of the General Staff as to the most effective means of employing the BEF in the event of 
such an occurrence.
299
 Although the extent of military planning between the French and British 
staffs prior to the outbreak of war was ‘not general knowledge in political circles’, 300  the 
specificity of the exercise was criticized in Parliament. As a result, the 1909 edition of the 
assignment removed the reference to Belgian neutrality but, illustrating the importance attached 
by Wilson to the consideration of Franco-British cooperation, the basic premise of a projected 
Franco-German conflict was retained.
301
 
Aside from inculcating his students with thoughts of a possible European war, Wilson 
also took the opportunity whenever possible to visit the Franco-German-Belgian borderland, 
territory which would conceivably be the theatre of operations for the BEF in the event of a 
European war (Figure 1.2 demonstrates the accuracy of Wilson’s predictions).302 In the summer 
of 1909 he travelled by train and bicycle from Mons into France, and along the French frontier 
to the Swiss border. The following summer Wilson made a note of significant new railway 
construction in Germany, out of all proportion to peace-time traffic, near the border with 
Luxembourg.
303
 As Stevenson has noted, through the construction of ‘more lines, and by 
double- and quadruple-tracking existing ones’, the European powers attempted to use railways 
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to ‘tilt the balance’ in their favour should war be declared.304 The building projects Wilson 
noted on the frontier were a sure indicator to him that German military preparations were 
ongoing, and would form an integral part of the preparatory phase preceding the ‘race to the 
offensive’ on German’s western frontier. 
This knowledge, coupled with his appreciation of the technical implications of large-
scale movements noted above, demonstrates that Wilson entered the DMO both familiar with 
the challenges of mobilizing for war and convinced of the location in which the clash of arms 
would take place. Furthermore, thanks to a combination of: the findings of Grierson’s war game 
in 1905; the genesis of Franco-British staff talks in the wake of the Moroccan crisis; Belgian 
hesitancy in terms of participating in joint military planning with the British; and the 
Admiralty’s refusal to guarantee the safety of the BEF on naval transports north of the Dover 
Straits, Wilson became Director of Military Operations at a time when the character of Britain’s 
military intervention, were it to be ordered by the government of the day, was already 
inextricably linked to the support of the French Army.
305
 The hanging of an immense map of the 
borderlands upon the wall of his office was a graphic demonstration of the geographical location 
Wilson would focus on for the next four years, much to the delight of the French Army.
306
 It 
would also play a prominent role in the infamous CID meeting on 23 August 1911. 
In the two years prior to that meeting, British defence planning had taken place within a 
political vacuum. A substantial number (Coogan and Coogan place it at thirteen out of eighteen) 
of Asquith’s Cabinet were unaware that military conversations between French and British 
generals were ongoing,
307
 and were equally ignorant of the divergence in strategic 
recommendations between the army and the navy. Unwilling to jeopardize the stability of the 
government by revealing these hypothetical discussions to a potentially hostile group of 
ministers; faced by service chiefs disinclined to cooperate with one another or to reflect upon 
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alternatives to their favoured strategies; and existing within an international situation of relative 
‘peace’ in northern Europe in comparison to the Franco-German tension of early 1906, the CID 
under Asquith’s leadership had stated that ‘in the event of an attack on France by Germany, the 
expediency of sending a military force abroad, or of relying on naval means only, is a matter of 
policy which can only be determined when the occasion arises by the government of the day’.308 
This meant that, when a second Moroccan crisis in 1911 once again raised the possibility of that 
German attack on France, the overall strategic direction of the British government remained 
undecided. 
On 23 August 1911, Wilson set about making the army’s case for intervention 
alongside France. Utilizing the giant map from his office,
309
 Wilson lectured for nearly two 
hours on the predicted movements of the German force through Belgium, the relative sizes of 
the French and German armies expected to be involved in the initial encounters, and the critical 
importance of the swift arrival of the BEF. Speaking with a confidence engendered by his 
personal knowledge of the territory involved, Wilson postulated that geographic considerations 
and the existence of French fortifications would severely restrict the number of troops the 
Germans could place in the field in the early stages of the conflict: 
In the 110 miles of open frontier there are not more than seventeen or eighteen through 
roads and four or five of these are separated from the remaining twelve or thirteen by 
sixty miles of fortresses. If we allow an advance of three divisions on each road and a 
radius of operations of sixty miles in front of railhead, we find that the Germans cannot 
employ more than fifty-one to fifty-four divisions... in the opening phase of the war.
310
 
 
The Germans ‘could not concentrate their superior force against any one point’ of the French 
line. Provided the BEF was in the field by the seventeenth day after mobilization, Wilson 
argued, the early intervention of the BEF ‘would therefore be a material factor in the 
decision’.311 
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Whilst the army’s strategy was lucidly explained and built upon a foundation of 
logistical and geographical awareness, the Admiralty’s response was confused and contradictory; 
Admiral Wilson contemplating coastal raids upon Wangeroog and Schillinghörn alongside 
troop landings at Büsum in which the BEF would be used – in Fisher’s words – as a ‘projectile 
to be fired by the Navy’.312 Yet the Admiralty’s plans for using the BEF in such a manner failed 
to take into account the need for retaining the naval transports used to ‘project’ the army close 
to the German coast. Admiral Wilson, as pointed out by the CIGS Sir William Nicholson,
313
 had 
himself published a note on the subject in response to the ‘invasion scares’ of the period. 
Although Wilson’s remarks in that instance had focused upon the possibility of a German 
invasion of Britain, the roles – and outcome – could easily be reversed. Firstly, Wilson had 
written, the fleet would have to be ‘extraordinarily lucky’ to reach the coast without detection; 
secondly, once there the transports would be attacked by submarines and destroyers stationed 
along the coast; and thirdly, it would be quite impossible to guard the transports against enemy 
action during the disembarkation process.
314
 
Despite the military Wilson’s clarity and ‘grip’, which made ‘a real impression on the 
attendees’ in comparison to his naval namesake,315 the CID meeting did not secure political 
backing for the ‘W.F.’ scheme. Instead, the encounter demonstrated the degree of separation 
between British diplomatic and strategic planning,
316
 and precipitated the sequence of events 
which led to the full disclosure of the military conversations within the Cabinet in November 
1911.
317
 Yet even these revelations did not impair ongoing relations between the British and 
French staffs. In fact, as Philpott notes, after the Agadir crisis contact between the two militaries 
accelerated and intensified.
318
 The catalytic effect of the perceived German aggression of that 
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summer upon Franco-British military (and naval) arrangements was not, however, matched by a 
correspondingly deepened political interest in the nature of the understandings being made 
between Wilson and his French counterparts. Asquith, who left the 23 August CID meeting 
undecided over the strategy to be implemented in the event of war,
319
 would continue to resist 
pressure from Wilson to cement the details of the ‘conversations’ into a formal military 
commitment right through to the outbreak of war.
320
 Winston Churchill, who would shortly 
afterwards be installed as First Lord of the Admiralty, retained doubts about the viability of 
linking with the French Army altogether. Comments made during the discussion, fearing that 
the BEF would simply be ‘merged’ with the larger French Army, were followed in the 
aftermath by letters to Wilson seeking to put the use of Antwerp as a base of operations back on 
the agenda.
321
 
Churchill was not alone in pursuing this line of inquiry. Sir John French, nominal 
commander of the BEF from 1906, and actual CIGS from March 1912, also retained an interest 
in the possibility of using Antwerp, a residue of the 1905 war game. Demonstrating that the 
General Staff was by no means unified in its attitude towards the ‘W.F.’ scheme during the pre-
war years (Badsey likens the behavioural patterns within the army to those of a political 
party),
322
 Sir John was unconvinced of the virtues of deploying the BEF alongside the French 
Army. As Philpott notes, Sir John took a keen interest in the challenges of defence strategy 
throughout the pre-war period, and frequently returned to the prospect of establishing a base of 
operations at Antwerp in order to reduce the risk of his command being subordinated to that of a 
French general.
323
 As a result, Sir John’s reluctance to unequivocally back the Director of 
Military Operations led to a further attempt to establish combined defensive plans with the 
Belgian authorities in 1912. The reduced international tension by this point, in contrast to the 
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strained relations within the Cabinet brought about by the revelation of joint staff talks in 
November, diminished Asquith’s desire to confront the matter, however. Consequently, 
although Sir John upon becoming CIGS could instruct the military attaché at Brussels to ‘get all 
possible information as to the feasibility and assistance available for British landings at Ostend, 
Zeebrugge, and Antwerp’, these instructions were not backed up diplomatically. 324  Belgian 
distrust of British intentions, comparable to that which retarded the 1906 discussions,
325
 
combined with a ‘mishandling’ of the job by the military attaché,326 effectively nullified any 
chance of a ‘Belgian scheme’ receiving the same comprehensive preparations as Wilson’s 
preferred option. 
By contrast, the French continued to encourage closer collaboration with the British 
Army. Sir John himself was among senior British officers to attend the French Army’s 
manoeuvres, whilst Wilson’s notes from his excursions to the Franco-German frontier were 
gratefully received in Paris. In exchange, the French Army provided Douglas Haig with their 
cavalry tactics manual, and France also supplied the inspiration for the establishment of the 
Royal Flying Corps.
327
 This process of reciprocal knowledge sharing continued until the final 
days of peace, and was not restricted merely to the discussion of tactics among representatives 
of the ‘teeth’ arms. In July 1914 Wilson despatched three officers from the DMO to France to 
accompany Sir John, Haig, Grierson and Allenby on a trip to view the manoeuvres of the 
French 11
th
 Division. Among them was Major Marr Johnson, whose previous responsibility had 
been the voluminous task of copying and proof reading all of the BEF’s mobilization timetables 
prior to their being printed at the secret War Office press.
328
 The object of Johnson’s visit was to 
familiarize himself with the military working of the French railways, and the lavishness of 
Huguet’s praise is noteworthy: 
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I also met at the same time [as Sir John, Haig et al] three of your officers, Radcliffe, 
Johnston (sic) and _____, and very glad to say they made a very, very good impression, 
first by themselves, their intelligence, their cleverness, their way of working, their 
seriousness… and also, I am glad to say, by the very good work which they had brought 
with them – our people were very gratified to see how well they work in the DMO 
department, how the thing has been seriously taken and carefully studied. In all this, I 
recognize the hand of my friend General Wilson, but all the same, it is really a pleasure 
to work with officers like those three whom you sent out.
329
 
 
 
‘The hand’ of General Wilson has been a recurrent theme in this chapter. It is important, 
however, not to overstate the contribution of the final Director of Military Operations and to 
effectively ‘personalize’ Britain’s mobilization planning before the First World War. Such was 
Wilson’s personal attachment to ‘“his” plan’, exemplified in the caustic diary entries of late July 
and early August 1914 when it appeared the government might ‘run away’ from the continental 
commitment Wilson himself had made, that the collaborative nature of the ‘W.F.’ scheme has 
been marginalized.
330
 Wilson was undoubtedly a ‘bright star’, with a larger than life persona 
which has outshone the contributions of those around him to the ‘W.F.’ scheme. 331  Major 
Johnson is just one such figure, his work largely forgotten. But Wilson’s appreciation of his 
efforts was longstanding, as highlighted by his attempts to secure Johnson a position within the 
newly established Ministry of Transport after the war.
332
 
Furthermore, Wilson’s frequently reiterated belief, that the BEF ‘must mobilize [on] the 
same day as the French and Germans’,333 was ignored by a British government which had paid 
scant attention to the work of the DMO over the previous decade. For Campbell-Bannerman and 
Asquith the realities of domestic politics, and the short-term challenge of harmonizing a divided 
Cabinet, overshadowed the hypothetical entanglements of the military ‘conversations’ and the 
multitude of strategic options available to the British Empire in the event of war on the 
continent. By the time the French and German armies began to mobilize, British and French 
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officers had been engaged in a decade-long exchange of personnel, information and expertise.
334
 
It was thanks to this process that Britain had a thoroughly researched and comprehensively 
mapped out mobilization scheme in August 1914. It was a plan which, in addition to the work of 
the DMO, had received the advice and attention of some of Britain’s foremost transportation 
experts, and yet throughout the pre-war period Britain’s political leaders failed to provide 
civilian control or guidance.
335
 This failure, combined with a mixture of Belgian reticence and 
French encouragement, and taking place within a political atmosphere in which successive 
prime ministers demurred from the potentially disastrous consequences of revealing such 
matters either in Cabinet or to Parliament as a whole, ensured that when Belgium’s neutrality 
was violated by German troops the ‘W.F.’ scheme was also the only mobilization scheme in the 
possession of the British government. 
At the expiration of the British ultimatum to Berlin at 23:00 on 4 August 1914, the 
abdication of responsibility for hypothetical decisions could continue no longer. Britain’s entry 
into the First World War was not governed by the timetables created by Henry Wilson and his 
staff over the previous four years, nor would their existence tie the British government to a 
single course of action once war between France and Germany erupted.
336
 As the philosopher 
A.D. Lindsay reflected to his wife on 3 August, the violation of Belgian neutrality and Britain’s 
guarantee to that country mattered.
337
 British public opinion would not be swayed towards war 
by the impossibility or otherwise of modifying railway timetables.
338
 They would, however, 
ultimately form the bedrock upon which Britain’s initial response to war in Europe would be 
built. The railways awaited the signal. 
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From planning to performance: British mobilization in August 1914 
The historical approach to the mobilization of the BEF illustrates perfectly the 
subordinate position of logistical factors in discussions of the war. Where the mobilization of 
the force is not altogether ignored, references to it are invariably brief, and limited to 
reaffirmations that the entire process ‘proceeded remarkably well’. 339  Indeed, the available 
literature on Britain’s mobilization for war in 1914 tends to reinforce the perception that 
logistics only predominate over the more ‘glamorous’ and controversial topics of tactics and 
strategy when the logistics fail.
340
 The presence of British troops at Mons on 23 August 
emphatically demonstrates that the logistical preparations of the BEF did not fail in August 
1914, but the minimal references to them in the history of the conflict underplay the massive 
civil-military commitment that took place to ensure the multitude of movements connected to 
the outbreak of the war were successfully completed. Yet on 5 August 1914, when the War 
Council met for the first time, it was unclear whether the moves in Britain would be conducted 
immediately, or whether the timetables for embarkation at the French Channel ports would be 
used at all. 
For all Wilson’s statements about the importance of mobilizing in line with the French 
and German armies, Britain’s decision to enter the war did not take place automatically. As a 
result, the three day gap between French and British mobilizations caused Sir John French to 
advocate that the ‘W.F.’ scheme be rendered void. In its place, the newly appointed C-in-C of 
the BEF once again, safe in the knowledge that Belgian support was secure, returned to the idea 
of transporting British troops direct to Antwerp in order to operate in concert with the Belgian 
Army. Aside from the implications for Dutch neutrality, the journey to Antwerp had already 
been discounted as unfeasible both by the war game of 1905 and the aborted Barnardiston-
Ducarne talks of the following year. Furthermore, as Sir John’s replacement as CIGS, Sir 
Charles Douglas pointed out, the arrangements which had been made for the despatch of the 
BEF from Southampton, Newhaven and Bristol had been made with the journey time to France 
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in mind. The extra distance to Antwerp would require either an increased number of transports 
to be sourced almost spontaneously or the existing railway timetables would be dislocated.
341
 
That the BEF’s senior commander could raise such a logistically impracticable suggestion at the 
council augured ill for his appreciation of the role of transportation in the coming conflict. 
His eventual successor on the Western Front, Sir Douglas Haig, questioned the validity 
of despatching the BEF at all. Instead, Haig argued that the BEF should remain in Britain for 
‘two or three months, during which the immense resources of the Empire’ could be 
developed.
342
 Yet the lack of any machinery with which to develop those resources, coupled 
with the nature of the understanding between the French and British governments as symbolized 
in the ‘exchange of letters’ in 1912,343 made Haig’s proposal largely untenable. Consequently, 
the only remaining, practicable scheme for the mobilization of the BEF was ‘With France’. It 
boasted the benefits of thorough logistical preparation, interdepartmental cooperation, the input 
of suitably qualified transport experts and, critically, it could be brought into action almost 
immediately. The work of almost a decade, uncontrolled by the CID and unknown to Parliament 
until 3 August, was now only being held back by a governmental decision over how much of 
the BEF to send to France. On 6 August, the newly instated Secretary of State for War, Lord 
Kitchener, decreed that only four divisions could leave the country immediately.
344
 By that point, 
however, thanks to the ‘standard operating procedure’ laid down in the War Book, the 
mobilization of the British Army for war was already underway. 
For those working in the War Office, ‘it had been frequently said that the worst day in 
the year for us to mobilize would be the August Bank Holiday’.345 Not only were the railways 
traditionally busy with the demands of holidaymakers, but the period was also used as an 
opportunity for the Territorials to undertake summer manoeuvres which, as noted above, 
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themselves represented a significant logistical challenge. The precautionary period had in fact 
caught Captain Mance in the act of preparing for manoeuvres in Worcestershire alongside 
representatives of the GWR, a further example of the close working relationship developed 
between the railway companies and the military prior to the outbreak of hostilities.
346
 Further 
south, the Aldershot Command had commenced training with Territorial Forces drawn from 
London, East Hampshire, Sussex, Surrey and Kent on 27 July. Over the previous few days, the 
LSWR had been required to provide movement for advanced troops prior to the ‘peak’ 
movement on Sunday 26 July. On that day alone, the LSWR transported: 455 officers; 10,672 
men; 985 horses; 95 vehicles; 98 guns; 190 cycles; and 193 tons of baggage from locations 
across the south of England (including the reception of traffic from neighbouring networks) to 
the stations of Liphook and Bordon.
347
 As Pattenden’s series of articles highlights, the annual 
manoeuvres were planned and executed as peace-time test mobilizations, illustrating both the 
complexity of large-scale railway traffic provision for the military, and also the number of 
engine crews, drivers and station staff required to know their responsibilities in order for the 
movement to proceed efficiently. 
On 31 July, Sir Sam Fay’s telephone rang. He received the notification that the 
precautionary period had begun and made his way to London to join the rest of the REC at the 
offices of the LNWR, which had been specially selected for the task of running the mobilization 
scheme. Telephones and telegraphs linking Fay to the chief offices of the Great Central, and 
lines linking the other managers to their own railways had already been installed and awaited 
the prodigious use which was about to be made of them.
348
 At midnight on 5 August, the 
railways were taken over by the government and ordered to ‘carry on under the orders of the 
REC’, and ‘the instructions to general managers’ compiled during peacetime were brought into 
effect.
349
 For the next three weeks the employees of Britain’s railway companies would be made 
aware of the ‘secret timetables’ prepared over the previous four years by a tiny minority of their 
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colleagues and the DMO at the War Office, and would be charged with responsibility for the 
movement of the BEF; the Territorials; the Reserves; the personnel of the navy; the supplies and 
equipment required by all of the above; and the maintenance as far as possible of Britain’s 
colossal passenger and freight traffic. 
On 8 August, owing to what Wilson referred to as the ‘dithering’ of the government 
over the previous week,
350
 the railway programme for the transport of the BEF to the Channel 
coast was finally commenced. A total of 350 trains, comprising an average of thirty vehicles 
each, were made up ready for despatch to Southampton. The schedule demanded that the LSWR 
be able to put those 350 trains into the port, disembark and unload their contents, and remove 
them from the platforms within sixty hours. The railways ‘delivered the goods’ within forty-
eight. Practically every day over the first three weeks of the conflict, trains arrived into 
Southampton at intervals of just under one every quarter of an hour. Over a fourteen-hour period 
of operations each day, the docks received seventy-three trains loaded with men, guns, 
ammunition, horses, wagons, and myriad other supplies. Thanks to the flexibility and 
contingency built into the programme from its very inception, the majority of the trains arrived 
between twenty-five and thirty minutes ahead of schedule, with just one being recorded as 
having arrived late.
351
 As the General Manager of the LSWR, Herbert Walker, would reflect 
later in the year: 
Magnificent and unprecedented as this feat was, we can pay the British railways no 
higher compliment than to say that it was expected of them, and that every man in the 
service knew the railways were equal to every demand that could be made on them, 
without it being necessary to dislocate ordinary traffic to one-quarter of the extent 
which mobilization involves abroad.
352
 
 
Over the first fortnight of the mobilization period, the British railways ran 1,408 specially 
timetabled trains for the carriage of over 334,500 troops.
353
 Between 10 and 31 August, the 
LSWR alone would deliver to Southampton: 4,653 officers; 113,801 men; 314 guns; 5,221 
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vehicles; 1,807 cycles; 4,557 tons of stores; and 37,649 horses.
354
 Despite notices being 
published advising commuters of potential disruption,
355
 ‘the business trains to and from 
London ran very much as usual, and the normal service was maintained on nearly all parts of the 
system’.356 
The military also played its part. Lyndall Urwick, a 2
nd
 Lieutenant with the 3
rd
 Battalion, 
the Worcestershire Regiment, was one of those on annual manoeuvres when the precautionary 
period began. He ‘thus had a grand seat from which to view the whole process of 
mobilization’.357 At Weymouth, where Urwick was despatched with a company to man the 
coastal defences, that process was described as ‘bedlam. But it was a planned and ordered 
bedlam’.358 Each unit had their trucks ‘standing by’, every man in uniform and their kit packed. 
As soon as the notification to move arrived, they were ‘piled... into the trucks’ and 
despatched.
359
 When one Mounted Brigade threatened to be late with its concentration, it ‘soon 
came into line when told what all the others were doing’.360 Indicative of the regimental pride 
engendered in the British Army during peace time were the final remarks issued to Urwick 
before he himself had entrained for Weymouth: ‘Don’t let the Battalion down’.361 The detailed 
instructions printed and issued to each unit prior to their departure, and the peace time training 
in entraining and detraining which had helped configure the mobilization process, combined to 
create the impression that ‘everyone seemed to know the general mobilization plan’.362 The 
troops themselves operated in synchronization with the railways to ensure that the programme 
was carried out within the specified time frame. 
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In fact, the very efficiency of the cooperation between the railways and the military 
created the only potentially serious problem experienced in Britain during the mobilization 
period. Owing to fog in the Channel, and what Mance described as ‘a too rigorous examination 
service at Southampton’, the boats scheduled to transport the BEF were not arriving quickly 
enough to clear the number of troops accumulating in the rest camps around the town.
363
 In 
direct contradiction of Taylor’s assertion that the mobilization timetables were ‘immutable to 
the last detail and that improvisation of any kind was impossible’, 364  the backlog was 
concerning enough for the QMG to visit Southampton to evaluate whether the railway 
programme should be halted for a day to allow the build-up of troops to be reduced. A staff 
exercise undertaken before the war had highlighted the flexibility within the programme (which 
was further demonstrated by the ability of the railways to react to Kitchener’s decision to retain 
the 4
th
 Division in Britain rather than despatch it with the rest of the BEF) and this, coupled with 
the lifting of the fog in the Channel, allowed the Directorate of Movements and the railway 
companies to – rather than postpone the despatch of troops – instead utilize the built in 
flexibility of the programme to keep the scheme on track.
365
 
Once across the Channel, the detailed planning between Johnson and his French 
counterparts became clear. Officers working as advanced parties were given instructions 
detailing their duties and those which the French rail authorities would undertake,
366
 whilst each 
unit was issued with a manual containing the relevant procedures to be followed during their 
journey to the front.
367
 Despite the lack of standardization between the railway operations of the 
two countries, and the three-day gap between the mobilizations of the French and British forces, 
the BEF concentrated around Maubeuge as planned in the days leading up to what would 
become the Battle of Mons. This was a ‘beautifully conducted’ deployment that not even 
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Kitchener had the power to modify at the last minute,
368
 although it would take three hours of 
‘wrangling’ between the Secretary of State and Huguet (acting on behalf of Joffre) before 
consent for the French Army’s plan was finally granted.369 The character of that meeting offered 
salutary lessons as to the nature of inter-Allied relations on the battlefront that was about to be 
formed. 
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Conclusion 
The fact that a British force was able to take to the field in August 1914 has been 
historically put down to a number of factors. To Lyndall Urwick, the single most important 
contribution to readying the British Army for war was the ‘superb job of organization Haldane 
had done during his six years at the War Office between 1906 and 1912’.370 As noted above, to 
Percy Radcliffe it was the result of the indefatigable efforts of Sir Henry Wilson. As the 
examination of the documents created by the CID and the DMO reveal, it was in fact the 
combined efforts of civilian and military figures which created the army of 1914. The 
organizational changes conceived and installed by Esher, inspired by the managerial structures 
and ‘boards’ of large companies; Haldane’s promotion of efficiency and economy in the pursuit 
of the most ‘powerful’ army available within the limits of the Liberal government’s budgetary 
constraints;
371
 and the efforts of technicians and experts from Britain’s transport professions all 
played their part. The senior railway managers who made up the REC, Sir Thomas Royden and 
Sir Lionel Fletcher, and various, unnamed employees of their companies who toiled on the 
details of the mobilization programme in secret for three years;
372
 without all of their 
contributions, the BEF of August 1914 would perhaps not have been subject to the flattering 
description given to it by the official historian. 
However, it was the entente rather than the ‘W.F.’ scheme which took Britain to war. 
The existence of a mobilization plan with its interlocking transport schedules may have imposed 
‘haste and urgency’ upon Asquith’s deliberations at the first two War Councils,373 but it was the 
evolution of the colonial understanding of 1904 into a quasi-military alliance between France 
and Britain which dominated political strategic thought in the early days of August 1914. 
Although Wilson and others may have feared that Asquith’s Cabinet would ‘leave France in the 
lurch’ prior to the German ultimatum to Belgium, the potential damage to Britain’s ‘honour’ 
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became such that neutrality was from then on a political impossibility.
374
 Fearing the collapse of 
the government he had carefully managed since 1908, partly through the concealment of the 
potentially explosive joint military preparations, Asquith was forced to back a Franco-British 
plan in which he had little faith. 
As the meeting between Huguet and Kitchener on 12 August illustrated, the French 
Army were no longer a partner in a mutually beneficial training and knowledge-exchanging 
relationship, but the senior figure in a coalition war which would be fought primarily upon their 
own territory. From 16 August onwards, the complex balance of civil-military, Franco-British 
cooperative structures which had planned, built, and propelled the BEF to France would be 
tilted. Pre-war hopes would create organizational arrangements which would prove inadequate 
to the scale and duration of the challenge placed before them. Over the next two years, the 
British and French armies – and the states they represented – would be forced to confront the 
realities of industrial war. 
                                                 
374
 J.W. Young, ‘Conservative Leaders, Coalition, and Britain’s Decision for War in 1914’, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, 25:2 (2014), 214–39. 
93 
 
Part 2: Expanding Armageddon 
 
No matter how skilful the plans of the Commander-in-Chief might be, they would almost 
certainly fail in execution if the troops were not properly fed and quartered, and kept 
supplied with ammunition.
1
 
Field-Marshal Sir William Robertson 
 
Transportation was the cause of our greater difficulties [early in the war] – not fighting 
power, leadership, or the more active side of military training.
2
 
Colonel M.G. Taylor 
 
Between its landing in August 1914 and 1 July 1916, the BEF grew from four to fifty-
eight infantry divisions. In order to supply, equip, and manage the movement, health, discipline 
and clerical requirements of such a force ‘there [was] a corresponding augmentation and 
expansion of the Staff’,3 the bases and the lines of communication located behind the trenches, 
along with the creation of entirely new branches and services.  Prior to the Battle of Mons in 
1914, the BEF as a whole consisted of some 160,000 troops. By July 1916, the number of 
people working on the lines of communication alone was some 50,000 higher.
4
  The creation 
and sustenance of a mass army to rival the conscripted forces of France and Germany presented 
the British military authorities with a series of colossal organizational challenges, the majority 
of which were faced in the first full year of the war. During 1915, the BEF more than trebled in 
size. Over 650,000 men were added to the ration strength between January and October alone.
5
  
However, the literature which has focused upon Britain’s response to the expanding scale of the 
‘European commitment’ has tended to overlook the administrative achievement which ensured 
that the growth of the BEF did not result in starvation and chaos.
6
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This historiographical gap adheres to a wider trend in the literature on the first half of 
the conflict. It has fostered debate upon the machinations of political and military authority,
7
 the 
genesis and conduct of campaigns in the ‘sideshow’ theatres (most notably Gallipoli), and the 
complexities of raising and training the armies which took to the battlefield on 1 July 1916.
8
 
Consequently, the myriad issues surrounding how this mass of troops was fed into the 
expanding Allied ‘war machine’ on the Western Front has remained largely unexamined. Even 
Elizabeth Greenhalgh’s Victory through Coalition, which analyses the ‘dry institutional history’ 
of inter-Allied management apparatus in far more detail than previous texts,
9
 covers the 
logistical frictions of the period between August 1914 and July 1916 in little more than two 
pages.
10
 Despite a recognition that ‘issues of man management and logistics... were the primary 
concerns of senior commanders for the first three years of the war’, and that the BEF underwent 
a ‘conceptual change’ which involved the mobilization of businessmen ‘to bring their 
knowledge of forecasting and economies of scale to military logistical supply’,11 there remains a 
tendency – doubtless a remnant of Lloyd George’s pervasive influence – to view this process 
almost exclusively through the prism of Sir Eric Geddes and the creation of the Directorate-
General of Transportation [DGT] in late 1916. Yet, prior to Geddes’ transportation mission in 
1916,
12
 the BEF actively sought out and engaged with experts from Britain and the Dominions 
in order to provide solutions for the recognizably ‘civilian’ problems of transport and supply. 
Unlike Geddes’ comprehensive mission, however, the BEF’s early attempts to grapple with the 
implications of industrialized warfare were relatively small-scale and limited in scope. They 
were subject to restrictions set by a British army and state ill-equipped for the administrative 
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challenge and unwilling to give consideration to the time and resource commitments that the 
fighting of 1916 would ultimately deem necessary in order to bring about victory. Furthermore, 
they were confined by a French army and state reluctant to relinquish command and influence 
over the foreign forces engaged on their soil. The result of these twin constraints would be to 
restrict the impact of these early engagements with civilian expertise to what Ian M. Brown has 
termed ‘ad hoc’ attempts to solve the limiting factor governing success on the Western Front; 
the sufficient and reliable supply of goods and ammunition to the fighting units.
13
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2.1: The clash of arms and the British Expeditionary Force’s logistical 
organization 
The preparations of the War Office before August 1914 made no plans for the 
extraordinary increase in the size of the BEF which took place after the initial engagements 
have proven indecisive.
14
 The pre-war ‘conversations’ between the French and British General 
Staffs resulted in an agreement whereby the logistics of the BEF were to be ‘manned and 
controlled by the French’, who would undertake ‘the work of construction, repair, maintenance, 
traffic management and protection’ required to supply the British forces in France. 15 
Demonstrating the confidence of the French in the projected nature of hostilities, and of the 
assumption that the BEF would not significantly increase in size during the war, the French also 
undertook to provide logistical support beyond the Franco-Belgian border. As a result of this 
pre-war agreement, the duties assigned to a Director of Railway Transport within the British 
Army’s manual on administrative principles were almost entirely assigned to the French,16 
leading to the decision that the British director should remain at home upon mobilization. 
Consequently, only a small staff of liaison officers proceeded to France to act as intermediaries 
between the BEF and the French railway authorities.
17
 
The pre-war agreement, let alone disintegrating upon contact with the enemy, was 
broken almost as soon as British troops arrived on French soil. Upon arriving in France, the 
Inspector-General of Communications [IGC], Sir Frederick Robb, was dismayed to find that 
they have not kept their promises about the dock employees, they can only furnish 1000 
stevedores out of the 3000 [and] they propose not to work at night. I have had to be very 
firm about this, they have now promised to try and get some more.
18
 
 
This inauspicious start to the practical operation of the coalition would set a pattern that 
continued when the fighting began. 
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The retention of overall control of the transport network by the French through the 
Commission Regulatrice,
19
 allied with the relative sizes of the two armies, ensured that during 
the emergencies of the opening months of the war priority was consistently given to the 
requirements of the French troops. French corps consistently gained precedence in the provision 
of railheads, which forced the BEF to rely upon stations with inferior facilities and, when 
French trains blocked the lines heading back to the BEF’s railheads, led to a lack of supplies 
reaching the British troops. On 23 October, as the First Battle of Ypres raged, the QMG, Sir 
William Robertson, observed with evident frustration that the troops were struggling to obtain 
ammunition: 
Some of the ammunition trains yesterday were within a few miles of our railheads but 
we could not get them there. It seems ridiculous that it should take some eighteen hours 
from Boulogne [to] here but it does, and the greater part of that time is probably spent 
near where we are... If anything goes wrong with the ammunition train there may be a 
shortage, of which there can be no greater QMG’s offence. Besides, it is exceedingly 
wearing and worrying for one every day to be wondering whether the ammunition 
required will be forthcoming.
20
 
 
As all orders for railway transport had to be made through the French railway authorities, the 
BEF was entirely reliant upon their hosts to ensure that deliveries were made.
21
 With the French 
Army engaged heavily throughout the period in a struggle of national survival, the requests of 
the tiny, untried, unreliable BEF were unsurprisingly subordinated to the demands of the host 
nation’s troops.22 
Further complications arose due to the nature of the British administrative organization 
prescribed by Field Service Regulations [FSR].
23
 The regulations used in August 1914 divided 
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the responsibility for transportation and supply between two officers. The IGC, Sir Ronald 
Maxwell,
24
 maintained stocks at the bases and controlled traffic on the lines of communication, 
and was located at the advanced base along with his staff.
25
 Robertson, based alongside Sir John 
French at GHQ, took charge of administrative arrangements between the Inspector-General and 
the fighting units. The General Staff would identify priorities for movement, Robertson issued 
instructions to the relevant units, and Maxwell then coordinated the move.
26
 With the frequent 
re-location of GHQ during the early fighting (between 25 August and 1 September the location 
of GHQ changed five times) affording little opportunity to establish adequate communications 
at each site, contact between Maxwell and Robertson became almost impossible to sustain. As a 
result, messages and orders from GHQ frequently did not reach their intended destination, or 
were inapplicable to the circumstances of the moment when they did finally arrive.
27
 
With the entire army on the move in both retreat and advance, the administrative 
departments could not be certain where the BEF would be from day to day.
28
 By the time 
rendezvous points had been selected by GHQ and communicated to Maxwell, there was no 
guarantee that British troops would be in position to receive the supplies being forwarded. 
Closer to the front, the quartermasters of individual fighting formations struggled to maintain 
contact with the troops they were employed to keep supplied as the road network became 
increasingly congested with troops, guns, supplies and refugees.
29
 Robertson reserved particular 
ire for the mass of refugees,
30
 criticizing them for having been ‘an awful nuisance, blocking our 
roads, and even our fire’ during the retreat, clogging up the streets with ‘bicycles, mattresses, 
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perambulators, boxes, cocks and hens, turkeys’ and, ‘in some cases’ flocks of up to one 
thousand sheep.
31
 
Lyndall Urwick, serving with the Worcesters at the start of the war, recalled that ‘only 
once or twice during the retreat and the Battle of the Marne had our regimental transport caught 
up with us’. 32  Consequently, the food received on the retreat ‘had been uncertain but 
monotonous, consisting, when we got any, almost entirely of bully beef and biscuit’, or 
whatever the enterprising soldier could scrounge.
33
 It was Robertson’s role, as QMG, to ensure 
that the men were supplied with food and ammunition.
34
 The supply arrangements in place were 
insufficient to guarantee that this would happen, and instead Robertson was reduced to 
arranging for food and ammunition to be ‘dumped’ at busy crossroads for the men to take as 
they passed.
35
 Naturally such a system led to ‘excessive waste’ and significant quantities of 
supplies being left for the advancing Germans, ‘but when troops are fighting very hard’, 
Robertson stated, ‘one does not like to worry them too much about administrative matters. The 
chief thing is to beat the enemy’ rather than obsess over red-tape and ‘compliance with routine 
regulations’.36 
Unable to maintain contact between the base depots and the fluid situation at the front, 
Robertson adhered to the guidelines laid down in FSR Part I, which emphasized that ‘the man 
on the spot’ should use his initiative when circumstances required,37 and temporarily abandoned 
the principles of dual control laid down in FSR Part II. As Robertson was situated at ‘the spot’ 
where the most up-to-date information on the disposition of troops and the military situation 
was to be found, GHQ,
38
 he was better equipped to respond to urgent requests and identify 
                                                 
31
 Robertson Papers, 7/1/1 Robertson to Wigram, 1 September 1914. 
32
 Urwick Papers, 8/4 Apprenticeship to Management, p. 47. 
33
 Urwick Papers, 8/3/2 Management Pilgrimage, p. 3; 8/4 Apprenticeship to Management, p. 34; F. 
Richards, Old Soldiers Never Die (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), p. 27. 
34
 J. Spencer, ‘“The Big Brain in the Army”: Sir William Robertson as Quartermaster-General’, in 
Stemming the Tide, ed. by Jones, pp. 89–107 (p. 97). 
35
 Spencer, p. 97. Urwick recalled the scene at one roadside dump where, had it not been for the posting 
of guards with fixed bayonets, the Royal Irish Rifles ‘would have looted the lot’. See Urwick Papers, 8/4 
Apprenticeship to Management, p. 37. 
36
 WO 95/27 Robertson to Maxwell, 23 October 1914; W.R. Robertson, From Private, pp. 208–10. 
37
 Field Service Regulations, Part I. Operations (London: HMSO, 1912). 
38
 Spencer, pp. 95–6. 
100 
 
priority moves to ensure that deliveries were directed to the most suitable railheads.
39
 To assist 
in this coordination Major Marr Johnson, the man responsible for creating the railway 
timetables used in the ‘W.F.’ scheme, was summoned from Maxwell’s office to GHQ. Having 
worked with the French railway authorities prior to the war to arrange the movement inland of 
the BEF, Johnson was fully cognizant of the technical aspects governing the French system and 
acted as a liaison between Robertson and the French throughout the period of movement.
40
 
Although initially viewed as a temporary measure designed to meet the immediate crisis rather 
than as a permanent solution, the volume of railway questions which demanded attention 
ensured that Johnson would remain at GHQ rather than return to his original duty arranging the 
technical details concerning British movements.
41
 
The transfer of the BEF to Flanders during October emphasized the reality of the 
command relationship in France, most notably of the BEF’s subordinate position to the host 
nation in terms of logistical priorities.
42
 As the front stabilized, Sir John planned to unite his 
forces and undertake a huge enveloping manoeuvre on the Germans concentrated on Lille. It 
would take ‘a week or nine days... and if successful [would] put an end to their invasion of 
France’.43 Sir John could request, forcefully,44 that the British troops be moved north to put his 
ambitious plan into action, but as Joffre stated in response to the British appeal: ‘the C-in-C has 
the honour to state that he will endeavour to satisfy this request, but... the movement of the 
British troops can only be carried out in succession’.45 Joffre’s letter went on to ‘assure Marshal 
French’ that ‘the greatest efforts’ would be made to concentrate the whole of the BEF in the 
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northern sector of the front, but pointed out that to comply with Sir John’s wishes would 
severely delay the intended operations of the French forces in the north. Consequently, the BEF 
moved not as a whole, but in small groups according to arrangements coordinated by the French 
railway authorities.
46
 Although Sir John had the machinery with which to inform Joffre of his 
transport requirements, the BEF contained no ‘voice’ to ensure those requests were given 
prominence at Grand Quartier Général [GQG].
47
 The result was a perception within the BEF 
that the French could not be relied upon to fulfil their logistical obligations, exemplified by 
Robertson’s grumble at the end of September that ‘I have always doubted the possibility of our 
obtaining much, if any, transport from French sources’.48 
As the French were already beginning to make demands on the British to abandon 
portions of the pre-war agreement and take over responsibility for repairs to the railways in the 
British zone when an advance took place,
49
 it became clear that the shifting relationship between 
the Allies demanded reconsideration. With the BEF woefully under-resourced both in personnel 
and technical knowledge, it was equally clear that any investigation could not be completed by 
those employed on either Robertson or Maxwell’s staffs at the time. Therefore the examination 
would need to be handled by an ‘outsider’. The man chosen for the role was not a senior figure 
in the War Office, but a Canadian engineer. 
 
Sir Percy Girouard’s report 
Édouard Percy Cranwill Girouard, the son of a French-Canadian lawyer and politician, 
was born in Montreal in 1867.
50
 Fluent in both French and English, Girouard entered the Royal 
Military College at Kingston at the age of fifteen and graduated in 1886 with a diploma in 
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engineering. After two years on the engineering staff of the Canadian Pacific Railway, during 
which time he was involved in the construction of the International Railway of Maine, Girouard 
disappointed his father by accepting a commission in the Royal Engineers and departing for 
Woolwich. On 1 January 1891, Girouard would become the first officer to hold the position of 
Traffic Manager on the 824 acre site of the Royal Arsenal.
51
 
Prior to Girouard’s appointment, each of the various departments and factories that 
comprised the Arsenal had been responsible for acquiring and maintaining its own stock of 
engines and wagons for use on the Arsenal’s narrow gauge railway system. Furthermore, no 
central administration had been established to oversee the traffic flow around the site, each 
factory arranging its own train schedules. Girouard’s task was to take control of all the engines 
and rolling stock from the various departments, ‘some thirty-six narrow-gauge engines and 
1,000 carriages, vans and trucks’, and centralize all requests for rail traffic within the Woolwich 
site.
52
 It was a responsibility upon which Girouard thrived, reorganizing the Royal Arsenal 
Railway into traffic sections and creating a system which gave ‘universal satisfaction’ to the 
departments.
53
 The narrow-gauge network became an integral part of the Arsenal, forming ‘a 
valuable link between office and shop, storehouse and magazine’, and the general goods and 
passenger service for employees of the various factories.
54
 The role gave Girouard experience of 
the pitfalls involved in giving separate departments within a single institution influence over the 
operation of a shared logistics system, particularly in terms of the ‘confusion and waste’ which 
were the corollary of interdepartmental rivalry encapsulated by the ‘each for himself and the 
devil take the hindermost’ policy pursued prior to his arrival.55 However, it was in Africa that 
Girouard would come face to face with the challenges of railway construction and operation on 
foreign soil in both peace and war. 
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In 1896, Girouard was seconded to the Egyptian Army and joined Kitchener on an 
expedition southwards along the River Nile. Although the existing lines in the Nile Valley had 
been destroyed, Girouard assisted in the reconstruction of the railway and its extension to the 
Egyptian-Sudanese border.
56
 Following Kitchener’s decision to extend the railway across the 
Nubian Desert early in 1897, Girouard became Director of Sudan Railways, responsible for 
overseeing the ‘cholera-decimated staff of Royal Engineers’ working on the project.57 Despite 
the inhospitable conditions, the railway was well built, permitting the passage of heavy trains 
carrying up to 200 tons at speeds of up to twenty-five miles per hour.
58
 By July 1898 the railway 
had reached Atbara, and it played a vital role in sustaining the 22,000 strong force which would 
ultimately triumph at Omdurman. As Carter notes, ‘the victory of the Anglo-Egyptian Army at 
Omdurman; the occupation of Khartoum; and the subsequent overthrow of the Mahdi and 
conquest of the Sudan, would never have taken place had it not been for the completion of this 
military railway to Atbara’. 59  The campaign offered a valuable practical lesson of the 
advantages to be gained from railway use, allowing for the concentration of superior British 
firepower, and Girouard’s efforts in the Sudan were officially recognized with the award of the 
Distinguished Service Order and appointment as President of the Egyptian Railway and 
Telegraph Administration.
60
 
Within a year, Girouard would return to wartime railway management, as the outbreak 
of the South African War saw him appointed Director of Railways and given responsibility for 
‘making maximum use of the railways in waging war against the Boers’.61 With territory in 
South Africa divided between those areas loyal to the British, those under Boer control and 
those in areas nominally ‘British’ but comprising many with sympathetic attitudes towards the 
Boers (making them unreliable for railway-operating purposes), the South African War 
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presented a wide range of administrative challenges for Girouard and his staff to overcome.
62
 
These lessons were compiled after the war by Girouard himself in a multi-volume work which, 
although titled as the History of the Railways during the South African War, was also viewed as 
a valuable educational resource for military officers on the importance of understanding the role 
of railways in modern warfare.
63
 Only one volume, Girouard’s general report of railway 
developments, would be published through official channels due to cost considerations in the 
post-war era of fiscal retrenchment. However, demonstrating an awareness both of the 
importance of such a ‘valuable record of the largest operations undertaken by a British army in 
the field’, and of Girouard’s mastery of the relevant details, the Royal Engineers chose to 
publish the remaining three volumes themselves.
64
 This meant that, although Girouard himself 
would leave the military in 1907 to take on a variety of governmental roles in Africa and a 
directorship at the munitions firm Armstrong’s, 65  Girouard’s position as a military railway 
expert remained thoroughly acknowledged within the army. 
Girouard’s pre-war experience ensured that, despite not being a serving officer, he 
could not be described as an ‘outsider’ in the sense that Eric Geddes would be in 1916.66 
Although Lloyd George would later assert that Girouard was ‘an out-and-out Kitchener man’,67 
with all the connected intimations of a perceived favouritism, Girouard was a logical choice to 
undertake a task which demanded the respect and cooperation of both allies in order to be a 
success. Arriving in France on 16 October, Girouard first met with Maxwell, to discuss the 
railway situation from the point of view of the IGC and his staff, before travelling to Paris for a 
meeting with the military commission responsible for the operations of the Chemin de fer du 
Nord, the system upon which the majority of the BEF’s supplies were transported. Prior to his 
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return to London, Girouard also consulted with Robertson and with the French Director of 
Railways before proceeding to Boulogne to examine the port’s suitability as an army base.68 His 
report analysed the French system of railway organization alongside both the British system as 
outlined in FSR and the methods in use at the time of his visit. 
The French system came in for particular attention, Girouard recognizing that ‘any 
organization of ours [was] bound to collaborate’ with the extant system in the host nation.69 It 
was a system which, quite apart from the efforts required to mobilize the French Army and to 
transport the BEF from the ports, had been called upon to deal with a huge influx of refugees 
streaming south from occupied Belgium and France; significant numbers of locomotives and 
rolling stock despatched from the Belgian railways; and the supply of the forces in the field in 
retreat and advance. Despite British complaints regarding the BEF’s inferior status, it was a task 
which Girouard concluded had been undertaken with a remarkable degree of success.
70
 There 
were two reasons for this accomplishment. The first was that the entire French railway 
organization was centred at GQG, from which point control of the whole railway system in 
France was coordinated. The ability to direct the transport network from the principal 
information centre of the French Army ensured that the railway authorities managed their 
resources with the most up-to-date information and could act on the latest intelligence. This 
compared favourably with the procedure laid down in FSR by which Maxwell had already 
found that inadequate communications had left him incapable of responding to the fluctuating 
demands of a mobile front line.
71
 
The second reason lay in the composition of the French military railway authority itself, 
a vestige of France’s last military clash with the Germans. Following the disastrous 
performance of the railway network during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, in which 
uncoordinated military command of the railways led to confusion, congestion and ultimately 
contributed to their defeat, French efforts had been directed towards the creation of a unified 
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civil-military command system to operate the rail network in wartime.
72
 Upon mobilization in 
1914 therefore, the entire network came under the control of a single railway authority. 
Individual railways were placed under the orders of special commissions, containing both a 
senior military officer and a professional railwayman with a comprehensive knowledge of their 
collection of lines.
73
 This combination of military and civilian experts ensured that the issuing 
of orders which were impossible to fulfil was eradicated, and that the railway officials 
responsible for movements received those orders from a single source with access to a breadth 
of information. The non-existence of a sole authority had ‘resulted in most serious failures in 
the working of our railways during the war of 1870’,74 as ‘orders and counter-orders were given 
direct to the civil staff [of the railways] by the General Staff, the administrative staff, [individual] 
departments, and even the Minister of War’.75 It was an experience the French were keen not to 
repeat. 
The knowledge base of the railway officials particularly impressed Girouard.
76
 Each of 
the commissions existed in peace time, and was able to take over their designated network upon 
mobilization.
77
 The staff of each line therefore possessed an intimate working knowledge of the 
limitations of the system and the capacities of individual stations on the network. This enabled 
the selection of the most suitable railheads for the detrainment of troops to begin immediately, 
and ensured that trains were only directed to stations capable of handling the goods contained 
upon them.
78
 By utilizing the civilian staff of the railways in roles familiar to them from peace 
time, the French Army were extracting the maximum efficiency from the system, a principle 
Girouard had strongly advocated in the aftermath of the South African War.
79
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The methodical structure of the French organization contrasted sharply with Girouard’s 
assessment of the British arrangements. In concurrence with the guidelines laid down in FSR, 
the various directorates governing the supply and movement services were not controlled by a 
single authority, but instead reported to both Maxwell and Robertson.
80
 In practice, this meant 
that officers such as the Director of Works were under the direct command of Robertson at 
GHQ, but had his office space at Maxwell’s headquarters.81 Effective liaison between the two 
staffs, particularly in light of the broken communications which were a key feature of the war’s 
opening months, was clearly impracticable. The transfer of Major Johnson symbolized the 
collapse of the FSR guidelines; Maxwell was no longer able to comply with the pre-war 
instructions which stated that all communications with French rail authorities were to be made 
through the IGC’s office, as the officer responsible for the work had been moved to GHQ.82 
The solution proposed by Girouard consisted of abandoning the organizational structure 
laid down in FSR and replicating the French system. In doing so, he argued, the BEF would 
ensure coordination between the British railway staffs and the French commissions at all levels 
of authority, right up to the ‘executive’ level of the transport hierarchy at which the BEF had no 
representation.
83
 Such a modification would give the BEF a say in the ongoing development of 
the Allied transport coalition. With the French already beginning to make requests that the 
British arrange to cover the repair of lines in the rear of the BEF in the event of an advance,
84
 
Girouard deemed it desirable that any organization established for the reconstruction and 
operation of the Belgian railways ‘should have a considerable [British] voice’.85 In France, both 
Robertson and Maxwell recognized the need for greater liaison between the French and British 
staffs with regard to transport, leading to the installation of a Director of Railway Transport at 
the end of October. This was a clear indication that the pre-war arrangements with the French 
had been rendered inadequate by the opening battles of the war. The director, Colonel Twiss, 
                                                 
80
 I.M. Brown, British Logistics, pp. 48–55. 
81
 I.M. Brown, British Logistics, p. 51; Edmonds, France and Belgium, 1914, I, pp. 415–16. 
82
 WO 32/5144 Report, pp. 6-8; WO 33/686 Instructions, Part II, section 6. 
83
 WO 32/5144 Report, pp. 5-6, 12. 
84
 WO 32/5144 Girouard to Cowans, 24 October 1914. 
85
 WO 32/5144 Report, p. 12. 
108 
 
originally left at home when the BEF sailed, took up his post to act as a dedicated traffic officer 
and to improve coordination and liaison between French and British staffs.
86
 
The location of this director’s office would also solve the issue over which officer, 
Robertson or Maxwell, was to take responsibility for traffic coordination on the Western Front. 
As we have seen, Maxwell, the authority under the pre-war arrangements, was unable to 
exercise effective control over the railways due both to his inability to receive the latest 
information in a timely fashion and to the location of numerous transport-related directorates at 
GHQ rather than at his own offices. It would be impossible for the IGC to retain responsibility 
for the coordination of traffic unless these directorates were placed under his direct control, 
which meant relocation away from GHQ and a reduction in their access to the latest intelligence 
reports and the established communication channels between the French and British 
headquarters.
87
 As a result of these disadvantages, Maxwell and Robertson were in accord that 
the ‘French system’ of unified control should be adopted, the Director of Railway Transport 
should be located at GHQ, and that, as a corollary, Robertson would accept responsibility for 
the BEF’s transport arrangements.88 
As Spencer notes, Robertson viewed regulation and procedure as ‘hand-rails to guide 
decision-making rather than barriers to creativity’ during the chaotic period that followed the 
initial engagements of the war.
89
 Maxwell’s belief that ‘the French system is likely to give the 
best results’ confirms that there was a working environment within the BEF’s administrative 
echelons fostered by ‘a combination of Staff College training... pragmatism, and [a] 
professional outlook’.90 However, this attitude was not universally shared, as the responses to 
Girouard’s report at the War Office demonstrate. The former IGC, Sir Frederick Robb, 
denounced Girouard’s proposals as ‘nothing new’, and criticized the ‘absurdity’ of holding one 
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man responsible for all transport requirements in the theatre of war.
91
 Furthermore, whilst Robb 
noted correctly that the system Girouard had reviewed in his report was not that envisaged by 
the pre-war arrangements, the modifications which had taken place between August and 
October had not been the result of the ‘co-efficient of human nature’ (by which Robb implied a 
desire by Robertson at GHQ to centralize supply responsibility under himself).
92
 As we have 
seen, Robertson’s adjustments were a response to inadequate communications between GHQ 
and the administrative departments established on the lines of communication. 
Yet the most condemnatory statements on Girouard’s report came from Robertson’s 
opposite number in London, the QMG at the War Office, Sir John Cowans. In a note written 
three days after the report, with the fighting around Ypres continuing to escalate, Cowans wrote 
that Girouard had 
far exceeded his instructions. He was not told to produce a scheme for uprooting 
organizations deliberately laid down after deep deliberation... The Regulations have 
been issued and acted upon and it is no time in the middle of a campaign to tinker with 
them.
93
 
 
For Cowans, despite his personal misgivings as to the ‘anomalies’ within the existing 
arrangements, the short-term exigency of ensuring the troops engaged around Ypres remained 
fed and equipped superseded the rearrangement of rearward services decided upon prior to 
mobilization by the BEF’s supreme arbiter, Sir John French.94 
The contents of Cowans’ memorandum flatly contradicts the commentary on Girouard’s 
report in the hagiographic biography of Cowans published after his death, which stated that 
Girouard’s report had been ‘shelved’ by the BEF, ‘most probably because the authorities in 
France were not ready for any change and because they... resented anything that looked even 
faintly like interference or dictation from home’.95 Such a statement could easily have been 
lifted directly from Lloyd George’s own writing on the BEF’s reticence to engage with 
innovative ideas. Yet after a month of operating under the new system, Sir John would write to 
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Kitchener that Girouard’s recommended centralization of responsibility under Robertson’s 
authority was working ‘to the satisfaction of all concerned’, 96  whilst Robertson’s own 
correspondence with Cowans further demonstrates that the BEF’s senior commanders held no 
resentment towards Girouard. In fact, Robertson had asked his War Office counterpart whether 
Girouard would be returning to France to deal with the ‘important questions’ which needed to 
be settled with regard to the operation of the Belgian railways.
97
 The French and Belgian 
headquarters had already undertaken bilateral discussions and Robertson, echoing Girouard’s 
observations, emphasized the need for the British to have a ‘voice’ in any formal agreements to 
be signed between the Allies. The final decision regarding Girouard’s contribution to those 
discussions was unequivocally left in the hands of the War Office. In the end, it was Colonel 
Henniker who acted as the British representative on what became known as the ‘Calais 
commissions’ on transport matters.98 
The reasons behind Henniker’s selection from within, rather than the appointment of 
Girouard to this role, have not been established, yet it is clear that it was not due to any 
ingrained BEF obstinacy towards the outside expert. Nor was the decision to ‘shelve’ the 
majority of recommendations made by Girouard in October 1914. Instead, the reason why much 
of Girouard’s report failed to be implemented lay in the fact that many of his recommendations 
envisaged a situation in which the war of movement would recommence in the spring. 
Girouard’s conclusions reflected a widespread tendency to view the stalemate of the winter as a 
temporary anomaly, and were founded on the belief that the BEF would soon be operating once 
again on Belgian rather than French soil.
99
 
The ‘retirement of the enemy’, which Girouard predicted would ‘be accompanied by 
very grave damage to the railway lines and structure’ of the Belgian network and would 
necessitate a tri-national response to ensure its swift reconstruction,
100
 did not take place in 1915. 
Indeed, despite Allied hopes, there would be no large-scale German withdrawal anywhere on 
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the Western Front until the spring of 1917. The result of lingering ‘short-term’ thinking and a 
belief in the power of the offensive fostered a desire not to jeopardize immediate possibilities by 
concentrating attentions and energy upon the creation of long-term structures which it was 
hoped would not be required. Furthermore, overseeing the expansion of the BEF was itself a 
colossal administrative challenge, one which the supply services themselves fully recognized.
101
 
The prospect of more British troops on the continent brought with it the demand for a 
correspondingly increased quantity of goods to keep them fed and equipped. The use of the 
French transport network would intensify, compelling the BEF to utilize its share of the finite 
logistical resources with the minimum of inefficiency. Although Cowans’ biographers and 
Lloyd George would imply otherwise in their post-war recriminations about the BEF, the 
challenge of expansion was not one that the military authorities in France would face alone. 
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2.2: Early experiments in civil-military cooperation: The South-
Eastern and Chatham Railway at the port of Boulogne 
In addition to eroding the duties of a Director of Railway Transport to such an extent 
that the BEF set sail without one, the pre-war arrangements between the French and British 
envisaged the host nation supplying all of the labour required by the BEF to unload ships at the 
Channel ports. The expansion of the BEF meant that transporting large numbers of troops to and 
from the continent would require an increasing amount of port space to be set aside for the 
disembarkation of soldiers and for the unloading of numerous shipments of foodstuffs, 
munitions, vehicles and the myriad other supplies required to preserve the fighting efficiency of 
the force. The creation of opposing trench lines for the winter months also gave rise to demands 
for ‘many kinds of tools and stores required in siege warfare’, with large quantities of sandbags, 
barbed wire and entrenching tools being requested by front line commanders to help secure the 
British positions.
102
 Furthermore, the BEF were not the only body reliant upon the Channel 
ports. Both the Belgian and French armies also drew supplies from the northern French coast, 
with demands for imports exacerbated by the loss of much of France’s industrial heartland to 
the Germans during the initial invasion.
103
 The territory relinquished by the retreating Allied 
forces left the French increasingly dependent upon Britain for imports of coal,
104
 enormous 
quantities of which were required for the heating of homes, the powering of factories, and the 
operation of the railways upon which the vast majority of supplies for the coalition were sent 
forward.
105
 Such a resource was clearly vital to the wellbeing of the forces and a fundamental 
component of the French war effort, one of many items which ‘monopolized’ the limited 
capacity of the docks. In addition, significant quantities of wine were also found being kept in 
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dockside warehouses, ‘to the detriment of efficient working of disembarkation of troops and 
stores’.106 
Although land existed for the expansion of sidings and storage accommodation on the 
Channel coast, as well as for the construction of additional harbour space, such projects were 
time-consuming, expensive, and required significant quantities of both skilled and unskilled 
labour. With the French Army suffering almost one million casualties by the end of 1914, the 
coalition’s senior partner was unable to provide the manpower necessary to bring such large-
scale engineering works into being. In addition, many previously reserved occupations, such as 
the stevedores provided to the BEF to help unload ships, were increasingly required to replace 
the fallen in the French ranks.
107
 With so many competing demands placed upon them, it was 
clearly imperative that the available space on the Channel coast was worked with the utmost 
efficiency. 
However, as part of his report into transport arrangements in October 1914, Sir Percy 
Girouard had examined Boulogne in order to ascertain its suitability as an army base. He 
concluded the port ‘to be in a somewhat disorganized condition’.108 Prior to the conflict, a 
further result of the pre-war arrangements with the French, no provision had been made for 
operations at the ports to be controlled by British officers.
109
 Yet in light of the inability of the 
French to supply the required manpower, it would be necessary for Britain to provide the ‘sheds, 
sidings and many other works’ deemed ‘requisite to get anything like the full capacity’ out of 
Boulogne and the other Channel ports.
110
 By December the situation at all the ports in use by the 
BEF was deteriorating, a problem deepened by a deficiency of cranes suited to the tasks of 
unloading military supplies and a lack of covered accommodation under which to shelter items 
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such as hay and oats from the winter weather.
111
 On the basis of Girouard’s criticisms, a project 
for the extension of sidings and storage accommodation around the Bassin Loubet (one of the 
two docking basins at the port) was prepared, a job described as both ‘vital’ and ‘urgent’ were 
the BEF to develop Boulogne as a supply base.
112
 
The accomplishment of this task, in addition to the other duties being thrown upon them 
in the opening months of the war, was beyond the capacity of the limited number of Royal 
Engineers in France.
113
 As a result, the civil engineering portion of the work was passed on to 
the War Office, and, further reinforcing the status of the major railway companies within 
official circles during the period, devolved upon the REC to delegate to a capable body. Percy 
Tempest, the Chief Engineer of the SECR and a major in the ERSC since 1902, accepted the 
responsibility.
114
 Between December 1914 and September 1916 the SECR provided the tools, 
materials, labour and supervisory staff for the construction of sidings, loading platforms, roads 
and railways, storehouses and workshops at Boulogne, alongside the laying of over two miles of 
drain pipes and the erection of a 700-foot-long sea wall.
115
 The contribution of the company to 
the BEF’s exploitation of Boulogne would not, however, be restricted merely to the provision of 
engineers and resources. Tempest was joined at the Bassin Loubet by the SECR’s General 
Manager, Francis Dent, who, along with forwarding Tempest’s estimates for the cost and 
duration of the works to the Director of Supplies, also added his opinion that the cramped space 
and risk of exposure at Boulogne was likely to result in heavy losses to supplies such as forage 
and oats in the near future.
116
 
Rather than being dismissed out of hand, as one would expect given Lloyd George’s 
depiction of the BEF’s attitude towards civilian ‘interference’, the suggestion Dent would make 
on 11 December led to the conduct of a civil-military experiment involving employees of the 
SECR working semi-independently at the port of Boulogne for the next twelve months. 
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However, in previous accounts the ‘Dent scheme’ has garnered precious little attention. Ian M. 
Brown dedicates just one page to the experiment, despite noting that it ‘had the potential to 
radically alter the way in which the BEF operated [the] port and test... a mix of civilians and 
military men’.117 The Official History offers an even briefer account, Henniker’s conclusion that 
‘it was [considered] inadvisable to entrust the work... to civilian management and labour’ 
forming the bedrock of the few published assessments of what took place at Boulogne during 
1915.
118
 Such was the perceived inconsequence of the experiment that even the Directorate of 
Supplies, Dent’s first point of contact within the BEF with regard to the scheme, omits all 
reference to the scheme in its post-war reports on wartime developments.
119
 Yet the experiment 
at Boulogne during 1915 highlights the role which civilians were able to play in attempting to 
improve the throughput of goods from ship to rail, and consequently enhance the BEF’s 
logistical efficiency. The abandonment of the project at the end of the year was less a case of 
‘anti-civilian phobia’,120 and more the result of an insufficiently comprehensive response to the 
developing conflict.  
 
Sir Francis Dent and the Bassin Loubet 
Francis Dent’s pre-war career made him a suitable candidate for the task of solving the 
problems identified at Boulogne. The son of a retired admiral who had found post-naval 
employment with the LNWR, Dent’s entire working life had been spent on the railways.121 He 
entered the General Manager’s office of the LNWR at the age of seventeen, and over the 
following two decades served the company in a variety of jobs and locations. Dent’s abilities 
and efficient work in each of these positions, particularly as goods manager in North Wales, led 
eventually to his taking the role of goods traffic superintendent for the LNWR’s Metropolitan 
district in 1901. The key factor in offering Dent this position lay in the increasing congestion 
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around London’s Broad Street station, the capital’s third busiest station at the turn of the 
century.
122
 Situated in the heart of the financial district, Broad Street was both the destination 
for thousands of commuters entering London each morning and a vital freight hub linking the 
Thames dockyards to industrial Birmingham. 
With passenger numbers and the volume of goods passing through the station rising, it 
had been feared by the LNWR’s board that the station would require significant expansion in 
order to cope, a hugely costly venture in the heart of the capital.
123
 However, through a 
combination of ‘personal tact and influence’,124 a reorganization of working methods, and the 
establishment of a bonus payment system for employees, Dent was able to accelerate the 
turnaround of goods within the station to such an extent that ‘the scheme for the enlargement of 
the station which had been proposed [was] abandoned’.125 The challenges involved in improving 
efficiencies within the restricted storage space available at the Bassin Loubet were, therefore, 
intelligible and recognizable to a man like Dent, whose career continued to blossom after the 
Broad Street reorganization. Dent’s commitment to efficiency and economy were such that he 
was selected to visit the United States in 1903 to observe the latest railway operating methods in 
use across the Atlantic, and his skills as a freight transport organizer convinced the SECR to 
offer Dent the position of Chief Goods Manager in 1907. Four years later Dent became General 
Manager, a promotion which brought with it not only a salary commensurate with his status as a 
highly qualified senior executive (Dent’s wage packet in 1912 was £4,000 per annum), but entry 
into the ERSC as well. With the prominent military sites of Woolwich and Chatham, plus the 
ports of Folkestone and Dover, located on the SECR’s network (see Figure 2.1), it was no 
surprise that the SECR acted as ‘secretary railway’ to the army’s Eastern Command, and that 
Dent would also be appointed to the REC prior to the outbreak of hostilities. 
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In August 1914 therefore, Francis Dent was a highly experienced, professional railway 
manager with an established talent for promoting efficiency, and a man fully conversant with 
the intricacies of military demands. By the time he arrived at Boulogne in December, he had 
already made a number of contributions to the nascent British war effort. Following the 
completion of the SECR’s share of the mobilization programme, Dent had acted as chair of a 
sub-committee of the REC charged with the duty of providing ambulance trains for the higher-
than-expected number of casualties returning to Britain. In September, working in collaboration 
with representatives of the Royal Army Medical Corps and the War Office, Dent was issued the 
task of designing a new, standardized ambulance train for use in both France and Britain. By 
December, plans were already underway for British firms to construct bespoke ambulance trains 
consisting of staff-cars, kitchen-cars, pharmacy-cars and stores-cars alongside carriages 
designed to take stretchers and ‘sitting-up’ cases.126 
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Figure 2.1 Map of the South-Eastern and Chatham Railway, 1912 
Source:  G.E. Mitton, The South-Eastern and Chatham, and London, Brighton and South Coast 
Railways (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1912). 
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His next contribution, at Boulogne, would be of a different order altogether. Dent’s 
varied experiences personified the uncoordinated nature of Britain’s response to the multitude of 
challenges thrown up by her increasing involvement in the war. Although primarily a passenger 
rail line in peacetime, the SECR also controlled the two principal cross-Channel ferry services, 
running from Dover to Calais and Folkestone to Boulogne, providing the company with a 
working knowledge of the French ports and offices at both. Indeed, even prior to Tempest and 
Dent’s arrival in France the staff of the SECR based at Boulogne had been placed at the army’s 
disposal by the company. However, according to the Director of Railway Transport, ‘full use’ 
was not being made of the workers by the military authorities, leading to a suggestion that the 
SECR itself might take on supervisory responsibilities within the Bassin Loubet with an ‘adjoint’ 
from the army acting as liaison.
127
 The BEF’s receptivity to civilian input, coupled with his own 
prior experience, led to Dent offering to spend a fortnight at Boulogne, to study ‘the situation on 
the spot’, before putting forward detailed suggestions as to how efficiency at the port could be 
improved.
128
 
The military authorities in France acquiesced and, shortly after Christmas, Dent was in 
a position to observe that: 
There is no doubt stores are suffering to a great extent through there being insufficient 
provision for stacking and storing under cover. Boulogne is a very good port for quick 
handling and, by using it properly, the transit of supplies to the front is much 
accelerated. In view of the increase in the army, it is desirable that we should get on as 
quickly as possible.
129
 
 
To ensure that ‘proper’ use was made of Boulogne, Dent proposed that the SECR, in addition to 
undertaking the building work at the Bassin Loubet, should be given responsibility for the 
operation of all areas of the port reserved for the use of the BEF. Dent’s offer entailed the SECR 
taking over the ‘work of discharging ships, stacking supplies and loading trains, [and] providing 
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all the personnel’ for these tasks rather than relying upon the dwindling supply of labour 
available from French sources.
130
 
Essentially, Dent was offering to supersede the suggestion made by the Director of 
Railway Transport the previous month. The SECR would replace the existing system whereby 
the naval staff were responsible for the discharge of ships onto the quayside, and the army for 
the forward transport and storage of goods.
131
 In a memorandum provided for the Director of 
Supplies, Dent outlined the rationale behind his recommendations. The object of the Bassin 
Loubet in peacetime ‘was to ensure quick transit between steamer and train. The hangars were 
laid out with a view to easy checking and customs examination’, and the boats supplying the 
port were, by and large, the same railway steamers as operated the routes in peace and for whom 
the basin had originally been constructed.
132
 The work of discharging ships, stacking supplies 
and loading trains was no different to the work undertaken at the railway ports controlled by the 
SECR. In fact, the military work would be ‘simple’ in comparison to ordinary trade practices, as 
the vast majority of supplies would arrive in bulk and would not require lengthy customs 
examinations upon arrival in France.
133
 There was, Dent concluded, ‘nothing in the way of 
checking or loading that would not be easy enough for a railway checker to perform’.134 
By managing the port using civilian working methods, Dent believed the dock to be 
capable of turning over 5,000 tons per day, provided that factors which operated against ‘quick 
work’ were eliminated.135 The proposed solution to these factors, including the new sidings and 
accommodation then under construction, were designed to produce a system whereby the 
majority of supplies were transferred direct from ship to rail upon arrival in France. Items 
required urgently at the front could be sent forward immediately, whilst those not required 
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straight away could be moved to storage sites away from the docks. This would ensure that the 
quayside would be kept free of obstructions to facilitate the discharge of arriving vessels. With 
the projected demands for food alone set to reach 4,400 tons per day once the Kitchener armies 
began to arrive,
136
 Dent’s estimates were understandably appealing to the officers charged with 
ensuring the BEF continued to receive sustenance. However, the Director of Supplies, Major-
General Frederick Clayton, was sceptical that Dent’s estimates were achievable at Boulogne, 
and had reservations over the practicality of the proposed ‘quick transit’ scheme. 
A central tenet of Dent’s plan to maximize efficiency at the Bassin Loubet involved the 
loading of cargo in Britain so that ‘each ship should have approximately sufficient of everything 
to make the greater part of one or more supply trains’.137 This would enable trains to be made up 
directly from the quayside, reducing the amount of ‘double-handling’ required in unloading 
ships, storing within the harbour and then transferring to rail. Any surplus stocks on each ship, 
or perishable items which had to be regularly ‘turned over’ to prevent spoilage, would be placed 
into systematized stores for later despatch. Although ideal in terms of efficiency, such a system 
was unfeasible as a solution to the requirements of an industrial army with a multitude of 
demands. For a start, the bulk of a soldier’s ration was meat and bread. The meat was taken 
from cold storage ships berthed at Boulogne, the bread baked in open fields near the port and 
transported by lorry to the railway.
138
 Neither of these integral commodities would therefore be 
on board the ships whose cargo was being transferred direct to rail. Furthermore, the rest of the 
soldier’s diet was regularly changed.139 Preserved meat would be substituted for fresh, whilst 
vegetables, bacon, and butter would be rotated to ensure that ‘Tommy’ received a diet that was 
not endless ‘tea and dog biscuits’.140 In addition, items such as petrol and lubricating oil which 
were also essential to the front line troops were not transported on the same ships as food, to 
prevent contamination. In short, Clayton summarized, ‘you could not pack a train for any 
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formation straight from the ship except as regards hay and oats’.141 Yet despite these detailed 
criticisms Clayton was, at this point of the war at least,
142
 sufficiently amenable to civilian 
involvement to encourage further discussion of Dent’s suggestions. 
Clayton and Robertson both saw the potential benefits in affording the SECR increased 
responsibility in the operation of the port, and a committee was formed to consider and discuss 
amendments and improvements to Dent’s scheme. The membership of the committee 
emphasizes the number of departments affected by changes in the supply procedures of the BEF, 
with officers attending from the staffs of: the Principal Naval Transport Officer; the Director of 
Railway Transport; the Director of Supplies (Clayton himself was the chair); the Director of 
Works; and the Director of Ordnance Services.
143
 The complexity of the intended operations 
and Dent’s ongoing commitments to the REC were such that a comprehensive statement of the 
projected arrangements was not submitted in time for consideration at the committee’s first 
meeting in late January 1915.
144
 Nevertheless, both the naval and military elements saw the 
‘advantage’ in centralizing responsibility for the management of Boulogne, and were willing to 
accept Dent’s offer subject to approval from GHQ, the War Office, and, as hosts, the French 
authorities.
145
 In the two weeks following the committee’s first meeting, Fred West (Goods 
Superintendent of the London district of the SECR) was asked to ‘ascertain the system of work 
of the various departments and to discuss various points with the officers in charge’.146 Upon the 
completion of his investigations the committee reconvened to evaluate West’s report, a 
combination of observations regarding the existing situation at Boulogne and recommendations 
to help the BEF ‘obtain the maximum amount of efficiency and economy’ in future.147 
                                                 
141
 WO 95/3952 Clayton to Dent, 30 December 1914. 
142
 Clayton’s attitude towards civilian involvement later in the war will be discussed further below, 
chapter 3.2. 
143
 WO 95/3952 Robertson to Maxwell, 9 January 1915. 
144
 WO 95/3953 Clayton to Twiss, 3 February 1915. 
145
 WO 95/3952 diary entry, 29 January 1915; WO 95/64 French to Kitchener, 23 February 1915. The 
committee’s approval was retained despite Dent’s subsequent downward revision of the estimated 
capacity of the Bassin Loubet to 3,536 tons per day. 
146
 WO 95/3952 Commandant, Boulogne Base to Clayton, 27 January 1915. 
147
 WO 95/3953 Bassin Loubet – Boulogne. Mr West’s Report, 13 February 1915. 
122 
 
The second meeting of the committee focused upon the importance of installing an 
appropriate ‘single authority’ to centralize control of the supply system within the port. Far from 
being treated as an ‘outsider’, Dent played a key role in the discussion, fielding questions from 
the military and naval officers and elaborating upon the projected role of the SECR in the new 
system.
148
 The members unanimously agreed that the navy, due to their inexperience in handling 
the landside procedures required to shift supplies away from the quayside, should cede 
responsibility for the work of discharging ships to that ‘single authority’. Once a ship had 
successfully berthed at the port, therefore, the navy’s responsibilities at Boulogne would be 
complete until the ship was ready to depart.
149
 The SECR’s experience in the operation of 
railway ports, their established commercial connections at Boulogne, the involvement of the 
company in the construction works being supervised by Percy Tempest, not to mention Dent’s 
evident willingness to take on the project; these factors resulted in the committee agreeing that 
the SECR represented ‘the most suitable’ entity to take on the responsibilities devolved upon 
the ‘single authority’.150 
Despite consensus being achieved in France, such a significant change in procedure 
required ratification from the War Office, which was inexorably slow to arrive. Permission was 
first requested on 4 February; confirmation finally arrived on 17 March after persistent appeals 
from Clayton,
151
 effectively putting the new system into stasis for six weeks. Further delays 
were then necessary in order for Dent to ‘collect his own staff’ for work in the port, for those 
men to observe the ‘routine working of a [military] port’ prior to taking over the Bassin Loubet, 
and for arrangements between the SECR and the French rail authorities to be finalized. 
Following discussions between Dent, the Director of Railway Transport and representatives of 
the Commissions Regulatrice, the SECR was eventually authorized to take over ‘all the work of 
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shunting, marshalling and the making up of trains in the Bassin Loubet’ from 25 April.152 The 
working of the other ports at which the BEF received shipments would continue to operate 
under the originally agreed procedures. Boulogne was, in all respects, a civil-military 
experiment. 
The result of this sequence of delays was that the SECR took over operations at a port 
which had experienced increasing congestion, as huge quantities of supplies were despatched to 
a port largely incapable of handling them.
153
 With demands from the front rising exponentially 
as the BEF commenced operations at Neuve Chapelle, the War Office responded by despatching 
ships as quickly as possible in the direction of the battlefield. Unfortunately, this meant that 
ships were arriving in France without sufficient intervals to allow each ship’s cargo to be 
discharged and, crucially, cleared from the quayside before the next ship berthed. Further 
problems were experienced due to poor communications on either side of the Channel, leaving 
staff at Boulogne with incomplete or unsatisfactory information regarding the contents of 
arriving ships. As an example, the SS Juno set out for Boulogne on 13 March with port staff 
informed only that she carried ‘general cargo’.154 With limited crane facilities available it was 
imperative that the port authorities received prior notice of the stores arriving, so that they could 
be directed to the most suitable berth and dealt with punctually. Without such information, 
Clayton warned, the supply services could not guarantee that urgent supplies would be 
processed in time.
155
 
To help alleviate this issue, Dent suggested the installation of a bespoke telephone 
connection between Boulogne and the SECR’s offices in London, Dover, Folkestone, Calais 
and Dunkirk. The system would allow for timely information to be received as to the contents of 
each ship prior to their arrival at the port, allowing those on the French side of the Channel to 
direct the incoming traffic to the most suitable berth and to arrange for the provision of any 
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specific requirements, such as specialist unloading gear, to be made available.
156
 The War 
Office raised no objection. However, although the BEF had been granted ‘every latitude’ for the 
improvement of local transport facilities within the zone populated by the fighting troops, 
schemes for more permanent installations of this type also had to be signed off by the French.
157
 
The provision of telephone facilities for the use of the SECR was clearly not considered a 
priority at GQG, as by the end of October Clayton had received no decision. Clayton clearly felt 
all along that the French were ‘unlikely’ to accede to Dent’s request,158 but following an appeal 
to ‘badger’ Joffre’s staff a further enquiry was made which generated a refusal from the French 
in early November.
159
 The reason given was that the French were disinclined to grant such 
privileges to a civilian firm. Although the proposed telephone line would be of great benefit to 
the Allies during the war, they would also hypothetically give the SECR a competitive 
advantage over French firms operating in the commercial sphere once the war was over. This 
potential scenario was coupled with a perception among the French staff that a ‘custom’ of 
unauthorized telephone use had ‘grown up’ in the SECR’s offices over the course of 1915, 
leading to a conviction that the existing facilities were adequate for the BEF’s requirements.160 
Although this ‘incident’ may appear superficial, the disagreement illustrates the limits 
of the business arrangement which existed between France and Britain during the war. 
Throughout the conflict, British and French (and Belgian) authorities were involved in a 
complex series of negotiations, within which the post-war economic and strategic 
considerations of the individual partners provided an underlying context which militated against 
absolute cooperation. Even the provision of a unified command in the latter months of the war 
could not eradicate national concerns and underlying suspicions, culminating in a Franco-
British disagreement over the necessity of upgrading the equipment available at Dunkirk which 
continued until the Armistice had come into force. Although the port was acknowledged by both 
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the army and the Admiralty as a more suitable candidate for transport improvement than the 
other ports serving the BEF at that point,
161
 the then QMG Travers Clarke was unable to ignore 
misgivings that the French were keen to see Dunkirk repaired for commercial reasons. Clarke 
stated in his review of November 1918 that, ‘unless absolutely demanded by the interests of 
victory, it was no part of our military or national duty to enlarge or modernize the equipment of 
foreign ports for after-the-war trade’.162 
Despite ostensibly seeking the same goal in Europe, the defeat of Germany, the war 
aims of both powers were in many respects profoundly different. These disparities, coupled with 
the changing nature of the comparative contributions of the two nations, required French and 
British leaders to constantly participate in a process of discussion and compromise in order to 
preserve the delicate connection between the countries.
163
 The absence of a ‘formal contract’ 
agreed upon prior to the war, and the lack of any organ for collective decision-making, helped 
reinforce the primacy of national considerations over coalition requirements.
164
 In 1915, the 
relative strength of the French in terms of land power, and the location of the BEF on French 
soil (an expanding commitment the scale of which had not been accurately anticipated before 
August 1914), acted as a powerful bargaining tool in such discussions. The French retained the 
‘upper hand’ and would continue to do so until the attritional struggles of 1916 further equalized 
the relative strengths of the Allied forces on the Western Front.
165
 Consequently, the installation 
of a bespoke telephone line to help improve the efficiency of the British logistics effort was not 
deemed of sufficient importance to the war effort to override French national considerations of 
post-war industrial positioning. 
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A failure of ‘civilianization’? 
Although the work of the SECR employees at Boulogne does not appear to have created 
any problems related specifically to the integration of civilian and military working practices, 
the continued growth of the BEF and consequent increases in demand for stores to be processed 
through the Channel ports created enormous strain in the system. The expanding scale of 
Britain’s commitment to the war also meant that Dent became increasingly disengaged from the 
experiment at Boulogne from March 1915 onwards. Such were the competing demands for men 
of established credentials and recognized organizational ability that Dent’s personal 
commitments were numerous by the time the SECR took over at the Bassin Loubet. In addition 
to his responsibilities with the various ambulance train sub-committees, Dent also participated 
in the creation of the Railway Operating Division [ROD], interviewing applicants for 
commissions in the division, and contributed to the identification and organization of Belgian 
railwaymen from among the refugee population in Britain.
166
 Furthermore, the decision to 
switch the main port of departure for British troops from Southampton to Folkestone (taken to 
reduce the journey time across the Channel and save shipping) vastly increased the quantity of 
military traffic passing over the SECR’s network. The upshot of these developments was that 
the day-to-day operations at the Bassin Loubet would not be overseen by Dent, but instead were 
left to Francis Flood-Page, the company’s Northern district Superintendent. Although clearly a 
capable official (he would receive the Military Cross in 1916), Flood-Page lacked both the 
experience and authority of the SECR’s General Manager. 
Despite encouraging early signs, ‘considerable progress’ was reported in the 
arrangement of storage accommodation on 3 May,
167
 by the middle of the month – less than 
three weeks after the SECR had taken over – congestion at Boulogne reached the point at which 
the Director of Supplies was forced to authorize the stacking of stores ‘in the open’.168 The 
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following month, sustained demands for ammunition led GHQ to request that additional labour 
be sent to Boulogne to ensure that the shells required at the front could be discharged and sent 
forward each day.
169
 For the specialist duty of handling hazardous explosives, the ASC had to 
transfer men from Calais to alleviate the immediate problem.
170
 By the end of August, the 
Director of Supplies had clearly begun to lose patience with what he deemed ‘the so-called Dent 
scheme’s’ inability to clear the ports as promised by the civilian the previous winter.171 
Following an inspection of the port and discussions with Clayton about the difficulties 
which had been experienced since the introduction of the ‘Dent scheme’, a decision was made 
to revert to the ‘old method’ of operating the Bassin Loubet for a fortnight’s trial.172 The ASC 
regained responsibility for the removal of stores from the quayside, with the personnel of the 
SECR retained purely for the discharge of ships and as labour to be directed by the military. The 
trial was adjudged to be ‘an unqualified success’ by the military departmental representatives 
asked to review the system (the same departments who had authorized the initiation of the ‘Dent 
scheme’ in March) as ‘ships were offloaded and dealt with more quickly’. 173  The naval 
representatives were less satisfied however, and a report proposing a reversion to the system 
whereby naval officers supervised the discharge of ships was forwarded to the Principal Naval 
Transport Officer in France on 1 October.
174
 
Despite Clayton’s request not to ‘disturb the existing arrangement’,175 the War Office 
was forced to concede that with the onshore labour back under the control of the army, it was 
illogical to resist the navy from regaining authority over the workforce employed on the 
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ships.
176
 The argument was particularly compelling when it is remembered that of all the supply 
ports being used by the BEF during 1915 (Boulogne, Calais, Havre, Marseille and Rouen), it 
was only Boulogne which had been subject to the ‘single authority’ experiment. By reverting to 
the ‘old method’, the BEF would merely be restoring Boulogne to the working practices 
familiar to soldiers, sailors and labourers at each of the other ports contributing to the supply of 
the BEF. On 24 October 1915, the SECR surrendered responsibility for the unloading of ships 
in the Bassin Loubet.
177
 Six months after the civil-military experiment had begun it had been 
terminated. 
The decision to reduce the authority of the SECR’s personnel at the Bassin Loubet is 
not evidence of ‘anti-civilian phobia’ among the senior command of the BEF, however. Such a 
conclusion overplays the existence of ‘ingrained distrust’ supposedly displayed by military 
chiefs towards the civilian expert in the first half of the war. The ‘Dent scheme’ was not 
persevered with into 1916 and beyond because the nature of the British war effort, to that point, 
had not provided the required impetus for the military – and political – authorities to re-evaluate 
the entire logistical bedrock underpinning the BEF’s existence. As the QMG’s final report states: 
‘the stationary character of the warfare of the first two years placed no undue strain upon the 
QMG’s branch’.178 Although congestion remained a considerable issue on both sides of the 
Channel, it had not as yet developed into the constraining factor on operations due to the 
relative paucity of supplies being handled in comparison to the capacity of the infrastructure in 
place. Despite being largely ignored in subsequent works, the progress of the ‘Dent scheme’ is 
worthy of study as it demonstrates both that the BEF was willing to engage with a man of 
recognized technical proficiency and established managerial ability, and how the logistical 
implications of the evolving, industrial character of the Western Front were fully developed 
neither at the end of December 1914, when Dent made his initial observations, nor in October 
1915 when the experiment drew to a close. 
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Although there was an acknowledgement within the military of the potential benefits of 
utilizing civilian expertise to increase productivity and improve fluidity on the transport 
network in northern France, this was not matched by a political desire to expand this process to 
cover all aspects of the BEF’s operations. The single-port experiment at Boulogne was 
essentially little more than ‘tinkering’ with one link in a long and complex chain, one with a 
multitude of potential weaknesses which lay dormant until the colossal demands of the Somme 
exposed the structural frailties in the BEF’s logistical foundations. As a result, the SECR’s 
failure to generate the estimated levels of productivity over the summer of 1915 (in part due to 
French protectionism as well as to Dent’s overambitious projections and the sustained increase 
in demands being made on the port by the expanding army) overshadowed the long-term 
improvements introduced to Boulogne by the SECR. The relatively small-scale of the 
experiment, coupled with the undesirable complications of operating different working 
procedures at Boulogne to the other Channel ports, saw the ‘Dent scheme’ ‘shelved’ before the 
end of the year.
179
 For another civil-military organization established in the final days of 1914 
however, October 1915 would bring about the opposite result. 
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2.3: The Directorate of Inland Water Transport: An overshadowed 
civil-military initiative 
Concurrent with the December 1914 investigation which would ultimately lead to the 
implementation of the ‘Dent scheme’ at Boulogne, another non-military figure was making 
proposals to the War Office which would have long-term implications for the logistics of the 
BEF. In much the same way as the work of Sir Francis Dent has been marginalized, the man 
responsible for bringing the Directorate of Inland Water Transport into being has been largely 
forgotten by the historiography of the conflict. Ian M. Brown, whilst acknowledging the role of 
inland water transport [IWT] in reducing the demands made upon the French railway network, 
both misdates the initiation of the service and makes no comment upon the manner of its 
creation.
180
 Charles Messenger, in his survey of the British Army’s evolution during the war, 
refers to IWT only in an appendix dedicated to cataloguing military acronyms and 
abbreviations.
181
 Whilst the development of rail transport during the war has generated a 
considerable collection of material, outside of brief passages in the Official History volume on 
transportation the contribution of IWT to the conduct of operations on the Western Front has 
been reduced to that of a mere footnote. 
The absence of a European companion to Hall’s volume on waterborne transport 
developments in Mesopotamia,
182
 although understandable in terms of the relative importance 
of IWT on the Western Front and in the Middle East,
183
 has led to the eclipse of canal and cross-
Channel traffic and the diminution of the roles of those involved in providing them in Europe 
for the majority of the conflict. The result is an incomplete understanding of the intricate 
mixture of supply methods cultivated by the BEF on the Western Front. Furthermore, the 
history of IWT in France adds further evidence to contradict Lloyd George’s assertions of 
ingrained distrust from the BEF’s senior command towards those from outside the army. From 
its very inception, the directorate was a ‘civilianized’ organization. The experience of IWT 
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demonstrates that profitable civil-military partnerships could be and were developed prior to the 
arrival of Sir Eric Geddes in the late summer of 1916. However, due to the combination of 
factors previously discussed: alliance politics; wider organizational deficiencies within the BEF; 
and an incomplete conception of the role of transportation within the British ‘war machine’, 
prior to the Somme IWT would not become a fully integrated component of the BEF’s logistics 
system. 
 
Commander Gerald Holland and the birth of inland water transport 
The corner of northern Europe which became the Western Front was not only served by 
a communications network based on road and rail. The canal and river systems of France and 
Belgium were ‘undoubtedly among the finest in the world’,184 consisting of almost ten thousand 
miles of navigable waterways across the two nations.
185
 Unlike in Britain, where the spread of 
railways had all but eliminated the canals as a carrier of goods prior to the First World War, the 
Belgian waterways were responsible for approximately half of the goods and merchandise 
traffic within Belgium. In 1905, the total quantity of goods carried by water in Belgium 
amounted to 53,345,000 tons.
186
 The war brought this traffic almost to a standstill. The 
‘permanent way’ of the canal network, however, remained in many places both intact and, in 
northern France following the initial phase of mobile operations, within the hands of the Allies. 
Yet despite the acknowledged existence of this network of waterways, the thorough 
reconnaissance of which had taken place over the previous years as the BEF prepared for a 
European deployment,
187
 such studies had not been buttressed by the creation of a procedure for 
the operation of IWT in the event of war.
188
 The only reference made in the instructions issued 
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to the IGC on mobilization were that ‘unless otherwise ordered... the Director of Transport will 
act as Director of IWT’ in addition to their other duties.189 
The reasons for this omission were threefold. In the first instance, the British Army had 
not utilized IWT during the war in South Africa. Coupled with the minimal use of canals in 
peacetime British industry, the army had consequently become ‘blinded’ to the advantages 
which an efficiently operated network of canals and rivers could offer.
190
 Secondly, when placed 
in direct comparison with the railway network serving the Western Front, the limitations of IWT 
were stark. Waterborne traffic routes were fixed, and the process of altering the flow of rivers or 
canals would take far longer than the equivalent task on the railways. Repairs to waterways 
damaged during operations also required far greater commitments of manpower and resources 
than similar lengths of railway, whilst the rate of progress of river craft also made them 
unsuitable for supply tasks in what was predicted to be a war of manoeuvre. Restricted to travel 
only during daylight hours, the negotiation of lock gates and problems related to adverse winds 
and currents further widened the already significant ‘speed gap’ between barge and 
locomotive.
191
 In the same way that the speeds of lorries were restricted in order to protect the 
roads from unnecessary wear to both vehicle and surface,
192
 canal traffic was limited to a top 
speed of six kilometres per hour for single vessels (and just four-and-a-half kilometres per hour 
for convoys) to ensure that the wash emanating from the craft did not damage the banks.
193
 
Finally, although much of the northern French network remained in Allied hands after the 
establishment of static warfare in the winter of 1914, a considerable stretch of the Belgian 
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system along with key connections on the French (such as the St. Quentin canal), either lay in 
the possession of the Germans or were unsafe for craft.
194
 
Despite these impediments, Commander Gerald Holland approached the War Office in 
the early weeks of the war convinced that the ‘splendid’ waterways of France and Belgium 
could provide a useful supplement to the existing rail facilities.
195
 As the rank suggested, 
Holland’s background was with the navy. Having joined the Royal Indian Marine in 1880, 
Holland had seen service in Burma before an appointment on the Naval Transport Staff in 
Durban during the South African War. His naval career ended in India in 1905 as the principal 
port officer at Rangoon, following which he returned to Britain and entered the employment of 
Britain’s largest railway company, the LNWR. Following a brief spell as Marine Superintendent 
at Fleetwood, in 1907 Holland transferred to fulfil the same role at Holyhead, occupying the 
position formerly held by Francis Dent’s father when war broke out in August 1914.196  
Holland’s initial approach was unsuccessful ‘as it was at that time considered that rail 
transport, supplemented by adequate road transport, would fully meet the requirements’ of the 
BEF in terms of logistical support.
197
 Rather than evidence of innate Whitehall insularity, 
however, the War Office’s decision was reflective of the military situation at the time. In the 
fluid opening encounters of the conflict there was both comparatively little strain on the French 
railways to provide for the ‘contemptibly’ small contingent from across the Channel, and – as 
noted above – a dearth of high-quality IWT facilities in the zone initially occupied by the BEF. 
However, following the move north of the British forces in October, and the onset of trench 
warfare as the position of the front line stabilized, both of these factors changed. Firstly, the 
decision to raise and deploy a large army on the Western Front brought with it the requirement 
to create and maintain a correspondingly large supply network to feed and equip that force. 
Secondly, the BEF’s deployment in Flanders placed it within the scope of the northern 
                                                 
194
 WO 158/851 History of IWT, p. 4; Henniker. 
195
 TNA: PRO CAB 45/205 Private diary of Lieutenant-Colonel G.E. Holland, R.E., information dictated 
by Major Bradbury. 
196
 The biographical information in this passage is taken from D. Biggins, ‘Order of the Indian Empire’, 
AngloBoerWar.com <http://angloboerwar.com/medals-and-awards/british/1869-order-of-the-indian-
empire> [accessed 9 September 2014]. 
197
 CAB 45/205 Holland diary, information dictated. 
134 
 
waterways (see Figure 2.2) and therefore made the use of IWT far more practicable than had 
been the case when Holland first approached the War Office. As a result of these developments, 
on 10 December 1914 the loading of barges as supply vessels began at Berguette,
198
 on 14 
December Holland’s name was raised as a ‘suitable officer’ to ‘connect’ the canal and railway 
networks,
199
 and on 28 December Commander Holland (whose name had been retained by the 
War Office for just such an eventuality) was offered a temporary commission in the Royal 
Engineers. Two days later, Lieutenant-Colonel Holland crossed the Channel in order to ‘report 
as to the steps which should be taken to enable the waterways to be utilized for transport work 
for the British Army’.200 
 Holland’s private diary from this period survives, and illustrates both the complexity of 
the task ahead of him, and the assistance provided by the military despite his status as an 
‘outsider’. On 30 December 1914, Holland reported for duty at GHQ and, in contravention of 
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Figure 2.2 Map of the northern waterways 
Source: Henniker, p. 173. 
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the instructions issued to the IGC upon mobilization, was placed under the authority of the 
Director of Railway Transport rather than the Director of Transport.
201
 The reason given for this 
decision carries the echo of Girouard’s report submitted in October, suggesting that as the 
French regarded canals and railways as ‘one question’, the British organization ought to mirror 
that of the senior partner in the coalition and administer canal and railway transport within the 
same department.
202
 The idea of following the French hierarchical structure would survive until 
October 1915. The possibility of using French crews to pilot the craft (in the same way that 
French drivers operated the locomotives supplying the BEF) was abandoned much sooner. On 
the day after his arrival in France, Holland interviewed a local tug captain and ascertained that 
the French custom was for a barge to be operated and lived on by an entire family, and – even 
more inconveniently – that the locals would not ‘go where ordered – [they] want to choose the 
ports they will ply on’.203 A meeting with the French Army’s canal expert revealed that this 
obstinacy was not based on any kind of national intransigence, the crews happened to be just as 
truculent in the face of French military authority.
204
 At the beginning of 1915, therefore, the 
IWT department consisted of ‘two officers, no men, one hired tug and thirty-four barges’.205 
The only alternative available to Holland was to enlist personnel from Britain to man 
the barges and to provide the technical and administrative support necessary to maintain an 
efficient fleet of craft. Holland’s diary records both the names and the experiences of those 
chosen to populate the new department, emphasizing the breadth of skills required to manage a 
modern army. The majority, unsurprisingly, were chosen as a result of having prior knowledge 
of shipping, such as Horace Pitman, who had ten years’ experience as a yachtsman. Corporal 
William McKinlay, who had originally enlisted in 1914, was transferred into the department by 
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virtue of having trained as a surveyor with Lloyd’s before the war.206 George Tagg, despite his 
being fifty-two years of age, was appointed for his knowledge of the French and Belgian canal 
systems and his family connections to the boat building industry.
207
 
Others were chosen for less obvious, but no less important abilities, such as E.G. 
Weston, Assistant Secretary in the Colonial Civil Service, who was appointed to offer clerical 
support in the War Office for the newly established department.
208
 The War Office itself also 
provided a cadre of officers, with the Director of Movements, Brigadier-General Richard 
Montagu Stuart-Wortley, agreeing to the release of Lieutenant Baugh and the attachment of 
Colonel Collard to the fledgling outfit.
209
 However, the majority of recruits, and the nucleus 
around which IWT on the Western Front was constructed, entered the department as a direct 
result of its founder’s pre-war career. Holland’s three senior subordinates were all retired 
officers of the Royal Indian Marine, whilst the LNWR contributed a number of administrative 
and marine staff who volunteered to serve under their pre-war manager.
210
 On 13 January, a list 
of men from the Marine Department at Holyhead who were willing to enlist was compiled, 
‘fifty all told’, each being medically examined and sent to the Royal Engineers’ training camp at 
Longmoor.
211
 An ‘active campaign of enlistment’ at various ports in Britain accounted for the 
lightermen, watermen, seamen, engineers and other assorted trades required to ensure the 
department’s ability to fulfil its duties.212 
Not only would Holland be in charge of the provision of adequate personnel and 
equipment to maintain a dependable delivery service, he would also be responsible for the repair 
of vessels and waterways, for the efficient operation of inland quays and docks, for regulating 
traffic on the canals, and for providing a telephone link across the entire IWT network in order 
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to secure communications.
213
 With the Directorate of Railway Transport coming under 
increasing pressure to provide additional railway personnel and facilities as the pre-war 
agreement with the French began to unravel (not to mention the profound differences between 
the two modes of transport), it was impossible for Holland to rely upon his nominal superior for 
guidance and support. The Director of Railway Transport, Colonel Twiss, was a ‘pure’ 
railwayman, lacking the technical knowledge of IWT upon which to found policy judgments 
within the directorate.
214
 As a result, on 2 February Holland was given twenty-five expert 
telephone linesmen to undertake all the necessary communications work required to make IWT 
a self-sufficient unit.
215
 
Concurrent with the organizational concerns, work was beginning. On 5 January 1915 
barges received road stone from Guernsey direct from a ship berthed at Calais, and inland 
discharge utilizing civilian labour contracted from a local firm was arranged the following 
day.
216
 As the units recruited in Britain passed through Longmoor and crossed to France, the 
civilian labour withdrew and the department began to resemble more closely a recognizable 
provider of military logistics. Despite the isolation of IWT from railway transport in terms of its 
command relationship, the organization of the department’s operations bore similarities to those 
employed by the railways, in both peace and war. In much the same way that the Railway 
Transport Establishments were formed to oversee the BEF’s use of railways,217 and to act as a 
conduit for British requirements to the French authorities, authority over IWT operations was 
divided into districts under the charge of a district officer.
218
 Not only were the district officers 
responsible for the loading and unloading of vessels within their zone of supervision, and for 
maintaining contact with the British and French military authorities in the area, they were also 
responsible for ensuring the safe passage of vessels through the district and the ‘passing on’ of 
information to neighbouring districts. 
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In effect IWT operated a system of divisional responsibility which decentralized the 
detail of everyday work and encouraged initiative among district officers (the ‘men on the spot’), 
freeing Holland and his senior subordinates to concentrate on establishing the principles and 
procedures required to obtain the highest degree of efficiency from the fleet. It was an 
organizational solution borrowed from the railways, expounded by the Midland Railway 
immediately prior to the war in a pamphlet issued to showcase their pioneering Train Control 
System.
219
 With the construction of new waterways impracticable, it was imperative that the 
existing network was used as productively as possible. To do so required the coordination of the 
BEF’s military traffic (which was by far the most prevalent of all canal use during the war), that 
supplying the Belgian and French armies, and the small amount of civilian traffic which 
continued to operate on the water.
220
 The telephone system was used to ‘pass on’ vessels from 
district to district and to update officers of their forthcoming traffic commitments. Such detailed 
information gave district officers advanced warning of upcoming busy periods, affording them 
the opportunity to arrange for extra labour to be put in place to reduce congestion around 
sequences of lock gates.
221
 The whereabouts of each vessel was also relayed back to GHQ every 
night and recorded on a diagram board – a central component of the Midland Railway’s control 
system – giving Holland’s staff a daily, graphical illustration of the whereabouts of the fleet. 
Such innovations aided decision-making in relation to the redistribution of craft and personnel 
as circumstances dictated.
222
 
By the end of June 1915, almost three months before Brown dates the initiation of a 
canal service on the Western Front, Holland’s department had provided transport for: 15,926 
tons of supplies; 27,241 tons of road metal; 3,216 tons of miscellaneous supplies (including 
bridging materials and coal); and 628 officers and men had been evacuated from the battle zone 
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by ambulance barge.
223
 By September, Holland could record with justifiable pride that 
requisitions for over 156,000 tons to be transported by IWT before the end of the year had been 
received, and that 1,200 tons were being carried daily over the northern waterways.
224
 In nine 
months the department had expanded from ‘one tug and thirty-four hired barges’ to control a 
fleet of over 270 vessels (with more on order) with a total capacity in excess of 38,000 tons.
225
 
Holland, however, was not satisfied with these achievements. Following the separation of IWT 
from Twiss’ authority in October 1915,226 and in direct contradiction of the reactive, ‘ad hoc’, 
pragmatic image of the BEF’s administration during the first half of the war as propagated by 
Lloyd George, Holland would spend the next twelve months preparing IWT for the future 
expansion of both the directorate and of the demands which would be placed upon it. 
 As the ‘Dent scheme’ at Boulogne was in the process of being terminated, Holland’s 
directorate gained its independence from the Director of Railway Transport and sanction for the 
raising of a sixth section of workers for the IWT service was granted by the War Office.
227
 The 
‘failure’ of the SECR’s employees to overcome the challenges created by the scale and 
complexity of the expanding British war effort should not overshadow the creation and 
development of a ‘civilianized’ IWT directorate during the same period. Far from being gripped 
by Brown’s ‘anti-civilian phobia’ at this point in the war, the continued expansion of IWT – in 
terms of personnel and in the scope of its authority – demonstrates that the BEF’s senior 
administrators were far more open to the possibility of applying civilian expertise to the 
challenges of battlefield supply during 1915 than has previously been asserted. However, the 
process of converting this recognition into an integrated component of the Allied transportation 
system would expose the limits of the BEF’s freedom of action on foreign soil, and the 
perceived utility of a slow means of transport operating outside the ‘traditional’ supply 
hierarchy. 
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Expansion and restriction in the development of inland water transport, 1915-1916 
Although the French and Belgian waterways comprised a vast network of navigable 
canals and rivers, the department of IWT began work in 1915 on just a small section connecting 
the ports of Dunkirk and Calais with the towns of Armentières and Béthune. Despite this limited 
zone of operations, the policy followed by Holland throughout his tenure as head of the service 
was one of ‘looking well ahead and forecasting the probable requirements of the future’.228 Such 
an outlook was by no means unique within the administrative ranks of the BEF. As we have 
seen, Sir Percy Girouard’s report into transport arrangements had as a core component the 
question of defining responsibility for supplying the BEF in the event of an Allied advance into 
Belgium. Regardless of the prevailing school of thought within the directorate, however, for 
IWT the period between the separation of the command link to the Director of Railway 
Transport and the Battle of the Somme would not be one of steady and unbroken expansion. 
The restrictions placed on the service during this time clearly illustrate the limitations of 
coalition warfare as the scale of the conflict increased, and also the difficulties inherent in the 
amalgamation of a new transport method into a pre-existing logistics system. 
There were many reasons why Holland could write in September 1915 of a need to plan 
for the acquisition and employment of ‘double, even treble, and possibly a still greater number 
of vessels’ than the 330 at that time accounted for. 229  In the first instance, inter-Allied 
discussions under the umbrella of the Railways and Canal Commission had decreed three 
months earlier that, in the event of any advance taking place in the zone containing the BEF, the 
responsibility for repair, maintenance, and use of the waterways in the area would be devolved 
upon the British to effect.
230
 Although Henniker’s official account does not record the outcome 
of the deliberations relating to the canal network, it is clear from Holland’s diary that he had 
stressed to Henniker the importance of securing British control over the Belgian canals should 
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the advance take place.
231
 The pre-war agreement between the French and British had already 
begun to unravel, and Holland was quick to identify that the responsibilities for maintenance 
and operation of the waterways could not be divorced from control over the network. 
A second reason given by Holland for promoting the expansion of the IWT service was 
financial. For cargo carried by the French railways on behalf of the BEF the British incurred a 
charge, whereas freight handled in British vessels would incur no cost to the Treasury.
232
 
Furthermore, Holland predicted, the engagement of French workshops on war-related work, and 
the ongoing military recruitment of huge numbers from the French labour force, meant that the 
French stock of vessels was likely to be badly degraded during the conflict. Consequently, 
Holland observed: 
It follows [that] if this is a correct forecast that at the end of the war, any vessels we 
may have will be of great value to replace losses, and will assuredly be bought by those, 
who then turn their attention to the restoration of commercial business, at prices which 
will, I confidently expect, recoup a large proportion of our outlay.
233
 
 
The most significant justification for expanding the role of IWT, however, lay in conjunction 
with the difficulties being experienced throughout 1915 at the docks under BEF control. 
As demonstrated from the very outset of their use in France, IWT vessels drawn up 
alongside ships berthed in port could be used to eliminate the need for supplies to be landed on 
the quayside. Not only did this reduce the demand for space within the confined accommodation 
immediately surrounding the harbours, but stores transferred to canal barge would not require 
rolling stock to transport them away from the ports by rail. Goods transported several miles 
inland by IWT allowed the diminishing number of wagons operating in northern France to be 
worked over shorter distances, leading to individual wagons returning to the depots at a higher 
frequency, and increasing the number of journeys each wagon could make to and from the front. 
Furthermore, the extra capacity provided by IWT created the option to remove stores with a 
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stable, predictable demand from the railways, freeing up rolling stock to respond to requests for 
more volatile stocks, most notably food and ammunition.
234
 
Consequently, as the shortage of rolling stock became ‘serious’ in the winter of 1915-
1916, and congestion at the ports of Calais and Dunkirk threatened the despatch of trains and 
the turnaround of ships, the decision was taken to construct an IWT depot capable of handling 
goods removed from those ports. The goal of the project was to reduce the BEF’s reliance upon 
the Channel ports, and on the railway communications which linked the ports with the wider 
French transport network. A suitable location for the depot was found at the junction of the 
Calais canal and the River Aa. Not only was the site within a day’s journey of both Calais and 
Dunkirk, it had the added advantage of offering a separate return route for traffic from the latter, 
minimizing congestion at the locks and maintaining fluidity in the system.
235
 However, as 1916 
progressed and the BEF’s expansion continued, Holland’s ambitions for the site grew. Rather 
than simply alleviate congestion at the docks by loading direct from ship to barge, Holland 
envisaged the depot at Zeneghem as the French hub of a direct cross-Channel barge service 
which would – for whatever traffic could be despatched by barge – entirely eliminate the need 
to use the Channel ports at all. Not only would such a service help relieve some of the pressure 
on the limited dock space at the Channel ports, but it would also reduce the journey length for 
the rolling stock required to forward the goods to the front. 
In full recognition of the fact that weather conditions in the Channel would restrict the 
frequency with which vessels could make the crossing, Holland wrote a memorandum on the 
subject on 29 April 1916. Following discussion in the Army Council, and despite the significant 
financial and material commitments required to bring the scheme into being, the project was 
unequivocally approved in London.
236
 By early May, Colonel Collard was engaged in the ‘very 
extensive’ work of placing orders in Britain for the construction of craft suitable for operation 
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both in the Channel and on the northern waterways.
237
 That such enthusiastic backing was given 
to the cross-Channel service, prior even to the breakdown of the transport network associated 
with the fighting on the Somme, emphasizes the high regard in which Holland’s opinion was 
held at the War Office and GHQ. Clearly, Holland’s non-membership of the army’s upper 
reaches did not cause his views to be ignored by the high command. 
Despite the obvious advantages to the coalition of implementing such a service (not 
least for the overburdened French railways, from whom GHQ received its first request for 
rolling stock in February 1916),
238
 permission to proceed with construction at Zeneghem was 
not automatically granted by GQG. Instead, work did not begin on the depot until 25 July 1916, 
almost a month into the Battle of the Somme.
239
 Although the location of a suitable site and the 
accumulation of the required building materials were contributory factors, the chief cause of the 
delay lay in the fractious relationship between Britain and her host. Only after ‘several 
proposals’ and multiple meetings with the French was the site near St. Pierre Brouck ‘eventually 
agreed upon’ for the depot.240 The requirement that the French must authorize all large-scale 
British projects on French territory has already been referred to in relation to working methods 
at Boulogne,
241
 and in the case of IWT, French insistence on retaining overall control of the 
decision-making process acted as a significant retardant on the growth of the directorate. Yet 
even before discussions began over the quay at Zeneghem, French bureaucracy had already 
served to frustrate Holland’s ambitions for the service, the proposed relief of Havre affording a 
notable example. 
In October 1915 Holland had suggested that, in order to facilitate the discharge of 
vessels at Havre and reduce congestion at the port, barges could be loaded direct from the ships 
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in dock and forwarded to Rouen via the Tancarville canal. The proposal was approved by both 
Maxwell and Clayton, but following ‘protracted negotiations’ the French authorities ‘would not 
hear of the proposal although it would undoubtedly have done much to relieve the congestion on 
the railways’.242 The relatively dispassionate language included in the post-war official report 
(which also claimed that ‘the French authorities [had], at all times, given courteous, prompt, and 
ungrudging aid’)243 lies in stark contrast to the tone in the documents produced by Holland in 
the immediate aftermath. In a memorandum written in May 1916, Holland dismissed the 
numerous reasons given by the French, which are sadly not elaborated upon, as 
‘unconvincing’;244 in his private diary he defaced the page charting the chrysalis of the idea with 
a note, scrawled in red pencil and depicting palpable frustration: ‘Finally French refused 
permission for any British service’.245 
Whilst Holland was attempting to be proactive, and planning for the expansion of the 
BEF’s logistical capabilities, the French authorities appear to have been asking the BEF to take 
on a larger share of the burden of sustaining the force whilst simultaneously acting to limit their 
ability to do so until absolute necessity intervened. This occurred in August 1916, when a 
chronic shortage of rolling stock resulting from the colossal demands of Verdun and the Somme 
led to severe congestion at Havre. Finally the French authorities agreed to the installation of a 
‘limited IWT service’ taking material direct from ships at the port and conveying it to depots 
inland. Yet with the barges required to operate the service only able to transfer from the 
northern waterways and the River Somme via the Channel, a journey time of thirty-three days, it 
was not until 22 September that IWT began to receive goods direct from ships berthed at 
Havre.
246
 As with the delayed start to the cross-Channel service centred on the depot of 
Zeneghem, it would not be the offensive operations of 1916 which would receive the benefit of 
Holland’s foresight, planning, and promotion of IWT over the first half of the war. 
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Yet to lay the blame for the lethargic exploitation of IWT in 1915-1916 purely at the 
feet of obstructive French authorities would be unwarranted, and creates a deceptive impression 
of the extent of logistical ‘understanding’ within the BEF as a whole prior to the Battle of the 
Somme. Although, as has been seen, there was a willingness to engage with IWT within the 
administrative services of the BEF, such openness was by no means universal. In this respect, 
the decision to sever the relationship between IWT and the ‘established’ transport divisions 
actually reduced the influence of Holland’s independent directorate in decision-making at corps 
and army level, with consequently negative implications for the efficacy of the BEF’s supply 
operation as a whole.
247
 IWT became in essence a ‘watertight’ directorate, capable of providing 
assistance to those services who actively requested it, such as the Director of Veterinary 
Services,
248
 but incapable of promoting the wider employment of IWT to commanders 
accustomed to the speed and flexibility of rail and road transport. District officers and Holland’s 
assistant directors were responsible for ‘keeping in close touch’ with the commanders in their 
area, and for ensuring that local requirements were met,
249
 but there appears to have been little 
desire among corps and army officers to reduce dependency upon the faster method of transport 
until the French railways were incapable of meeting demand. 
Individual formations, each desirous of obtaining the resources they believed were 
necessary to ensure the security and efficiency of their own units, were reluctant to embrace the 
canals. The relatively slow progress of the barges made IWT comparatively useless for urgent 
deliveries. In the absence of a centralizing authority to coordinate transport requests, and until 
the sheer volume of goods entering France made the identification of priorities a fundamental 
requirement for keeping the logistics system flowing, there was little IWT could do to persuade 
commanders to take a holistic approach and voluntarily subordinate their own requests for 
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transport for the wider benefit of the BEF as a whole. The result was ludicrous. When the 
railways in the rear of the BEF were overloaded during the opening weeks of the Battle of the 
Somme, the supply of food and ammunition took precedence over that of stone for road 
repairs.
250
 The ‘deplorable state of the roads’ soon became the ‘chief source of anxiety for the 
Chief Engineer of Fourth Army,
251
 a development catalogued by an equally concerned Deputy 
QMG in a series of notes.
252
 
Yet despite the shortage of vital engineering material reaching the BEF, during the same 
period IWT vessels were being utilized for the conveyance of road stone along the River 
Somme at the request, and for the use of, the French Army.
253
 In addition, as Holland would 
later reveal to Geddes, for all the unprecedented scale of demands generated by the fighting on 
the Somme, during the opening phase of the offensive Holland was reduced to returning barges 
requisitioned from the French to their civilian owners due to a lack of military work for them to 
undertake.
254
 Clearly then, regardless of the increase in tonnage conveyed by IWT during 1916, 
there remained spare capacity in the system. Of the 73,500 deadweight tons carrying capacity 
available in October 1916, Geddes recorded that the maximum quantity conveyed in any single 
month was just 69,000 tons. ‘Each deadweight ton of capacity’, Geddes observed, ‘was not fully 
occupied once in the month... a great carrying capacity has been provided and no adequate use 
found for it’.255 The man who, more than anyone else, had been responsible for providing that 
great carrying capacity was Gerald Holland, Marine Superintendent of the LNWR. The task of 
making adequate use of it would ultimately fall to Geddes himself. 
The colossal scale of demands placed upon the transportation services supplying the 
BEF during 1916 were such that IWT could only ever play a subsidiary role in their fulfilment. 
The position of the directorate as a scion of the established supply chain, coupled with the minor 
                                                 
250
 R.U.H. Buckland, ‘Experiences at Fourth Army Headquarters: Organization and Work of the R.E.’, 
Royal Engineers Journal, 41:3 (1927), 385–413 (p. 389). 
251
 Buckland, pp. 391–2. 
252
 IWM, Papers of Brigadier-General C.R. Woodroffe, 3/38/1/2 Notes and Reports (forwarded to QMG), 
June to November 1916. The contents of this material will be discussed in more detail below, see chapter 
2.4. 
253
 WO 95/56 Memorandum number 3, p. 3. 
254
 Granet Papers, MSS.191/3/3/4 Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 September 1916, p. 2. 
255
 Granet Papers, MSS.191/3/3/102 Memorandum by Sir Eric Geddes, 26 November 1916, p. 23. 
147 
 
role afforded to the development of waterborne traffic in the pages of the Official History, have 
subsequently overshadowed the evolution of this small, under-exploited but effectively 
managed civil-military partnership. Unlike at Boulogne, where Francis Dent’s position outside 
the military hierarchy and his other commitments to the war effort removed him from the day-
to-day management of affairs, Holland was incorporated into the BEF and free to focus all of 
his attentions on the improvement and expansion of IWT on the Western Front. He was able to 
source equipment and raise personnel at a rate capable of ensuring that IWT would constantly 
be in a position to respond effectively to the BEF’s continued growth. 
Despite this, Holland’s proactive approach and Dent’s organizational expertise were 
together unable to counteract the limitations caused by a lack of pre-war preparation between 
British and French officials, and hampered by the absence of a formal alliance structure to 
govern the expansion of the BEF’s contribution to the land war. The abilities of Britain’s 
transport experts, although recognized and respected by the majority of officers in France, were 
only applied in ‘penny packets’ to the solution of problems identified in single links of the 
transport chain. Throughout 1915 and into 1916 there was neither the political will to broaden 
the scope of civil-military cooperation, nor the military imperative to establish long-term, ‘semi-
permanent’ administrative structures in place of short-term ‘tinkering’. Such localized 
responsibilities left individuals such as Dent and Holland incapable of negotiating successfully 
with an ally attempting to balance requests for further assistance with a desire to retain a 
position of superiority within the coalition. The resulting frustrations, coupled with the 
continued decentralization of transport control within the BEF,
256
 impaired the development of a 
coordinated, fully integrated, centrally directed logistics system on the Western Front. The 
‘unmistakable proof of the value, indeed the necessity of centralized control’ had yet to 
surface.
257
 It would do so astride the Somme, and would precipitate ‘the reorganization of the 
whole service of transportation’.258  
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2.4: The Battle of the Somme: A logistical assessment 
The preparations for, and conduct of, the Battle of the Somme have remained a point of 
controversy ever since the offensive began. The immense losses for little territorial gain within 
an environment of unremitting horror have been consistently drawn upon as evidence of the 
obstinacy and ineptitude of the British high command.
259
 Casualty levels, on the first day in 
particular, have formed the bedrock upon which criticisms of ‘Butcher Haig’ have flourished in 
the public memory of the conflict.
260
 Conversely, historians have also used the Somme to 
demonstrate the challenges of coalition warfare, and the limitations that acting in concert with a 
powerful ally placed upon the BEF’s freedom of action.261 Within the ‘strategic labyrinth’ of 
Allied politics and debates over the development of battlefield tactics following the calamity of 
1 July 1916,
262
 the logistical foundations of the battle have been almost entirely overlooked.
263
 
An examination of the supply preparations for the Somme, and the Allied response to the 
evolving nature of the fighting after the opening day, highlights that a lack of appreciation for 
the importance of the transport factor exerted a critical influence over the course of events in 
Picardy during 1916. 
The Battle of the Somme was not a ‘British’ battle. From its conception at the Chantilly 
conference in December 1915, through to its culmination in November 1916, it was planned and 
undertaken as part of a coordinated, all-front strategy designed to eliminate the German 
advantage of interior lines of communication.
264
 This, coupled with the BEF’s position as the 
junior partner on the Western Front, severely restricted Haig’s ability to influence the location, 
if not the character, of the battle upon his appointment as C-in-C. Just as Sir John French’s 
attack at Loos took place in September 1915 upon ground not of his choosing, it was clear from 
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the outset of his command that Haig would be required to participate in a major offensive in 
1916 to preserve the solidarity of the Franco-British alliance.
265
 The terrain, once again, would 
not be chosen by the British. 
Joffre’s plans for the battle envisaged the British contributing to a joint attack with a 
larger French force, at the junction of the two armies astride the River Somme.
266
 It would be a 
wearing-out battle, conceived to draw in German troops and to act as a prelude to the decisive, 
war-winning offensive. Joffre was as thoroughly aware of the political significance of ‘winning 
the peace’ as his British counterparts, and hoped to use British troops in the wearing-out phase 
in order to husband his own wearying divisions for the coup de grâce.
267
 Fighting side by side 
would also give the French commander more opportunity to assert his influence over his ally, 
reducing the prospect of Haig ‘postponing’ the BEF’s contribution in order to preserve British 
manpower at the expense of further French losses.
268
 
Aside from the fact that the two forces were already located in the area, reducing the 
quantity of troop movements required prior to the battle, the terrain around the Somme was also 
considered to offer a number of potential benefits to the attacking forces. There were no 
precipitate rises to contend with, the soil was well drained (particularly in comparison to the 
ground in Flanders), and there were no ‘industrial wildernesses’ to aid the defending Germans 
and evoke memories of the previous year’s encounter at Loos.269 To Henry Rawlinson, Fourth 
Army commander and one of those whose name was to become inextricably linked to the battle, 
the Somme offered ‘capital country in which to undertake an offensive’. 270  Rawlinson’s 
reconnaissance, however, was concentrated on the view east from the British front line. To the 
west, in the area that would be tasked to supply and sustain the battle, it was a different story. 
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Preparing for the largest offensive in British military history 
In order to build up the necessary reserves of troops, munitions, and supplies for the 
coming offensive, the BEF was required to essentially build, populate and sustain a new city 
immediately behind the front.
271
 New railheads were needed, to enable the projected thirty-one 
trains required per day to maintain the army to disgorge their various cargoes before returning to 
base; wells would have to be dug to guarantee fresh supplies of water for the hundreds of 
thousands of men and beasts that would be asked to participate in the battle; road stone would 
be required in huge quantities in order to ensure that the road network, critical for bridging the 
gap between the railheads and the trench lines, remained passable.
272
 The troops themselves 
would need to be transported into the concentration area prior to the attack, along with the guns 
required to fire an artillery bombardment of unprecedented ferocity, the shells for which also 
depended upon transport inland in order to be of any use on the battlefield. Such a colossal 
enterprise demanded a first-rate transport network. However, according to the official historian, 
‘the railways were inadequate, [and] the roads in the area behind the front where the troops 
would have to be concentrated, were few and indifferent’.273 
Edmonds’ other judgment, that ‘in 1916... almost any part of the Arras-Ypres front was 
better furnished with villages, railways and roads’,274 has been somewhat overlooked in many 
texts on the battle. Even Winston Churchill, vocal critic of the Somme campaign, reserved his 
criticisms over the choice of battleground to the strength of the German defences in the sector 
and the lack of perceptible strategic gains to be made in the area.
275
 Yet even in the more 
understated words of Colonel Henniker, ‘the railways serving [the Somme] part of the front 
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were not good’.276 Two single lines to Arras, running from St. Pol and Doullens, and the double-
line between Amiens and Albert (which itself was within range of the German artillery) were 
the only pre-war main line rail communications available in the twenty-three mile distance 
between Arras and the Somme. Alongside the task of supplying the multitude of British forces 
in the area in the build up to the battle, these lines would also be required for the passage of coal 
from mines in the north to the factories of Paris, a commitment of fifty trains per day.
277
 In 
addition, although the ‘rolling downs’ of Picardy may have lifted the spirits of men transferred 
from the bleak Ypres salient,
278
 the undulating countryside was highly impractical for the 
construction of reliable railways. 
The absolute necessity for construction around the Somme had been appreciated almost 
as soon as the phase of mobile warfare had ended, leaving the main Amiens-Arras line severed 
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Figure 2.3 Map of the Amiens bottleneck, 1916 
Source: Henniker, p. 136. 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
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north of Albert (see Appendix 3). French engineers began work on improving and doubling 
lines in October 1914, and as soon as the decision had been made for joint offensive action to 
take place in the area, further new lines were taken under construction. One such line, a 
seventeen mile stretch between Fienvillers-Candas and Acheux, was completed in April 1916 
and handed over to the ROD to run. This line alone created five new railheads within the battle 
zone,
279
 however the major infrastructure developments took place further south, around the key 
railway junction of Amiens. Of particular importance to the upcoming battle was the extension 
of a gun-spur near Dernancourt to supply artillery ammunition to the guns situated on the high 
ground south-east of Albert. For this extension, envisaged for carrying a relatively small 
tonnage during the battle, a gradient of one-in-forty-five was adopted in some places.
280
 This 
decision would have profound consequences once the battle began. 
Another potential problem was the bottleneck passing through Amiens (see Figure 2.3). 
This section, approximately one mile long, was for almost its entire length situated in tunnels or 
cuttings which made the laying of extra tracks alongside the existing route impossible. The 
section heading east through St. Roch comprised the principal rail connection between Amiens 
and the southerly Channel ports supplying the BEF;
281
 the only inland line running north-south 
between the French coal mines and Paris; a heavily worked civilian traffic route; and the vital 
junction for any strategic troop movements that might be required during the battle. At the 
Camon-Longeau interchange to the east of Amiens, all of the traffic heading to and from 
Rawlinson’s Fourth Army would meet, and be forced to intersect the route of, the vast majority 
of the traffic serving the French Sixth Army operating on their right flank.
282
 
The implications of such a heavy traffic flow were recognized, and engendered a series 
of discussions within the BEF and between Allied representatives.
283
 Initial plans for the daily 
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provision of the troops were created in April, and highlighted that only through the use of every 
available station, working to the utmost of their capacity and with no dumping of supplies 
(which was as much a hindrance to efficient working at the railheads as it was at the ports)
284
 
could the armies in the field be maintained. Even this estimate was dependent upon substantial 
pre-battle construction, led by the French but with the assistance of considerable numbers of 
British troops, being completed in time.
285
 Ironically, given the importance placed upon the 
early commencement of the battle by Joffre to relieve the pressure on Verdun, the BEF’s liaison 
Edward Spears noted in mid-June that the progress of construction meant that ‘unless it is 
absolutely unavoidable’, the French should not be asked to attack before 1 July. 286  The 
construction work related to the Somme in the French sector had a projected completion date of 
25 June, but no contingency. Furthermore, there would be an unavoidable lag between the 
completion of construction work and the development of stockpiles of ammunition. In the 
meantime, materiel was being rushed to the front by lorry, as at Verdun, but this was a slow and 
difficult process, adding further strain to the already overburdened road network. Such was the 
pressure placed upon French engineers to finish their allotted tasks on time that the penalty for 
missing targets was severe: the Chief Road Engineer received fifteen days’ arrest for not 
opening a road ‘in the specified time’.287 
British construction companies laid some 150 kilometres of track in preparation for the 
Somme,
288
 an achievement which demonstrated the increasing logistical contribution of the BEF 
to the coalition. In addition, by reducing British stocks in France to just ten miles of track,
289
 the 
preparatory efforts on the Somme further restricted Haig’s freedom to seek battle elsewhere on 
the Western Front in 1916. The Somme had been agreed to by Haig in the understanding that it 
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was to be the wearing-out action prior to a decisive battle. The decisive battle Haig favoured 
would take place in Flanders, with the twin aims of clearing the Belgian coast and striking at the 
main railway arteries of the German Army.
290
 Rawlinson had prepared and submitted a plan for 
such an attack prior to the settlement of arrangements for the Somme between Haig and 
Joffre.
291
 Having seen the chances of the ‘Flanders scheme’ being put into practice diminished 
by a lack of support from King Albert, C-in-C of the Belgian Army and sovereign ruler of the 
territory Haig wished to attack,
292
 the exhaustion of British stocks of railway material in the 
preparations for the Somme contributed the final nail in that plan’s coffin. It ensured that any 
further construction would be reliant on the supply of French material, which was highly 
unlikely to be released were there any suggestion that it could jeopardize operations astride the 
Somme. The most significant blow of all against an offensive in Flanders during 1916, however, 
was struck by the Germans at Verdun on 21 February. 
The effects upon the preparations for the Somme of the German attack on Verdun were 
twofold. Firstly, it provoked a crisis within the French government, which cultivated rumours 
that Joffre would be replaced and the strategy of the senior partner in the coalition changed. 
Secondly, as successive divisions were put through the ‘Mill on the Meuse’, the French 
commitment to the combined assault on the Somme contracted. Following Verdun, it would be 
the BEF that would shoulder the main burden of the attack in Picardy. The progressively 
smaller quantity of French troops being made available for the Somme during the spring of 
1916, amidst increasingly bleak prognoses as to the future power of the French Army, has been 
thoroughly documented.
293
 Yet the impact of Verdun upon the French transport infrastructure 
was equally noteworthy. 
Although the network of country lanes dubbed the Voie Sacrée between Verdun and 
Bar-le-Duc has been presented as the ‘French Army’s only communication route to the 
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battlefield’,294 and the automobile engine championed as the ‘difference maker’, railways also 
played a vital role in the defence of Verdun despite the two major lines in the area being 
rendered ‘useless’ by the shelling of the German guns.295 The construction of a forty-five mile 
stretch of standard gauge line, built parallel to the road network in just four months and earning 
equal praise from Pétain to that issued to the lorry drivers who kept the battle supplied,
296
 
consumed materials and engineers’ efforts which would otherwise have been available for the 
Somme. In addition, the Chemin de Fer Meusien metre-gauge railway drew in locomotives and 
rolling stock from all over France, equipment which – as the battle of Verdun rumbled on into 
the summer – would not be available to those charged with sustaining operations in Picardy. 
The strain of Verdun accelerated the degradation of the French transport infrastructure to the 
extent that urgent demands for assistance were made to GHQ for rolling stock to be despatched 
from Britain, in addition to large orders already placed in Canada and the United States.
297
 In 
the period before those requests were fulfilled, the burden of supplying the Battle of the Somme 
would fall on a diminishing quantity of resources. Those resources would be asked to 
accomplish a correspondingly increased workload, adding further pressure to the logistics 
system. 
In an attempt to relieve some of that pressure on both the equipment and on the 
labourers at railheads, all commercial traffic and trains containing road stone were to be 
suspended at the outset of the battle.
298
 This decision, taken in order to concentrate upon the 
immediate tasks of feeding the troops and maintaining a schedule of seven to ten ammunition 
trains per day on the Fourth Army front in June, exposes the lack of foresight in the logistical 
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planning of the offensive.
299
 This oversight, alongside an inadequate appreciation of the sheer 
volume of work required to prepare the battlefield prior to the BEF’s first offensive on such a 
scale, combined with the lack of pre-war planning to diminish the chances of success even 
before the infantry went over the top. The insufficient quantity of labour available to carry out 
that work, despite Haig’s entreaties for labour battalions which he deemed to be ‘quite essential’ 
for maintaining the ‘large numbers of troops [that] will be required under certain eventualities at 
certain points’,300 demonstrates the problem. 
 
Managing the ‘workforce’: labour use in the British Expeditionary Force, 1914-1916 
The provision of labour for the multitude of tasks necessary to maintain roads, repair 
railways and handle materials during transit had, as with the operation of the transport network 
itself, undergone a series of ‘ad hoc’, uncoordinated changes prior to the Battle of  the Somme. 
The pre-war FSR, upon which the British labour organization was based, contemplated the use 
of civilian labour ‘for unloading and stacking supplies wherever possible’, supplemented only 
when necessary by fatigue parties drawn from the fighting troops.
301
 However, although the 
French had agreed to provide civilian labour for the BEF in 1912,
302
 it had been recognized 
immediately upon the outbreak of war that further, British-supplied manpower would be 
required to ensure the maintenance of British logistical operations. An authorization order for 
ASC labour companies was issued simultaneously with Britain’s entry into the conflict, and the 
first units were at work in Havre before the end of the month.
303
 The need for men with 
experience of handling and moving supplies was appreciated immediately, and civilian foremen 
and gangers were enlisted to act as sergeants and corporals within the new units.
304
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As demonstrated above, the managerial challenges facing the BEF’s administrative 
departments as the force expanded over the first two years of the conflict were approached 
through a variety of civil-military experiments and short-term expedients. Despite such 
endeavours the growth of the BEF, coupled with an increasing reluctance on the part of the 
Belgian and French authorities to continue releasing civilian labour to assist their allies rather 
than their own national armies,
305
 meant that the employment of ‘resting’ infantry became an 
increasingly vital component of the BEF’s supply system. The war diaries of the Army Troop 
Companies employed in the Somme sector during 1916 illustrate the varied nature of the tasks 
undertaken by infantry working parties in order both for the battle to go ahead, and for it to be 
sustained after 1 July.
306
 That the maintenance and goods-handling demands of the lines of 
communication had a deleterious effect on the training of infantry units prior to the Somme has 
been thoroughly acknowledged in the literature on the battle.
307
 The negative effects of the 
redeployment of fighting troops to labour duties, however, was not merely restricted to the 
dismal performance of the BEF on 1 July. 
A further problem, as demonstrated by the Deputy QMG in the days before the battle 
commenced, was the manner in which the short-term desire to ensure readiness for zero hour 
trumped considerations as to the long-term effects on the infrastructure of the work being 
undertaken: 
It seems quite clear that in view of the operations now going on, every effort should be 
made to get as much as possible as far forward as possible, even if the roads in rear do 
suffer a bit for the time being.
308
 
 
As far as the administrative departments of the BEF were concerned, the primary concern in 
June 1916 was to get the items required by the fighting troops sent forward. The issues arising 
from the manner in which this task was accomplished were visible in the week before the battle, 
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with Woodroffe noting during inspections on both 28 and 29 June that roads near Corbie and in 
the III Corps area were ‘in a terrible condition’ and a ‘bad state’ respectively.309 However, as 
corps were not ‘fixed’ to one sector but rotated between armies, there was little onus on 
individual commanders to prioritize road repairs for which their troops might never see the 
benefit;
310
 crucially, such work would reduce the number of opportunities for training those 
soldiers to adequately perform their duties on the battlefield when required. In the same manner 
that national priorities and post-war industrial concerns eclipsed the potential benefits of inter-
Allied cooperation at the strategic level, a preoccupation with ensuring satisfactory battlefield 
performance was enough to ensure that individual corps commanders gave precedence to front 
line considerations over those of creating and maintaining a solid logistical foundation for the 
benefit of the BEF as a whole. 
Furthermore, the troops themselves took little interest in ‘grunt’ work for which they 
had not enlisted. As Frederick Voigts’ account of a fatigue duty which consisted of moving 
railway sleepers from one side of a line to another indicates, groups of soldiers instinctively 
‘swung the lead’ or sought out hiding places in which to rest. At the same time, others refused 
to do more than what they considered their ‘fair share’ of the work. The net result of such 
behaviour was that the men who were working became increasingly tired, and the group as a 
whole descended into inefficiency and resentment of those ‘shirking’ the duty, all supplemented 
by a combination of disinterested or officious supervisors.
311
 Such practices were prominent in 
the pre-war workplace from which the majority of the citizen soldiers were drawn: ‘An 
important aspect of learning about work was learning how to avoid it, to make it easier, to 
dodge the foreman, to sneak off for a smoke without getting caught.’312 To mitigate the effects 
of such behaviour, and to help cope with the lack of available labour (which had been 
                                                 
309
 Woodroffe Papers, 3/38/1/2 Unofficial notes, 28 and 29 June 1916. 
310
 Granet Papers, MSS.191/3/3/4 Geddes to Lloyd George, 15 September 1916, pp. 4-5. 
311
 F.A. Voigt, A Combed Out: Reminiscences of the European War (London: Swarthmore Press, 1920), 
pp. 24–30. 
312
 Bourne, ‘The British Working Man’, p. 345. 
159 
 
recognized as a developing problem in 1915),
313
 the army raised specialist battalions that would 
be dedicated to the performance of ‘unskilled’ jobs rather than viewing such work as a 
distraction from their primary duties as fighting soldiers. 
The labour battalions raised in the spring of 1916 from men unfit for general service but 
available for labour duties overseas, did little to alleviate the issue. The men were found to be 
enthusiastic but hopelessly inadequate, having had ‘absolutely no knowledge of road 
making’.314 Furthermore, the lack of expert supervisors (from either civil or military engineering 
backgrounds) available to teach them meant that ‘consequently the waste of labour [was] very 
great’. As Woodroffe concluded, ‘the difference between the class of work done on a road by a 
trained Field Company, RE, and one of the labour battalions is... remarkable’. Nor were the 
numbers of labour battalions anything like enough to satisfy the quantity of tasks required to 
ensure Fourth Army’s preparations for the Somme were complete. As a result, not only was 
Rawlinson unable to avoid the sustained use of infantry working parties on ‘grunt’ work in the 
build-up to the battle, but the supply of materials had to be prioritized and subordinated to take 
into account the limited amount of labour available to handle and store it at the railheads. Road 
stone, with its demand for huge quantities of rolling stock which otherwise could be used for the 
provision of food and ammunition, was the victim of pre-battle austerity. By cutting the supply 
of stone, however, the BEF solved one problem by creating another; and one which would only 
increase as the battle wore on and the roads behind the army were placed under unprecedented 
pressure.
315
 
 
The collapse of the transport network 
The opening month of the battle would exacerbate the transport issues which the 
reactive policies of the previous months had engendered. The poor weather of late June, which 
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contributed to the postponement of zero hour, continued into July.
316
 GHQ’s weather diary for 
July 1916 records fourteen days during the month on which there were ‘slight showers’ or 
heavier.
317
 Away from the ‘chateaux’ in the rear, Lieutenant-Colonel Whitty, serving in the 
Somme area with the 25
th
 Division, recorded several days of ‘heavy rain’ in July, making 
movement very difficult.
318
 In periods of poor weather, horse transport, which would usually 
travel by the open ground next to the roads, was forced to share road space with the lorries.
319
 
The inevitable results of this action were increased congestion and, as the roads were not built to 
withstand much more than their pre-war traffic of farmers’ carts and bicycles, continued 
degradation of the road surface. ‘Under repeated impact the sub-base [of the road] first 
compacted, the road surface then became uneven and ultimately failed, forming potholes’ for 
the repair of which neither the labour nor the materials were available in the required 
quantities.
320
 Within the first week of July, the sheer quantity of vehicles ‘all over the country’ 
drew comment from even the most experienced campaigners.
321
 Within the first fortnight, the 
two armies were forced to make arrangements to minimize the use of particularly damaged 
roads.
322
 Emphasizing the volume of traffic, on the twenty-four hours ending at 9am, 22 July, 
the traffic passing Fricourt Cemetery was recorded by Fourth Army. In total: 26,516 troops; 568 
cars; 1,244 lorries and ambulances; 3,832 horse-drawn vehicles; 1,660 motor-cycles and cycles; 
and 5,404 horses passed the spot, on what the Provost Marshal described as ‘one of the quietest 
days we have had’.323 In just six hours over the following day, over two-and-a-half thousand 
vehicles pounded along the Amiens-Albert road.
324
  
The roads were not the only network in need of urgent attention either. Following the 
successes of the French and southernmost British units on 1 July, Fourth Army requested that 
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the gun-spur at Dernancourt be extended towards Maricourt on what would become known as 
the Plateau line (after the high ground upon which Plateau station was situated).
325
 With further 
progress made in the southern sector of the British front during the first fortnight of the battle, it 
soon became clear that the traffic on the Dernancourt branch would be extremely heavy. A 
conference at Fourth Army headquarters on 15 July projected the requirements of the forces in 
the area at a total of thirty-five trains per day in each direction.
326
 Yet in contrast to the 
disagreements of Haig and Joffre over future operations after the battle opened,
327
 the task of 
enlarging and improving the Dernancourt spur was discussed amicably at an inter-Allied 
conference of railway authorities on 18 July and construction began almost immediately.
328
 
As noted above, the Plateau line had not been designed with heavy traffic supply in 
mind, rather as a gun-spur for relatively small deliveries of ammunition. By 1 August however, 
the line was receiving heavy goods trains weighing between 600 and 800 tons. Simply moving 
trains on the steep, winding line required great skill on the part of the locomotive crews 
involved, combined with significant motive power: ‘to take such a train up... required two 
engines in front and three behind’.329 Despite the application of a rigorous speed limit of just 
five miles per hour, and the installation of catch points to trap runaway trains, derailments and 
accidents were a frequent occurrence, interrupting the flow of traffic along the line. The time-
consuming process of attaching extra engines to cope with the heavy gradient further disrupted 
movement on the network. 
Thanks to congestion at the ports which made loading times unpredictable, the goods 
trains of the BEF and French Army were, unlike suburban passenger trains running to a 
scheduled timetable, despatched whenever they were ready. This meant that trains arrived at the 
Amiens bottleneck from three different directions at largely random intervals. At Camon 
junction, 240 trains per day were scheduled to run, intersecting one another’s route at a rate of 
one train every six minutes. When several trains arrived at the Plateau line in quick succession, 
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the delay caused by the attachment of extra engines meant that those in the rear of the queue 
could do nothing but block the main Amiens-Albert line. Serious delays were inevitable, and 
not helped by what was perceived by British observers as ‘local mismanagement’ of the railway 
traffic by French engineers running the line.
330
 At Amiens, ‘eighteen miles of trains under load 
stood end-to-end waiting to get to railheads’.331 
The effects of this paralysis on the railway lines spread throughout the transport 
network. With so many trains held up on the way to or from the front, a lack of engines and 
rolling stock were returning to the base ports to collect the ever-increasing quantity of matériel 
arriving in France. With the railways unable to clear imports from the docks, the ports, quays 
and wharves became overcrowded with supplies and the unloading of ships became more 
difficult and less efficient. Urgently required items were buried beneath ‘mountains’ of stores 
(such as warm clothing for the winter) not yet required at the front.
332
 This created further 
delays as constant stacking and re-stacking was required in order to unearth the desired goods 
and load them into the limited trucks available.
333
 The sustained calls for ammunition continued 
to take precedence over deliveries of road metal, which meant that fewer of the new railheads 
could be completed nor existing ones maintained. The consequences were increasing delays at 
the railheads, the continued sluggish unloading of trains, and further deterioration of the already 
worn-out road network.
334
 Had a major breakthrough occurred on the Western Front, it could 
not have been adequately sustained in such circumstances.
335
 
The Germans had not been idle bystanders either. In response to the gargantuan artillery 
barrages of the early battle German tactics changed, with further negative implications for the 
BEF’s supply systems. Rather than remain in their own trenches which presented an obvious, 
static target for bombardments, German machine-gunners began to deploy in shell holes, well 
clear of the trench lines. This meant that British artillery could no longer direct its fire on the 
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known and easily located trench lines, but instead had to ‘batter down a whole area of ground, 
using an immense quantity of ammunition to ensure the destruction of the German 
defenders’. 336  Despite the corresponding priority afforded to it, however, the supply of 
ammunition was severely affected by the degrading transport situation in France. As early as 2 
July the supply of ammunition was being viewed as ‘the limiting factor’ on the battlefield,337 
with Haig using it to illustrate the BEF’s inability to cooperate with Joffre’s strategic vision for 
the battle.
338
 Despite attempts between the two commanders to ‘thrash out’ the logistical 
difficulties engendered by the development of the offensive,
339
 by early August it appeared that 
another shells crisis was imminent on the Western Front.
340
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Conclusion 
In the Anglophone history of the First World War, the date of 1 July 1916 has exercised 
a ‘tyrannical hold’ over both academic and public discourse alike.341 Whether used as evidence 
of the brutality, obstinacy and inadequacy of the British high command, or the nadir from which 
the ‘learning process’ began, the evolution of the British war effort during the conflict has been 
inextricably linked to the aftermath of that day. Undoubtedly, 1916 was a transformative year 
for the BEF. It would see the first large-scale offensive by British forces on the Western Front 
and, thanks to the cumulative pressures of twenty-four months of industrial warfare on their 
own soil, the gradual cession of responsibility for the provision of transport to the British troops 
from their French hosts.
342
 Yet although the Somme overshadows Verdun in the English-
language history, it was the combined effects of these twin conflagrations that compelled the 
French Army to abandon the pre-war agreement between the two powers, and which ultimately 
led to the ‘civilianization’ of the British logistics effort in France and Flanders. 
At the end of 1914, when Francis Dent and Gerald Holland became enmeshed with the 
military authorities at GHQ, the circumstances of undoubted French primacy in the land-based 
coalition; the relatively insignificant scale of British operations; and the general level of 
contribution asked for by the French, all of these factors combined to erect substantial barriers 
to the widespread implementation of industrial operating procedures within the BEF. The result 
was to constrict the influence of Britain’s transport experts to the periphery, and to subsequently 
eclipse their contributions in the voluminous literature on the conflict. By the late summer of 
1916 these barriers had been eroded. The sheer scale of the Somme and Verdun as battles of 
materiel, combined with fundamental oversights in logistical preparation which led to 
dependence upon a wholly inadequate transport infrastructure, created a situation in which 
‘gradually movement as a whole slowed down, and complete cessation was threatened’.343 
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For the BEF, the demands of the Somme brought into sharp focus the executive 
inadequacies of the first two years of the war. Those charged with managing the BEF’s lines of 
communication had, it is true, correctly identified the challenges to be faced in the establishment, 
expansion, and maintenance of a mass army on foreign soil. They had also engaged with and 
accepted the advice of technical experts from some of Britain’s largest companies. However, as 
the small scale and eventual abandonment of the ‘Dent scheme’, and the existence of the 
Amiens bottleneck demonstrated,
344
 the supply echelon of the BEF was unable to design and 
sustain a logistics system capable of responding to the unprecedented demands placed upon it. 
Instead, it was reactive amendments and adjustments to an inadequate system, rather than the 
establishment of an integrated, multi-modal transport network based on a holistic consideration 
of priorities and capacities, which characterized the BEF’s approach to the Battle of the Somme. 
The appointment of David Lloyd George to the position of Secretary of State for War following 
the death of Lord Kitchener aboard HMS Hampshire would, however, change everything. 
For Lloyd George, who had taken up the munitions shortage as a personal ‘cause’ early 
in the war,
345
 a scandal resembling that of 1915 would have been a source of acute personal 
embarrassment for a man who had been publicly critical of previous efforts to match the supply 
of shells to the demands of the army. Unlike in the crisis of 1915, however, Lloyd George was 
fully aware of the increases in shell production that had taken place since the establishment of 
the Ministry of Munitions. In fact, as early as September 1915 he had written to Kitchener 
questioning whether the French rail network would be able to handle the enormous mass of 
warlike stores projected to be thrown upon it in the following year.
346
 Despite his receiving 
reassurances at the time,
347
 events on the Somme proved unequivocally that it could not. And if 
the transport network in France could not cope with the offensive requirements of the Somme, 
how could that same network be expected to deal with the even larger quantities of matériel in 
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the process of being manufactured for the consumption of an even larger BEF in 1917 and 
beyond?
348
 
The answer, Lloyd George believed, lay in a comprehensive re-evaluation of transport 
facilities in France. The goal would be to assess what resources were available, what they would 
be required to carry in the forthcoming battles, and what improvements would be necessary in 
order to ensure that the carriage of such quantities would be possible. In short, with the ‘very 
fate of nations [depending] on replenishing the artillery shells and machine-gun ammunition 
they hurled at the enemy’,349 guaranteeing the reliability and fluidity of the logistics network 
upon which those munitions travelled was now fundamental to the continuation of the war. To 
tackle this imposing challenge, Lloyd George did what he would later claim misleadingly that 
the British Army had a ‘rooted prejudice’ against doing.350 He turned to a civilian. Sir Eric 
Geddes’ transportation mission would soon begin. 
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Part 3: Unleashing Armageddon 
 
I tremble to think what our position now would have been, had I not grappled… with 
the whole question and brought in the best railway men from England and created a 
new department viz ‘Transportation’ under a ‘Director General’ to deal with it.1 
Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig 
 
On 19 November 1917, the by now Prime Minister David Lloyd George made a 
statement in the House of Commons during which he claimed to have acted against the advice 
of the military high command only twice during the war. The first case was in the ordering of 
‘extravagant’ quantities of guns and shells whilst acting as Minister of Munitions.2 The second 
time Lloyd George had pressed his advice ‘on soldiers against their will was in the appointment 
of a civilian to reorganize the railways behind the lines… and [he was] proud to have done it’.3 
In the War Memoirs, Lloyd George restated his position: firstly, that the War Office ‘held the 
opinion that [transport issues] were purely military matters, into the sanctity of which no 
profane civilian must be allowed to intrude’;4 and secondly, that ‘the whole story of British 
achievement in the sphere of transport during the war… would reflect very high credit on those 
who were responsible for its development, most of all on Sir Eric Geddes’.5 In his final despatch 
in 1919, Haig also paid glowing tribute to the former Deputy General Manager of the NER: 
The Director-General of Transportation’s Branch was formed under the brilliant 
direction of Major-General Sir Eric Geddes in the autumn of 1916… To the large 
number of skilled and experienced civilians included by him on his Staff, drawn from 
the railway companies of Great Britain and the Dominions, the Army is greatly indebted 
for the general excellence of our transportation services.
6
 
 
That the two principal figures in the direction of Britain’s war effort, diametrically opposed in 
almost every aspect of their attitudes towards the war, could come together over the contribution 
of Sir Eric Geddes to the logistical organization of the BEF is significant. That Geddes’ 
contribution was itself substantial is similarly beyond doubt. 
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Few civilians could claim to have had a larger, more important role in the organization 
of the BEF during the First World War. Between August 1916 and May 1917, Geddes 
investigated and reported upon the existing logistics network on the Western Front; created, 
installed, populated and directed entirely new transport management hierarchies in France and 
at the War Office; and bequeathed both of these organizations to civilian successors sourced 
from the railway companies of the British Empire.  The directorates established by Geddes in 
the autumn of 1916 continued to operate for the duration of the conflict, supplying the men, 
materials and coordination required to sustain the BEF during the Materialschlacht of the 
second half of the war. From October 1916 until the Armistice, through Arras, Passchendaele, 
Amiens and the final battles of the hundred days, the BEF was reinforced and equipped by a 
logistics network comprising some of Britain’s most experienced transport professionals, 
utilizing working practices and managerial methods which had proven themselves on the 
civilian transport network. Through the successful fusion of military and civilian expertise the 
BEF would not face a transportation ‘crisis’ to match that experienced on the Somme for the 
remainder of the conflict. 
  
169 
 
3.1: Sir Eric Geddes 
Although the transportation mission to France in the summer of 1916 and subsequent 
developments in logistics organization have received periodic attention in the history of the First 
World War,
7
 a fundamental question relating to Geddes’ personal involvement remains largely 
unexplored; why him? At the outbreak of the war, Geddes was not the senior manager of a 
British railway company, the role of General Manager of the NER being occupied by Sir 
Alexander Kaye Butterworth. Nor was he employed by the largest railway company in Britain, 
that being the LNWR under the stewardship of Sir Guy Calthrop. Neither, unlike the SECR’s 
Francis Dent, had Geddes made any contribution to the existing transport infrastructure in 
France prior to the opening of the Somme offensive. In fact, Geddes was the Deputy General 
Manager of the NER, the fourth-largest railway company in Britain behind the LNWR, GWR 
and Midland railways, and had spent the majority of the war to that point in York and London. 
Yet in the summer of 1916, when the logistical demands of the Somme threatened to paralyze 
the transport network in northern France, it was not to Butterworth, Calthrop or Dent that Lloyd 
George would turn, but to the thirty-nine year old Geddes. 
The historical literature on Sir Eric Geddes owes much to the work of Keith Grieves. 
Geddes has been the subject of a biography, three chapters of which deal with the war years, 
complemented by a chapter-length discussion of the transportation mission to GHQ and an 
article outlining Geddes’ focus ‘on problems whose unravelling was vital if the efficiency of the 
war effort was to be sustained’ during the period 1915-1918.8 However, Grieves’ biography 
dedicates just nine pages to Geddes’ life between 1875 and 1914. A thorough assessment of the 
formative experiences and distinctive career path taken by Geddes prior to the outbreak of the 
war uncovers a man on an unequivocal ascent to the peak of his profession; a talented and 
resourceful figure on an upward trajectory that was redirected from private enterprise to the 
service of the state only as a result of the conflict. Furthermore, a focus upon Geddes’ life and 
work before the war not only reinforces the existence of close professional relationships 
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between the government, the military and the railways prior to 1914,
9
 it also confirms Grieves’ 
conclusion that Geddes was not a ‘discovery’ of the Prime Minister.10 The name of Eric Geddes 
was well known to some of the highest political and military authorities in Edwardian Britain 
long before the summer of 1916. By the summer of 1917, Geddes would be a recognized name 
to the ‘general newspaper reader’ as well.11 
 
‘No doubt a remarkable man’: the early career of Sir Eric Geddes12 
Born at Agra, India, in 1875, Eric Campbell Geddes was the eldest son of a Scottish 
civil engineer. Having originally set sail for the east in 1857, Campbell Geddes had been 
engaged by the government on survey and construction work for the Indian railways before 
entering into private practice.
13
 Although Geddes Sr. was part of what Buchanan described as 
‘the diaspora of British engineering’ during the nineteenth century,14 the family would move to 
Edinburgh a year after Eric’s birth. Following a disruptive childhood in which he was ‘asked to 
leave’ a succession of public schools, Geddes was eventually placed in the Oxford Military 
College at Cowley. His studies were ultimately competent enough for him to pass the 
preliminary examination for entry into Woolwich, yet despite the opportunity to follow in his 
father’s footsteps (albeit along the military rather than civil engineering path) the impetuous 
young Geddes would instead ‘set sail on a passenger liner for New York with ten pounds… and 
an introduction to family friends in Pittsburgh’.15 The army’s short-term loss would be its long-
term gain. 
Over the next twenty years Geddes would accumulate the breadth of knowledge and 
experience required for the various tasks he would be called upon to undertake during the First 
World War, beginning in his two-and-a-half year spell in the United States. During this time 
Geddes performed a variety of jobs, from selling typewriters for Remington to labouring at 
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Andrew Carnegie’s steel works.16 It is the identities of the employers in these cases which are 
largely more significant than the menial roles being performed by Geddes on their behalf. Both 
Remington and Carnegie were innovative businesses, operating at the forefront of the new 
systematic management ideology that was spreading across America and into Europe at the turn 
of the century. Remington had been among the first private enterprises to experiment with 
modern office equipment such as the typewriter, and had also been swift to adopt the card index 
as a management tool following its transition from the library sector.
17
 Carnegie’s Pittsburgh 
steel works possessed a global reputation for the ‘perfection’ of its organization.18 Whether the 
experience gave Geddes similar insights into labour conditions as those gained by the scientific 
management pioneer Frederick Winslow Taylor during his own period on the ‘shop floor’ is 
unclear due to an absence of surviving records.
19
 However, the period at Carnegie’s 
undoubtedly contributed towards Geddes’ awareness of the role of labour within large and 
increasingly complex businesses, organizations in which relations between the workforces and 
their managers had become increasingly ‘distant and impersonal’ as the quantities of men and 
machines employed had multiplied.
20
 Although Geddes managed in a period when managerial 
positions were becoming increasingly taken by men whose characteristics denoted the ‘initial 
advantages of birth and education’ rather than by those who progressed from the shop floor,21 
throughout his career Geddes would extol the virtue of labour work for giving the budding 
manager ‘sympathy with the point of view of the working man, the value of which cannot be 
exaggerated’.22 
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America would also bring Geddes into contact with the industry which would become 
his ‘religion’, and one which would interest him ‘more than anything else’: transport.23 The 
young man clearly showed an aptitude for the profession too, progressing from the position of 
station agent at a lumber-loading station in Virginia, through to assistant yardmaster in a freight 
yard of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and, with further promotions, to the role of car tracer 
for the southern group of railroads known as the ‘Big Four’. As Chandler has demonstrated, the 
American railways of the period were pioneers in modern management techniques, having faced 
up to the challenges associated with efficiently handling large numbers of men, money and 
materials within a single business unit earlier than the huge industrial concerns such as those 
created by Carnegie and Henry Ford.
24
 Although illness impaired Geddes’ ability both to 
continue climbing the managerial ladder and to further absorb the methods and working 
practices of America’s blossoming corporations (he would return to Edinburgh in August 1895), 
the United States had provided Geddes with skills which would prove invaluable the next time 
his ‘volcanic energy’ became too large to be constrained by the British Isles.25  This time, 
however, he would follow in his father’s footsteps by travelling east, to India. 
Building upon his experience gained in the Virginia lumber yards, and with the aid of 
family contacts, a post was secured for Geddes managing a forest clearance project in the 
Himalayas. Part of the job called for the building of a light railway system which was linked up 
to the Powayan Steam Tramway. Geddes oversaw the construction and became responsible for 
the management of the network, the efficiency of which so impressed an agent of the Rohilkund 
and Kumaon Railway [RKR] (who also happened to be a former employee of Geddes’ father) 
that the company assumed control of the line and retained Geddes to run it. Thence began 
Geddes’ second rise in the railway industry, along with marriage to Alice Gwendoline Stokes, 
the sister of an Indian Army officer.
26
 Geddes became Traffic Superintendent for the RKR in 
1901, moving to the prominent railway junction at Bareilly. His wife’s ill health led Geddes to 
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seek employment with a British railway company during 1903, but his lack of success would 
bring Geddes into close re-acquaintance with the army the following year. On this occasion, he 
would get the opportunity to showcase his burgeoning talents as a railway administrator to none 
other than Lord Kitchener himself. 
The catalyst for the meeting between Geddes and Kitchener was the outbreak of the 
Russo-Japanese War in February 1904. Upon the declaration of hostilities, the Russians began 
deploying troops to their frontiers in order to meet any force Britain might have been compelled 
to send north from India in support of her Japanese ally.
27
 The build-up of soldiers on the 
Afghan border fed into longstanding British concerns over Russian intentions on the north-west 
frontier, leading to a call being made upon the Indian railway network to convey an all-arms 
force to the area as quickly as possible.
28
 With several lines intersecting in the city of Bareilly, 
the junction formed a key component of any large-scale troop movements and placed a 
significant responsibility upon the RKR to ensure a smooth concentration. The efficiency with 
which the scheme was realized so impressed Kitchener, himself an expert in the use of military 
railways from his campaigns in Africa, that he requested to meet and congratulate Geddes, the 
man responsible for devising the programme.
29
 Contact between the two would be rekindled a 
decade later, but in the meantime Geddes once again took advantage of family connections to 
obtain employment. In late 1904 Geddes would become Claims Agent at the NER, under the 
management of Sir George Gibb. For the next ten years, the structure and working practices 
Gibb had created on the NER would play a critical role in developing Geddes into the 
recognized transport expert he would become prior to the outbreak of the First World War.
30
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Sir George Gibb, the North-Eastern Railway and modern management 
The NER provided the organizational culture within which Geddes obtained the 
majority of his pre-war management experience. It is therefore essential to establish how the 
company itself operated, and what lessons the NER’s particular approach to business 
management would impart upon Geddes during his years of employment there. From the 1870s 
onwards, Britain’s railway companies had confronted increasingly difficult operating conditions 
caused by factors such as rising expenditure on resources such as labour and coal, augmented by 
parliamentary controls designed to check opportunities for the railways to raise prices for 
customers.
31
 This restrictive legislative environment produced an industrial atmosphere in which 
efficient operating procedures were therefore vital to sustain the profitability of the railways. 
However, contemporary observers such as William Acworth and George Paish suggested that 
British railway companies were on the whole unresponsive, and their managers too conservative, 
to cope with the challenges facing them. Such commentators were particularly disparaging in 
their comparisons between the performance of British railway managers and their American 
counterparts, men among whom Geddes had gained his first, albeit brief, taste of the railway 
industry.
32
 
Thanks to the progressive attitude of George Gibb, however, the NER was not 
considered part of this trend. Instead, the NER was held up as one of the ‘too few’ British 
companies to have taken advantage of the lessons provided by the innovative railways of the 
United States in order to revolutionize their own working practices and organizational 
systems.
33
 Having taken up the post of General Manager in 1891, Gibb was convinced that the 
NER’s managerial framework was defective, and that ‘there were few men in the higher grade 
of management who could give him a critical assessment of operating procedures which had 
                                                 
31
 D.H. Aldcroft, Studies in British Transport History, 1870-1970 (Newton Abbot: David & Charles, 
1974), p. 34; G. Alderman, ‘The Railway Companies and the Growth of Trade Unionism in the Late 
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries’, The Historical Journal, 14:1 (1971), 129–52 (pp. 131–8). 
32
 W.M. Acworth, ‘Railway Economics’, The Economic Journal, 2:6 (1892), 392–98; Paish, pp. 5–6, 14–
15. 
33
 That ‘too few’ British businesses matched the ‘best practices’ employed in other countries is the central 
argument of Keeble’s survey of the period. See S.P. Keeble, The Ability to Manage: A Study of British 
Management, 1890-1990 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 
175 
 
remained basically unchanged for at least thirty years’.34 The traditional practice of promotion 
from within, and the lack of professional education available for managers, had created an 
executive branch which suffered from a narrowness of vision and a deficiency of original 
thought. The similarities to Lloyd George’s criticisms of the ‘military mind’ are clear. 
Gibb’s response to such insularity of experience was encapsulated in the creation of a 
Traffic Apprenticeship Scheme, which sought out ‘young blood, some of it not long out of the 
universities’, as well as those from within the industry who displayed potential for higher 
appointments.
35
 The first recruit, Ralph Wedgwood, typified the class of ‘outsider’ Gibb wished 
to attract. A descendent of the famous pottery family, Wedgwood possessed no experience of 
the railway industry prior to his enrolment on the scheme, having studied Classics at Cambridge 
before his arrival in York.
36
 By the time Geddes arrived in 1904, the Traffic Apprenticeship 
Scheme was offering a carefully planned, comprehensive introduction to the NER’s operating 
procedures. The scheme was ‘designed to allow the employee to move around the system 
experiencing the work of various grades of labour, as well as that of supervisory and 
management levels’.37 Rather than rely upon traditional, haphazard methods of learning by 
experience, Geddes received the benefits of a planned introduction to managerial ‘best practice’ 
upon entry to the company. A management culture emerged upon the railway which was 
diffused throughout the multitude of departments within which ‘graduates’ of the scheme found 
employment, reducing the need for overwhelming and time-consuming central control. Senior 
managers were thereby relieved of administrative duties which could be confidently devolved 
upon talented juniors, allowing those at the top to concentrate on the consideration of broader 
questions of policy and procedure within the hostile competitive environment of turn-of-the-
century Britain. 
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Concerned by the escalation of working costs, and unable to pass many of these 
expenses onto consumers in the form of higher prices, Gibb sought instead to reduce working 
expenditure and increase productivity within the company through a relentless focus on 
improving efficiency. To this end, he set in motion a detailed reassessment of the operating 
methods, organization, and information systems employed by the NER, based upon lessons 
acquired during a month-long tour of the United States.
38
 Alongside the management ‘hustle’ of 
the Americans, which Geddes himself had experienced during his own time across the 
Atlantic,
39
 the tour demonstrated to Gibb the potential benefits of using different forms of 
statistical analysis as management tools to those traditionally produced by British railway 
companies. It was a conviction Gibb would circulate within the trade press, to parliamentary 
committees, and in discussion with the Royal Statistical Society for the rest of the pre-war 
period.
40
 Gibb passionately advocated the use of statistics for allowing 
a railway manager to test the work done in carrying passengers and merchandise on any 
part of the railway, to measure the work performed in relation to many important items 
of cost incurred in performing it, to compare period with period and district with district, 
to supervise local staff with a full knowledge of results, to control train mileage, and to 
enforce economy in working.
41
 
 
Comprehensive statistics, disseminated throughout the company, were used to ‘found judgments, 
to make policy decisions and to establish standards which would enable officials to watch and 
control the effects of the steps being taken to improve working methods’.42 In collaboration with 
the statistician George Paish, Gibb oversaw the opening of a Traffic Statistics Office in York in 
1902 to ‘pioneer and promulgate the use of new statistical concepts for operational 
measurement, control and efficiency’.43 A highly publicized event, the opening of the office was 
a physical manifestation of the company’s abandonment of old-fashioned, ‘rule-of-thumb’, 
experience-led management, and the embrace of new methods of control founded upon 
scientific knowledge gained through the collection, dissemination and interpretation of reliable, 
regularly collected data streams. 
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The NER was not the only company to undertake a ‘pilgrimage’ to the United States 
during this period,
44
 nor were such fact-finding missions restricted to the railway industry. 
Thousands of engineers from various organizations crossed the Atlantic in the early twentieth 
century to examine American working practices, fostering a wide-ranging discussion of the 
merits and weaknesses of US methods prior to the First World War.
45
 But the NER was one of 
very few British railways to adopt the so-called ‘American practice’ of using statistical data as 
the driving force behind root and branch reform of their operating procedures. In fact, some 
railway companies were downright hostile to the efficacy of the ton-mile statistics which 
provided the foundation of the NER’s restructure, despite their successful use on both American 
and Indian railways.
46
 It is highly likely that Geddes, having had experience on the railways of 
both nations, was at least familiar with the compilation and application of such statistics prior to 
his arrival at the NER. However, the chairman of the LNWR, in a particularly scathing criticism, 
stated that ‘in his opinion such statistics were worthless and absolutely useless’.47 
Such dismissive attitudes, in spite of Gibb, Paish and Acworth’s unrelenting advocacy, 
have been held up as evidence of the inherent conservatism of British railway administrators in 
the early twentieth century.
48
 Although the present study is not the place to reassess this debate 
in depth, not all companies rejected Gibb’s approach on the grounds of reluctance, either to 
provide the necessary funds to create the machinery for statistical accumulation, or to depart 
from ‘trusted’ operating procedures.49 A compelling reason for the NER’s ability to apply the 
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‘ton-mile’ more effectively than other companies lay in the unique composition of the NER’s 
business in comparison to its rivals. Comprising a territorial monopoly over the industrial 
regions of Tyneside, the coalfields of Yorkshire and many of England’s north-eastern ports, the 
NER – unlike the majority of British railway companies – derived a majority of its income from 
the carriage of goods traffic rather than passengers.
50
 The NER therefore gave Geddes 
experience of the particular requirements of managing a railway network upon which bulky 
freight operations comprised a large and important share of the company’s business. To recall 
Mackinder’s maxim: the efficient, economical movement of goods was critical for the 
accumulation of profits on the NER, and with the BEF’s soldiers treated as commodities to be 
moved to one place rather than ‘commuters’ to be transported to a range of destinations each 
day, would also prove vital for the concentration of power on the Western Front. The ‘worthless’ 
ton-mile would provide the foundation both for Geddes’ reorganization of transport in France, 
and the statistical framework upon which the post-war Ministry of Transport was constructed.
51
 
In five years as Chief Goods Manager at the NER between 1907 and 1912, Geddes 
obtained a significant appreciation of the challenges involved in freight rail operations. And, 
despite the testing working environment referred to above, the period was one of great 
prosperity for the company. Between 1899 and 1912, the NER improved its earnings per freight 
train by eighty-seven per cent. The improvement was due in large part to the application of 
methods derived from statistical analysis, which led to ‘more work being done but [by] fewer 
trains all round, thus giving greater line capacity throughout the system… a smaller number of 
engines employed, economy in rolling stock, repairs, renewals, and… staff’.52 Utilizing the data 
prepared by another graduate of the Traffic Apprenticeship Scheme (and Geddes ‘indefatigable 
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assistant’ for the rest of their professional lives) J. George Beharrell, 53  and through the 
maintenance of a dynamic, enterprise-promoting office, by 1912 the goods train mileage of the 
NER stood at roughly the same level as it had been in 1906. Over the same period, however, the 
gross tonnage hauled had increased considerably. Through the implementation of more efficient 
loading and marshalling practices, the receipts per goods train mile on the NER rose from 
75.20d. in 1900 to 132.91d. in 1912.
54
 Not only had his five years in the Goods Department 
prepared Geddes for the wartime challenge of an army requiring colossal quantities of work to 
be performed by a limited pool of human and material resources, it also, in much the same way 
as Francis Dent’s reorganization of Broad Street had done in 1902, marked out Eric Geddes as 
the ‘coming man’ in the British railway industry. Consequently, in 1912 Geddes was offered the 
position of Deputy General Manager, a title he would hold until the outbreak of war two years 
later. 
Geddes’ appointment to this new role was made not only as a reward for his 
achievements in the Goods Department, but also to ensure that the NER retained his services. 
News of Geddes’ talents had spread throughout the industry, with companies foreign and 
domestic making overtures for his services. The Buenos Aires Southern and Western Combine 
and the LSWR both attempted to lure Geddes away from York with the title of General 
Manager and the promise of a wage increase.
55
 However, such was Geddes’ standing within the 
NER that his salary was renegotiated alongside his change of job. Upon becoming Deputy 
General Manager therefore, Geddes became the highest paid railway official in Britain. It was a 
decision that the NER, according to one of its directors, ‘never regretted’.56 Furthermore, with 
the incumbent General Manager, Alexander Kaye Butterworth, scheduled to retire in 1916, 
Geddes’ meteoric rise to the peak of the industry appeared to have had its trajectory mapped out. 
Yet Butterworth, or more precisely Butterworth’s religious proclivities, would also play a role 
in reintroducing Geddes to the institution he had almost joined after leaving school, briefly 
assisted during his time in India, and for whom his brother-in-law was the subject of 
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contemporary gossip between some of the highest ranking members of the profession;
57
 the 
army. 
 
Eric Geddes’ military connections in peace and war, 1912-1916 
Upon taking the position of General Manager in 1906, Butterworth also received a 
commission into the ERSC. However, Butterworth’s religious persuasions (his father George 
had been a vicar at St. Mary’s parish church in Deerhurst) sat uneasily with this quasi-military 
status, and he resigned from the corps in January 1907. For the following six years the NER 
would be represented on the ERSC by the company’s engineer, Charles Harrison 
(commissioned in 1900) and Traffic Superintendent, Henry Watson (commissioned in 1910). 
There was, however, no representative of the General Manager’s office. The rules of 
qualification were explicit in only permitting appointments to the corps to general managers. 
Yet upon Geddes’ appointment as Deputy General Manager, and in a further demonstration of 
the NER’s long-term expectation that Geddes would ultimately step up to the top job, 
Butterworth began to lobby for the entry criteria to be relaxed. As a result, on 27 January 1913 
Geddes obtained his commission and became Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Geddes, the only Deputy 
General Manager of a railway company to gain admission to the ERSC prior to August 1914.
58
 
The NER had a further operational link to the army. As noted above, the mobilization 
programme for the BEF ‘assumed very large proportions, the tables to be prepared and the mass 
of details to be dealt with involving an amount of labour greatly in excess of what had 
previously been necessary’.59 The critical process of coordinating the thousands of individual 
railway movements required to mobilize the BEF called for a systematic distribution of the 
necessary labour. Consequently, a network was created to link the major railway company in 
each of the territorial commands with the local army headquarters, to act as a ‘secretary railway’ 
under the overall supervision of the LSWR. In the northern command, under the future Field-
Marshal Sir Hubert Plumer, the NER was the obvious choice. Not only did the NER possess a 
near monopoly over the traffic passing through the northern command’s jurisdiction, but the 
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NER’s head office in York was located just over a mile from Plumer’s headquarters. Geddes’ 
company was therefore closely connected to the detailed, demanding requirements of the 
military. Although no documentary evidence has been found which links Geddes explicitly to 
the NER’s contribution to the ‘W.F.’ scheme, it would be surprising if the man who had 
prepared large-scale troop movements for Kitchener in 1904 had not passed on the benefits of 
his previous experience to facilitate the development of the BEF’s mobilization timetables. 
What is clear, however, is that in line with his position as ‘General Manager designate’ at the 
NER, Geddes took on a significant amount of army-related work in London on Butterworth’s 
behalf.
60
 Geddes regularly attended REC meetings on behalf of his chief and, as a consequence, 
by the time war broke out Geddes’ name was already ‘well known’ within the walls of the War 
Office.
61
 Although Butterworth would take up the REC duties commensurate with his role in the 
opening days of the conflict, the War Office would also not have seen the last of Eric Geddes. 
The pre-war career of Eric Geddes reinforces the claims made in the first section of this 
thesis. The professional link between the army and the railway companies was embodied by 
Geddes’ experiences in India and at the NER. Yet the civility within which the voluntary 
officers of the ERSC and the professional soldiers met for their annual dinner at the War Office 
appeared for Geddes to have been extinguished with the outbreak of war in Europe. In August 
1914, Geddes approached the War Office with the idea of raising a battalion of skilled 
railwaymen of all grades for service in France. His approach was rebuffed by the Director of 
Movements, Brigadier-General Richard Montagu-Stuart-Wortley, with Geddes being ‘told that 
the military railway personnel were competent to deal with the situation in France and that 
railway units were not wanted’.62 Reflecting upon the incident, and no doubt coloured by the 
manner in which relations between Geddes and Stuart-Wortley developed during the war, the 
NER man later claimed that the rejection was due to the ‘military machine’ at that time not 
being prepared to accept civilian specialists within its ranks.
63
 However, Stuart-Wortley’s 
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response was more a reflection of the pre-war agreement between the British and French staffs 
which saw the task of providing logistical support to the BEF devolved entirely upon the French 
Army to fulfil. Unfortunately, the legacy of this misunderstanding, as demonstrated by Geddes’ 
reference to it twelve years later, would needlessly politicize the transportation mission in the 
summer of 1916. 
Undeterred by this perceived snub from the War Office, Geddes turned his attentions to 
the answering of Kitchener’s call for volunteers by helping to raise a battalion from among the 
NER’s staff. The creation of what became the 17th (Service) Battalion (NER Pioneers) of the 
Northumberland Fusiliers, which would be equipped with uniforms relatively quickly in 
comparison to other locally raised units, brought to Geddes’ attention the complexities 
associated with feeding, housing and administration that would be of paramount importance to 
the supply services on the Western Front.
64
 And whilst Butterworth had resumed his position on 
the REC in August 1914, the multitude of logistical concerns generated by the opening months 
of the war intensified pressure on the committee to delegate the work of investigating potential 
transport issues to sub-committees of trusted senior officials. Geddes would therefore have the 
opportunity to remain directly involved in the expanding war effort, playing an active role on 
one such sub-committee tasked with the organization of civilian labour in and around London in 
the event of an emergency arising.
65
 The priorities of governmental decree had by now firmly 
supplanted commercial imperatives as the driving force behind operations on the NER, which 
meant Geddes’ skills as an enterprising manager were no longer of paramount importance to the 
day-to-day running of the business.
66
 This meant that Geddes was free to undertake duties more 
suited to a man of his talents, and his former mentor Sir George Gibb was quick to recommend 
Geddes for more ‘hands on’ work in support of the forces in France.67 
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Following on from Sir Percy Girouard’s investigations into the administrative structure 
of the BEF’s supply echelons, over Christmas 1914 Kitchener summoned the railway organizer 
he had first encountered a decade previously in northern India to the War Office. What followed 
has been presented as evidence of the insular and protective nature of the military ‘family’, 
closing ranks to avoid the criticisms of outsiders. This perception stems mainly from the 
account given in the Geddes’ family chronicle, which states that Kitchener proposed sending 
Geddes to France in order to ‘see what was wrong’ (as Lloyd George would do eighteen months 
later), but that the mission was vetoed by the QMG, Sir John Cowans: 
Eric realised... that such a mission would be hopeless unless he had the good will of the 
soldiers; and, from the way in which Lord Kitchener, in Eric’s presence, sprang the 
proposal on a totally unprepared QMG, it was obvious that the officer must think Eric 
had already passed adverse judgment on his department’s handling of railway transport. 
In such circumstances good will would inevitably be lacking.
68
 
 
As Cowans was a fellow Rifle Brigade officer and close friend of Stuart-Wortley’s, Geddes 
himself would suggest to Lloyd George after the war that it was personal jealousy and 
professional ‘demarcation’ that led to the abortion of any possible transportation mission in 
January 1915.
69
 Unsurprisingly, given the subsequent success of Geddes’ work on the Western 
Front, Cowans’ biographers makes no reference to the event.70 Cline has also suggested that the 
NER’s reluctance to release Geddes played a part in the project being abandoned.71 However, 
on the basis of the company’s proactive recommendation of Geddes in 1915, when Lloyd 
George was looking to populate the Ministry of Munitions, this conclusion appears to be 
unlikely. 
It would be unfair to suggest that this episode was purely a case of rhadamanthine 
military attitudes to civilian assistance, as Geddes later asserted. Cowans had been a significant 
early promoter of the potential benefits of civil-military cooperation in the sustenance of the 
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army,
72
 whilst at the same time as Geddes was being ‘rebuffed’, Francis Dent was busy 
examining potential efficiencies at Boulogne and Gerald Holland was drawing together the 
civilian technical experts who would dominate the senior appointments in the Department of 
IWT. Both illustrated the army’s receptiveness to specialist, non-military advice in early 1915. 
The key differences between the Dent scheme and the proposed Geddes mission were of scale 
and control. The Bassin Loubet was one dock, with responsibility for the unloading of ships and 
the operation of the docks under the control of the BEF. The French railways, however, were 
still very much under the control and direction of the French authorities, and would remain so 
until the strains of Verdun and the Somme overstretched the extant organization. 
Under such circumstances, and considering the colossal workload placed before 
Kitchener (exacerbated by the Secretary of State’s reluctance to delegate much of the 
responsibility for raising, equipping and feeding the army he was in the process of constructing): 
the embryonic stages of what would become the Gallipoli campaign; the relatively miniscule 
size of the demands being placed upon the lines of communication in France; and the continued 
adherence to the pre-war agreement with the French over responsibility for the maintenance and 
management of the French railway network, it was perhaps understandable that arguing for 
another transportation mission in the wake of Girouard’s investigation did not rank as a high 
priority for Kitchener in early 1915.
73
 Furthermore, the trench warfare which had developed on 
the Western Front over the winter was still, at that point, considered to be a temporary anomaly; 
manoeuvre warfare was widely expected to recommence in the spring. Until the French 
indicated a willingness to share the burden of supplying the BEF, and until the character and 
duration of the ‘static war’ had been accurately comprehended, it would seem reasonable to 
suggest that the military authorities believed there was little Geddes could offer to the British 
military effort at that time. 
Just a few months later, Geddes’ opportunity to apply his business skills to the war 
effort would arrive. In April 1915, Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Geddes, commissioned officer in the 
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ERSC, pre-war contributor to the REC on behalf of one of Britain’s largest employers,74 and a 
man ‘well known’ both at the Board of Trade and the War Office, was ‘discovered’ by Lloyd 
George. Upon receiving a ‘glowing account’ of Geddes’ abilities from Sir Edward Grey, a 
former director of the NER,
75
 Lloyd George supposedly interviewed Geddes with a view to 
utilizing his talents in the newly formed Ministry of Munitions. Although he admitted to 
knowing nothing about the production of munitions, Geddes claimed to have ‘a faculty for 
getting things done’.76 This conviction was enough, according to Geddes family folklore, for 
Lloyd George to make him head of a department in the nascent Ministry.
77
 
In fact, Geddes was first interviewed by Christopher Addison as part of the ‘man-
grabbing’ process involved in the Ministry’s formation. 78  Addison’s first impression, that 
Geddes appeared to be ‘first rate’, was supplemented by positive references forwarded to Lloyd 
George by Grey, Butterworth, Sir Hugh Bell, and the NER’s chairman, Lord Knaresborough. 
Further positive reports were received shortly after from within the Board of Trade and from Sir 
Percy Girouard.
79
 Each confirmed what Geddes’ pre-war career had demonstrated in detail; that 
he was a successful administrator of large, complex organizations. He was a man of energy, 
efficiency, and drive. He possessed the ability to ‘think big’ and was comfortable working 
within an innovative, proactive environment, liberated from the constraints of established 
routine.
80
 Geddes’ ‘first class business experience’ was precisely what Lloyd George intended to 
mine in order to drastically increase the output of munitions within his new enterprise.
81
 
At the NER, Geddes had acquired experience of managing a large, geographically 
dispersed workforce. The ‘blank canvas’ of a new department, and the ‘minimal attention’ paid 
by Lloyd George to questions of detail, afforded Geddes and his contemporaries the opportunity 
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to infuse the Ministry with the latest innovations in managerial practice: the statistical analysis 
used on the NER; scientific management methods of Taylorism; and the motion studies of 
Frank and Lilian Gilbreth being foremost among them.
82
 The progressive, scientific, analytical 
management techniques that Geddes had been introduced to in the United States, and had spent 
the pre-war decade utilizing at the NER, were combined with the pioneering methods of some 
of the nation’s other leading business figures to help raise productivity in Britain’s munitions 
industry. With the assistance of Beharrell’s comprehensively gathered statistics, which allowed 
the team to compare outputs; identify available capacities and weaknesses; and to create 
accurate forecasts of production, a more efficient use of the labour supply and raw materials 
available to Geddes’ department was established.83 Despite the complexities involved in the 
production of modern artillery (a single eighteen-pound shell contained sixty-four components, 
a complete round of 4.5-inch ammunition required fifty-seven parts, all of which had to be 
drawn together and despatched to the front in an organized, efficient flow),
84
 improvements in 
output were substantial prior to the commencement of the Somme offensive. 
The development of a successful munitions production system based upon what Geddes 
referred to as ‘intelligent’ control,85 saw the railwayman rewarded with a knighthood in June 
1916, official recognition of the improvements made in output since the Ministry of Munitions 
had come into being. Lloyd George would later declare that there was ‘no better driver in the 
United Kingdom’ than Geddes.86 The success of the Ministry’s efforts in raising output both 
before and during the Somme had, however, exacerbated the strain on the transport network in 
northern France. With production rates projected to increase further for the rest of the year and 
into 1917, Lloyd George believed there to be a very real prospect that the delivery system 
required to place these resources on the battlefield would be inadequate to the task of keeping 
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pace with that of manufacturing in Britain.
87
 Having raised the issue of transportation as early as 
September 1915 without success, upon becoming Secretary of State for War the following June 
Lloyd George was now in a position to act on those concerns. Unlike before, when the 
indisputable French primacy in the coalition, the relatively insignificant scale of British 
requirements, and the general level of work asked of the French railway network had yet to 
seriously diminish the transport infrastructure behind the Western Front, the barriers preventing 
substantial British intervention had now been eroded. 
Yet far from being a ‘discovery’ of the future Prime Minister, Geddes would arrive on 
the Western Front in the middle of a life and career which had brought him into regular personal 
and professional contact with the British military establishment. His brother-in-law was a 
serving officer, his brother Auckland had served in South Africa, and Eric himself had been 
educated with a view to his joining the Royal Engineers. Geddes’ career, particularly during his 
periods in India and York, illustrates the close working relationship between the army and the 
major railway companies in the pre-war British Empire. He occupied a unique position in the 
ERSC by virtue of being the only Deputy General Manager to obtain a commission in the corps, 
had contributed to the pre-war planning process in conjunction with the REC, and in the early 
months of the war had helped raise the NER Pioneers and prepare plans for the defence of 
London. He was also ‘known’ to some of the most prominent political and military figures of 
the period prior to his arrival in Addison’s office in May 1915; men such as Grey and Kitchener 
both recognized and testified to Geddes’ organizational abilities. Very shortly, the most 
prominent soldier in the BEF, the C-in-C Sir Douglas Haig, would also gain first-hand 
experience of this ‘remarkable man’. 
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3.2: A ‘civilianizing’ mission? Civil-military relations and the birth of 
the Directorate-General of Transportation 
Sir Eric Geddes emerges from the above as a managerial expert thoroughly conversant 
with modern, professional business methods, none more so than the collection, interpretation 
and analysis of operational data in the pursuit of informed decision-making and the 
identification of structural weaknesses. He personifies an era in which statistics had become a 
recognized ‘weapon’ of the ‘efficiency engineers’;88 a process exemplified for the First World 
War in the 1922 publication of an eight-hundred page compendium documenting the Statistics 
of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War.
89
 However, despite the 
prominent role played by Major-General Geddes on the Western Front, acknowledged with 
great appreciation at the time and after the war by Haig, histories of the conflict produced by 
military figures during the post-war ‘battle of the memoirs’ sought to minimize the impact of 
this civilian ‘usurper’. 
The acerbic introduction to the volume of the Official History dealing with 
transportation on the Western Front (provided by Sir James Edmonds), stating that ‘what 
soldiers had been denied was freely accorded to a civilian’,90 demonstrates the existence of 
some resentment towards the outside expert from within the military, and emphasizes the 
importance of Geddes’ access to raw materials and equipment to the growth of the BEF’s 
transport capacity. The war histories of the various technical corps most closely linked to the 
reorganization of transport in the BEF are similarly ‘protective’ of the military trade union. 
Geddes is not mentioned by name in the history of the Army Ordnance Service,
91
 whilst the 
only reference to Geddes in the record of the ASC is a critical observation regarding the size 
(and cost) of his office whilst employed by the Ministry of Munitions.
92
 Such criticisms were 
not merely the result of post-war ‘revisionism’ either, Colonel Beadon using the pages of the 
                                                 
88
 J.R. Beniger and D.L. Robyn, ‘Quantitative Graphics in Statistics: A Brief History’, The American 
Statistician, 32:1 (1978), 1–11 (p. 6); Macmillan, p. 9; Geddes would be dubbed ‘England’s efficiency 
engineer’ during the war. See Marcosson, Business of War, pp. 258–85. 
89
 Statistics of the Military Effort of the British Empire during the Great War, 1914-1920 (London: 
HMSO, 1922). 
90
 J.E. Edmonds’ introduction in Henniker, p. xxii. 
91
 A. Forbes, A History of the Army Ordnance Services (London: Medici Society, 1929). 
92
 R.H. Beadon, The Royal Army Service Corps: A History of Transport and Supply in the British Army, 2 
vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), II, pp. 405–6. 
189 
 
RUSI Journal to publish a number of somewhat trenchant comments on the utility of ‘business 
men’ in the army during 1917. 93  Although the previous sections have demonstrated the 
inaccuracy of Lloyd George’s blanket statement regarding the army’s institutional attitude 
towards outside expertise both before and during the First World War, clearly on an individual 
level some degree of animosity existed within the British Army. Fortunately for the BEF, it was 
not shared by its senior commander, nor were the methods of civilian industry disregarded by 
the ‘managers’ of the British Army’s increasingly mighty ‘business undertaking’.94 
 
Attitudes towards civilian ‘interference’ in the British Expeditionary Force ‘pre-Geddes’ 
The image of a military clique, disengaged from the wider world and reluctant to accept 
advice from civilians (particularly politicians) was also by no means created in the post-war 
‘battle of the memoirs’.95 Although the enmity and recriminations that litter Lloyd George’s 
War Memoirs would be particularly affected by the events surrounding the Third Battle of 
Ypres, and the deterioration in Haig’s attitude towards Lloyd George accelerated in the 
aftermath of the Calais Conference of February 1917,
96
 an atmosphere of suspicion towards ‘the 
goat’ was already perceptible in the summer of 1916 when Lloyd George arrived at the War 
Office.
97
 Sensitivity over the potential for the ‘fluttering of military dovecotes’ was enough of a 
concern for Asquith to advise Lloyd George to ‘work intimately with the soldiers’ upon his 
appointment rather than seek confrontation with them.
98
 Lord Esher, himself no stranger to the 
inner-workings of the military, also counselled Lloyd George to exercise ‘care’ in the use of 
Geddes in France.
99
 
Lloyd George was not the only one being warned to tread carefully. In an ‘unofficial’ 
chat at the War Office, Auckland Geddes was notified that ‘you can’t do a war-dance on senior 
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officers’ pet corns and expect them not to kick’.100 Consequently, ‘brother Eric’ was implored 
not to ‘start a row’ or to present himself as Lloyd George’s ‘dogsbody’ at GHQ. Instead, he was 
advised to ‘talk the language’ of the army, emphasize his education at the Oxford Military 
College and his experience of the American railways, and ensure that the officers in France 
were made fully aware that Geddes’ role was to be that of expert assistant rather than that of 
civilian usurper.
101
 Allied to this fraternal pep talk, Geddes’ visit was foreshadowed by a letter 
from Lloyd George to Haig in which the transport problem was laid out in plain terms: 
The output at home of munitions has now so greatly increased that we can meet with 
comparative ease the higher demands which you quite properly make on us, but I doubt 
whether, without careful preparation, the powers of absorption of the ports and lines of 
communication can expand to a commensurate degree. What I have specifically in mind 
is the desirability of ensuring such an expansion as will next year, and the year after if 
necessary, enable us to cope with the ever increasing volume of munitions and stores 
which will be needed for the services of your force.
102
 
 
Put simply, Lloyd George could now largely guarantee that the munitions demanded from the 
front could be manufactured. He could not, however, guarantee that they would arrive where 
they were required, with obvious implications for the effectiveness of the BEF. 
The initially cool response from Haig to Lloyd George’s proposal that Geddes visit 
France gave little cause for optimism; the C-in-C stated that ‘you will, I am sure, realize that 
everyone behind the army, no less than at the front, is working at such high pressure at present 
that they will not be able to devote as much time to [Geddes] as we should like’.103 If Haig’s 
reaction was cool, the attitude of his QMG, Sir Ronald Maxwell, was positively icy. Haig, upon 
receiving an initial memorandum on the subject of a new transport organization from Lord 
Derby in mid-July, understandably referred the paper to Maxwell for his comments.
104
 The 
QMG’s response claimed that the proposal (which bears a striking resemblance to the 
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arrangements settled upon by Geddes following the mission, adding credibility to Haig’s 
assumption that it was written by one of ‘Lloyd George’s men’) was ‘quite impracticable’. 
Furthermore, in a demonstration of his inability to foresee the necessity of strong forward 
planning as the BEF continued to expand, Maxwell noted that: 
It is not stated why the time has arrived to strengthen the transport arrangements of the 
BEF. So far as the work in France is concerned these arrangements have worked 
perfectly smoothly and efficiently: 1. in the ports; 2. on the railways and canals; 3. on 
the roads.
105
 
 
As will be demonstrated further below, Maxwell was not alone in evincing such opinions 
among the senior supply officers on Haig’s staff. 
Yet despite Maxwell’s reluctance, Haig’s answer to Lloyd George’s request in early 
August was far from the stereotypical image of military insularity that the Prime Minister would 
seek to accentuate in the War Memoirs. Haig’s comments were really a reflection of the fact that 
the BEF was engaged in the largest battle in British military history and, understandably, Haig 
could not guarantee that an investigation into administrative procedures would receive priority 
at GHQ over events at the front. The development of significant logistical problems over the 
first month of the offensive meant that Haig was actually ‘anxious to afford Sir Eric Geddes 
every possible facility for conducting his enquiry, and I shall be glad to make arrangements for 
his visit’.106 As Brown has highlighted, Haig’s interest in administrative issues was apparent 
from the moment he became C-in-C,
107
 and he was clearly in no doubt as to the potential 
benefits of Geddes’ visit. Consequently, a meeting between the two was arranged.108 Where 
Haig’s attitude was clearly encouraging, the War Office displayed a far less hospitable posture 
towards Lloyd George’s interference. The chief protagonist behind this was the Director of 
Movements, Stuart-Wortley. His ‘intense dislike for Geddes’ had not thawed following their 
frosty encounters at the outbreak of the war,
109
 and had been exacerbated by what Stuart-
Wortley perceived to be civilian encroachment into the realm of the professional soldier as the 
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war progressed.
110
 Buttressed by the support of his commanding officer, Sir John Cowans, 
Stuart-Wortley’s antipathy would manifest itself in an attempt to derail the transportation 
mission before it had even begun. 
Mindful of the delicacy of the mission in civil-military relationship terms, and of the 
requirement that the investigation should be handled swiftly, Geddes wished to be accompanied 
by representatives of the army who could both explain the existing procedures and minimize the 
inconvenience to the rest of the staff at GHQ.
111
 From the War Office, Geddes identified Stuart-
Wortley’s deputy, the now Lieutenant-Colonel Mance, as a suitable companion. Mance had 
prior experience of both military and civil railway operations. Having served as Director of 
Railways and Armoured Trains on the Kimberley Line during the South African War, Mance 
had later returned to the continent to work on the Nigerian railways between 1908 and 1911.
112
 
It is highly likely that Geddes’ involvement with the REC before the war meant that he was 
aware of Mance’s work in preparing the British railways for their role in August 1914. 113 
Accordingly, a letter was despatched from Lloyd George to Cowans requesting the temporary 
release of Mance in order for him to join Geddes’ team. 
Stuart-Wortley’s response to the request was to claim that he ‘could not possibly spare 
[Mance] for so long a time as three or four weeks’.114 To do so would ‘seriously prejudice the 
work of my directorate’. Not only was Mance the ‘head railway advisor’ to Stuart-Wortley, and 
technical assistant on ‘all questions which involve dealings with the REC or with the French and 
Belgian railways’, he was also in charge ‘of all questions connected with Mesopotamian, 
Egyptian and Salonika railways’. Mance, Stuart-Wortley argued, had an expertise that nobody 
in the Directorate of Movements could match, and in a further appeal to get Mance removed 
from the mission, Stuart-Wortley highlighted that ‘Mance [was] the designated Acting Director 
of Movements in the event of an invasion... and he has a knowledge of all home defence 
schemes which is unique’. The ongoing fear of invasion may have led to the retention in Britain 
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of an enormous permanent garrison of 1.5 million men,
115
 but it would not be enough to prevent 
Mance from joining the mission. 
No such obstructions existed at GHQ. Haig made no attempt to dissuade Geddes from 
utilizing the services of Colonel Henry Freeland on his investigation, despite the stress being 
placed on GHQ as the Somme continued to make inexorable demands upon the British staff. 
Freeland, like Mance, was handpicked by Geddes to join the mission thanks to Geddes’ prior 
awareness of Freeland’s talents. The two had worked at the same station, on adjoining railways 
in India, and ‘over a period of several years’ Geddes had acquired a ‘knowledge of his work and 
of [Freeland] personally’.116 In addition, Freeland was an expert on the methods employed by 
the French, having visited the French Army to observe the systems in use for the packing of 
supply trains in January 1916.
117
 
Lloyd George’s recollection of the mission omits the participation of these soldiers, 
referring only to the ‘small expert civilian staff’ provided to assist Geddes in his 
investigations.
118
 Yet the reasoning behind the choices of Freeland and Mance emphasize the 
degree of interaction between the railways and the military prior to 1914. Both were chosen for 
their demonstrable military expertise, obtained during the First World War and before, but were 
also well known to the civilian railwayman thanks to their employment on railways across the 
globe. Opportunities existed throughout the Empire in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth 
century for British engineers to obtain experience on vast civil engineering projects which 
helped to both preserve and project British power in the developing world. Buchanan has 
acknowledged the importance of engineering, both civil and military, as a tool for maintaining 
the ‘political power of the Raj’ during the nineteenth century.119 Mance and Freeland, like 
Geddes (father and son), exemplified the permeability of soldier and civilian in such an 
environment. Now they would come together on French soil to scrutinize the BEF’s existing 
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transport procedures alongside Geddes’ statistics expert, George Beharrell, and another figure 
with imperial railway experience; East Indian Railway manager, Philip Nash.
120
 
Geddes observed that the soldiers, Mance in particular, joined the mission with some 
hesitancy. This was doubtless thanks to the influence of Stuart-Wortley’s hostility at the War 
Office. Such reluctance was further engendered by the fact that the soldiers were being placed in 
the unenviable position of passing judgment on the organization and working practices 
established and managed by their superiors, most notably the IGC, Sir Frederick Clayton.
121
 In 
October 1914, when serving as Director of Supplies in France, Clayton had raised the 
possibility of employing civilians from large firms on the lines of communication in France. 
Taking into account the experience of employees from firms like Harrods and the railway 
companies in moving goods around Britain (and the world) in a timely fashion, Clayton 
believed that such men could be used in ‘essentially the same roles in France as they had filled 
with their civilian firms in Britain’.122  By the middle of 1916 however, Clayton’s attitude 
towards civilian involvement in examinations of the lines of communication had undergone a 
sea change. His frustrations were threefold. Firstly, the ‘combing out’ of men suitable for front 
line duties during 1915 had, Clayton claimed, robbed him of ‘all the important trained men... 
[who] know exactly what to do’ in the supply services. 123  Secondly, due to Clayton’s 
headquarters being located at Abbeville rather than at GHQ (originally at St. Omer, 
subsequently Montreuil-sur-Mer), Clayton believed himself to be an isolated figure, cut off 
from the decision-making cluster surrounding the C-in-C.
124
 That Clayton felt himself to be a 
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‘forgotten man’ was illustrated in a letter to Cowans, bemoaning the lack of recognition 
afforded to him (Clayton) over the course of the war: 
I was not mentioned in the previous dispatch (sic) and as I have told you have never had 
a mention since I have been IGC over twelve months now. Robb who was not a brilliant 
success as IGC got a KCB. Maxwell who was IGC for three months and only had 
250,000 men to deal with got a KCB. I have had over one million to deal with and have 
not even had a mention.
125
 
 
Finally, Clayton’s frustrations that his efforts were unappreciated was exacerbated by the 
number of investigations into logistical and administrative procedures undertaken during his 
tenure as IGC, pointing out that answering enquiries from such parties took up ‘a great deal of 
my time and that of my staff at HQ and bases’. All Clayton was interested in was whether ‘the 
work has been done to the satisfaction of the C-in-C, and if so cannot some steps be taken to 
stop these constant attacks and investigations being made on the lines of communication’.126 
Whilst, as the previous section illustrated, these investigations (undertaken by both civilian- and 
military-led parties) demonstrate that the British Army was by no means static and reactionary 
in terms of logistical organization prior to the Somme, their overarching goals were not 
adequately understood by some of the BEF’s senior soldiers. As a result, by the summer of 1916, 
Clayton’s antagonism threatened both the Geddes mission and the transportation network then 
struggling to supply the BEF. 
Clayton’s argument, summed up in his response to the findings of a commission led by 
the shipping magnate Sir Thomas Royden into the ongoing problem of congestion at the ports, 
was that despite the colossal expansion of the BEF over the previous eighteen months the BEF 
had ‘been supplied with everything it requires with clockwork regularity; nothing had failed, all 
demands have been met and nothing but praise has been given to those who have done the 
work’.127 Geddes, who had read Clayton’s remarks on the Royden report before forwarding 
them to Lloyd George, was fully aware that his civil-military mission would have to contend 
with a mind-set that stated: 
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The only conclusion one can come to after reading [the Royden report] is, that it is 
impossible for the ordinary business civilian to understand what are the conditions 
under which we have to work and that it is a mistake to allow them to interfere with an 
army business that most of us have studied all our lives... when we fail in any way to 
keep the army supplied it will be time for criticism.
128
 
 
Clayton was by no means alone in his attitude towards the conclusions produced by such 
examinations. In April 1916, for example, the Director of Supplies branded a report into the use 
of labour at the port of Rouen by the head of the Dockers Battalion as ‘simply valueless and 
useless’.129 Even Robertson, whose understanding of logistical issues early in the war helped 
sustain the BEF as a fighting force,
130
 believed that criticisms of congestion at the ports, bad 
storage practices, neglect of the canal network and the failure to develop railway traffic prior to 
the Somme were ‘misinformed’.131 Such responses exemplified the ‘reactionary’ portion of the 
military establishment whose influence Lloyd George sought to eradicate. Until the supply line 
had actually broken down, Clayton believed it was unfair for the War Office to continue 
bombarding the BEF with civilians bent on ‘interfering’. The evidence suggests that, at the very 
least, Clayton was unwilling to countenance the potential problems awaiting the BEF should the 
transport network be suffocated under the weight of goods being despatched from Britain. 
Nothing within Clayton’s remarks implied that he appreciated how investigations such as 
Royden’s were undertaken precisely to ensure that catastrophic failure did not occur as the 
British war effort continued to grow.
132
 Investigations taking place after the network broke 
down would, theoretically, be too late to rectify the situation should the BEF wish to remain an 
effective fighting force on the Western Front. 
Despite the successful working relationship fostered between civilian and military 
figures both prior to and during the early stages of the war, there remained a clear and palpable 
sense of mistrust between the soldiers of the BEF and the politicians charged with managing the 
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war effort. Suspicion and reservation over the motives of ‘outsiders’, particularly those with 
such close connections to ‘the goat’,133 to do anything other than meddle with pre-existing 
structures and erode the jurisdiction of the army, were matched by wariness and doubts over the 
competence of those tasked with overseeing the operation of the BEF’s umbilical cord. Lord 
Derby, the Under-Secretary of State for War, described Clayton as ‘very stupid, conceited and 
narrow-minded’.134 Maxwell, it was feared, would also not be the ‘sort of man who would 
favourably impress Lloyd George’ as a result of his ‘hide-bound manner’.135 These were the two 
senior supply officers in the BEF throughout 1916, and it was their working methods and 
operating procedures that would be under examination by Geddes’ hybrid team of experts. The 
hostility with which Haig’s senior subordinates viewed the exercise, however, was not 
replicated by Haig himself. Despite having adjudged Clayton’s ‘methodical system’ as being 
‘very remarkable’ in December 1915,136 Haig acknowledged the potential benefits the BEF 
could gain as a result of Geddes’ investigation. The transportation mission was received at GHQ 
on 24 August, and began work the following day.
137
 
 
The transportation mission and the genesis of the Directorate-General of Transportation 
The terms of reference of Geddes’ mission were as follows: to review the existing 
capacity of the transport network in France and ascertain if it would be capable of dealing with 
the ‘very considerably increased quantity of ammunition and other stores’ which would be 
despatched from Britain in preparation for the offensives of 1917; to identify the repairs, 
extensions and operational improvements required at the ports, on the railways, and on both the 
canal and road networks in order to render them capable of sustaining an advance;
138
 and finally, 
to learn ‘all that is possible from the very excellent transport arrangements of the French Army’ 
in order to appropriate efficient French practices for use in the BEF’s distribution system.139 
Following the period of investigation, Geddes was to produce a series of statistical breakdowns 
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detailing the quantities of materials required by the BEF for the conduct of future operations, 
alongside a number of reports cataloguing the full range of variables involved in the 
maintenance and improvement of the transport network.
140
 In short, Geddes was being asked to 
undertake a methodical study and analysis of the BEF’s transport capability, based upon a 
comprehensive and precise accumulation of the data necessary to create an effective and 
practicable logistics policy. Geddes’ instructions called for a similar approach to that advocated 
by the management pioneer Henri Fayol in what Fayol termed the study of the ‘administrative 
apparatus’ of an undertaking. The ‘surveyor’, in this case Geddes, was charged with 
ascertaining the past, present and future of the BEF’s transportation services in order to discover 
both the weaknesses in the organization and the ‘probable consequences’ of managerial 
decisions.
141
 
Accompanied by Colonel Woodroffe, Geddes was given a two-day tour of ammunition 
railheads, newly constructed stations and sidings, and afforded the opportunity to discuss the 
existing supply system with the officers on the ground, most notably those in charge of artillery 
batteries in action along the Mametz-Carnoy valley.
142
 Although Grieves states that the tour was 
‘largely uninformative’ due to the ‘model’ nature of the sites visited,143 Woodroffe’s account of 
the trip illustrates that it was actually the chrysalis for many of the subsequent improvements to 
be made on the transport network. The tour impressed upon Geddes the immediate need for 
action to be taken in order to alleviate congestion and increase economy in the BEF’s 
administrative tail, and provided the lines of enquiry upon which the wider investigation would 
rest. The points which impressed themselves most upon Geddes were: the enormous quantity of 
labour required for road maintenance and the construction of station yards; the urgent need for 
‘some form of light railway to take the traffic off the roads’; the waste of manpower inherent in 
the transhipping practices taking place where the various modes of transport terminated; and the 
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significant quantities of expended materials (such as ammunition cases) congregating in the rear 
of the British troops.
144
 
At the conclusion of the ‘model’ tour, and prior to his return to London, Haig asked 
Geddes for his opinion on what he had seen. ‘His reply was guarded – to the effect that he had 
seen plenty to think about but as yet did not know what to think’.145 Rather than risk sounding 
like he had arrived in France with pre-existing judgments, Geddes requested the opportunity to 
have a ‘free run’ of the BEF’s lines of communication, along with access to any information and 
statistics he may require in order to complete a thorough report. Haig, increasingly concerned by 
the blockage of supplies around Amiens, acquiesced, and notified Maxwell of the impending 
investigation. Perhaps mindful of the insularity prevalent in some quarters, most notably 
Clayton’s and Maxwell’s departments, Haig issued an instruction to all armies, and his senior 
administrative officers, ordering that ‘all necessary information and any statistics required will 
be placed at the disposal of Sir Eric Geddes... and the C-in-C desires that every facility will be 
afforded [Geddes] in the conduct of [his] enquiries’.146 Demonstrating the thoroughness of the 
impending investigation, upon his return to France Geddes’ original party was bolstered by the 
inclusion of Mr Blades, the Dock Superintendent of the NER; another technical specialist to 
provide expert analysis for the examination of the French Channel ports.
147
 Blades joined Nash 
and Freeland in the task of discovering the capacity of the docks based on the nature of the 
traffic to be dealt with. Geddes and the others, meanwhile, surveyed the rest of the network and 
discussed matters with Clayton in order to ‘build up a complete statement of the weight of 
traffic’ required to support the BEF.148 
Within a fortnight Geddes felt sufficiently informed to offer a preliminary view of the 
situation to Lloyd George. It is clear from this letter, in which Geddes implores Lloyd George to 
refrain from revealing its contents to anyone in the War Office or at GHQ, that Geddes 
remained sensitive to the fragility of relations between his mission and the BEF, fearing that the 
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criticisms the letter contained would severely jeopardize the remainder of the investigation. His 
conclusions, produced before the bulk of the necessary data had been collected, let alone 
analysed, were an unequivocal condemnation of the BEF’s logistical foundations and the innate 
reactivity of the administrative echelons: 
This is a war of Armies backed by machinery and ‘movement’ and I do not think that 
‘movement’ has received sufficient attention in anticipation of the advance. I judge this 
by the total absence of light railway or road organization, or policy for the use of 
waterways.
149
 
 
The fact that even as the railways continued to be clogged up by ever-increasing quantities of 
matériel, canal barges were being returned to civil work, exemplified the issue. Rather than 
being viewed as an integral part of the transport mix, canals were only being utilized when rail 
conveyance was not available. Whilst, as noted above, Holland believed IWT to be capable of 
carrying a great deal more than was being requested of it, ‘neither [in Britain] nor in France’ 
could Geddes ‘ascertain what the policy of canal user is. I doubt if one exists’.150 
The problem facing the BEF was one of insufficient forward planning and coordination, 
a result of the policy of decentralization instigated as soon as the BEF began to expand in early 
1915. Whilst Robertson had noted at that time that ‘the force is now assuming too great a 
strength to admit of matters being centralized at GHQ to the extent they are now’, 151  the 
corollary was that the departments responsible for supply had become heavily 
compartmentalized; officers were capable only of making adjustments to their own sections, 
with no oversight in place to ensure such modifications would not adversely affect other 
departments whose work was necessarily interconnected.
152
 The geographical barrier between 
Clayton at Abbeville and Maxwell at GHQ was a physical manifestation of an organizational 
problem, one which Harding-Newman, employed under the QMG, was in no doubt had 
contributed to the ‘bottleneck’ around Amiens.153 
Furthermore, as no structure existed which allowed for regular reviews of the extant 
systems, forward planning had hitherto been conducted in ‘pennyworths’, and was liable to be 
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subordinated to short-term exigencies at times of heavy demand on the administrative staff. 
Transport facilities had been improved ‘here and there’ as the movements and battle plans of 
senior commanders had dictated, as demonstrated by the construction projects undertaken in 
preparation for the Battle of the Somme, but the system was a ‘hand-to-mouth’ one.154 In the 
event of a substantial advance, particularly should the German lines be ‘broken’, the mileage of 
railways to be repaired and operated in support of the troops would be greatly enlarged. The 
plans to deal with the railway construction had been agreed between the Director of Railways 
and the French authorities, but the quantity of rolling stock required to bridge the gap between 
the Channel and the front had not been accurately forecast.
155
 Instead, the question had been the 
subject of sporadic ‘rule-of-thumb’ estimates from within the Railway directorate, which 
highlight the inadequacy of the existing planning mechanisms in the BEF in 1916. 
Illustrating that the army was aware of the potential implications should the Somme 
develop into an extended advance, the Director of Railways had commissioned an examination 
into how many railway wagons would be needed to service British requirements to the Belgian-
German border. The two estimates which came back were at wild variance with one another. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Henniker predicted that 22,501 wagons would be required to work the 
BEF’s daily traffic to the eastern frontier of Belgium; Lieutenant-Colonel Paget suggested that a 
mere 11,240 wagons would suffice.
156
 This discrepancy was in part explained by the different 
parameters the officers had set for themselves, Henniker adding a twenty-five per-cent margin 
for the dislocation of traffic and the use of wagons as storage vehicles at railheads and in 
construction areas. Neither officer, however, had based their estimates upon the latest 
projections as to the anticipated size of the BEF in 1917. As a consequence, their statements 
were essentially worthless, based on out-of-date information and a perfect example of the 
limitations under which the BEF’s administrators, until the peak strength of the army was 
ascertained, had to operate. Until a comprehensive statement as to the eventual size of the BEF 
(and its related needs in terms of food, fodder, munitions et al) could be made, the staff of the 
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administrative services could only ‘guess’ at the nature of the task that would ultimately 
confront them.  
The problems of control were amplified beyond the railheads, none more so than in the 
use of light railways. In January 1916, Haig had written in his diary that light railways could be 
constructed in order ‘to save the roads’ from excess wear through the winter,157 and where units 
had acquired light railway systems from the French Army as the share of the line had changed 
individual formations had begun to request engines and material over the spring. However, in 
the same way that labour duties were inefficiently completed due to the units engaged in 
construction frequently being moved, and therefore not seeing the ‘benefit’ of their work, the 
constant redeployment of formations negated the chance for a coherent, methodically planned 
light railway policy to develop within the BEF. By the time the Somme opened there were less 
than half a dozen tractors employed on the BEF’s small, dispersed light railway systems,158 
leading Haig to order that a policy for the development of light railways, as used by the French 
and German armies, should be adopted by the BEF. Discussions with the individual armies over 
the form such a policy should take led nowhere, however. A lack of strong central coordination 
from GHQ (Haig himself placed the Director of Railways, based at Abbeville, in charge) and 
the absence of a sufficiently senior team to ensure priority was afforded the scheme against the 
backdrop of the Somme meant an inevitable stagnation between the ‘stakeholders’ in each army. 
For the army commanders the appearance of the light railways question was yet another 
intrusion upon the day to day business of running their armies. A month after receiving Haig’s 
instructions, the Director of Railways had been unable to make any progress on the matter.
159
 
That Haig was not alone in recognizing the potential utility of light railways was 
highlighted by Woodroffe’s belief that ‘it is... necessary to apply all our efforts to developing a 
60cm system at the greatest possible speed in order to ensure that as much of the front area as 
possible is served by this means before the winter sets in’. 160  However, although some 
construction work had begun on new lines in the area around La Boiselle and the ‘Sausage 
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Valley’, ‘owing to a lack of material, no others can be commenced at the present time’.161 Light 
railways were in effect being approached in the same ad hoc, piecemeal fashion as characterized 
earlier British attempts to implement infrastructural changes to the supply chain on the Western 
Front. Having observed the operation of light railways on the French network alongside 
Woodroffe,
162
 and taking into account his own previous experience of managing a light railway 
system in the Himalayas, Geddes was equally convinced of the possibilities surrounding the 
extended use of the medium. A light railways department, he wrote to Lloyd George, would be 
a great success provided the ‘right men’ were appointed to run it. ‘If they are not, it will be a 
dismal failure.’163 
The magnitude of operations on the Somme had overloaded a transport system created 
through short-term amendments over the previous two years; adjustments which had been made 
in the absence of any comprehensive, centrally directed policy taking account of the myriad 
questions of coordination, resourcing, staffing, and expansion which arose in the arrangement of 
a modern army’s supply requirements.164 As Geddes concluded in his preliminary report to 
Lloyd George: 
It is beyond argument that there is today no one who controls the continuous transit 
from this country to the front. There is no one who can tell you throughout where his 
weak places are, or coordinate the policy and resources, present and future, of the 
various means of transit. It is not possible for the C-in-C or QMG in France to do it; it is 
alone a big job for the best man you can find. If the C-in-C is not satisfied with his 
transport arrangements and desires someone to go into them in anticipation of the spring, 
he must, I think, appoint a man for the job, put him in charge of it, and back him 
strongly.
165
 
 
Geddes was convinced that the time for further investigations, formal enquiries and interviews 
had passed. Writing less than two months after the Dardanelles Commission had been 
established by Asquith to examine the shambolic operations on the Gallipoli peninsula, Geddes 
warned that Lloyd George ‘would only launch into delay and controversy’ if a formal enquiry 
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into transportation on the Western Front was set up.
166
 Witnesses would be required to compile 
evidence to support their actions, and participants could attempt to conceal their own culpability 
in the events which had created the existing situation; neither would solve the immediate and 
pressing issue of ensuring that the BEF continued to receive supplies, whilst simultaneously 
presenting opportunities for further obstinacy from those within military circles that were 
unwilling to engage with civilian methods. Lloyd George agreed with Geddes’ assessment that 
‘executive action is called for both on this side [of the Channel] and in France’.167 Crucially, so 
did Haig. The special memoranda originally requested by Lloyd George were no longer the 
priority.
168
 Instead, the common ground between Haig and Lloyd George would be used both as 
a platform for the restructuring of the BEF’s logistical organization, and for the appointment of 
some of Britain’s leading transport experts into the military ranks. 
In London, Lloyd George requested that Geddes become head of the Directorate-
General of Military Railways [DGMR] at the War Office. In this role he would be ‘responsible 
for the supply of all railway, light railway, dock, road and canal appliances in France’.169 The 
appointment would see a considerable degree of influence and accountability for the efficiency 
of the BEF being handed over to a civilian. The following day, Lloyd George’s action was 
augmented by Haig’s decision to offer Geddes the position of Director-General of 
Transportation. This would see Geddes ‘take complete charge of the transportation services of 
the army in France’, thereby eliminating the divided responsibility which had emerged as a 
result of the system adopted in 1914.
170
 Upon accepting the two roles Geddes became, in 
twenty-four hours, responsible both for the provision and maintenance of a logistics network 
capable of sustaining the BEF in France, and for the acquisition and supply of all the resources 
necessary to establish and improve that network. By early 1917, Geddes was the head of a 
directorate with responsibility for the supervision and direction of some 50,000 men; a figure 
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similar to that employed by the NER before the war. When combined with Geddes’ 
appointment in London, the result was a unique concentration of power within Geddes’ hands. 
Lloyd George’s redeployment of Geddes immediately drew expressions of opposition 
from two of the military members of the Army Council. In response, Geddes was issued with 
the temporary rank of major-general, giving him parity with the established military 
hierarchy.
171
 Stuart-Wortley reacted to the news by informing Derby that ‘under no 
circumstances’ could he work under Geddes, and that he would resign immediately.172 It was a 
threat which Lloyd George had anticipated and, in the event, a meeting between the two men 
was ultimately enough to pacify the Director of Movements. Although Geddes annexed Stuart-
Wortley’s railway and IWT supply branches, privately the soldier admitted that his ‘show had 
really got too big’.173 In France, Maxwell similarly tended his resignation over the ‘position and 
responsibilities of the new Director-General’, but was persuaded by Haig to withdraw the 
offer.
174
 Haig was able to convince Maxwell that the civilian had not ‘been sent out by L[loyd] 
G[eorge] to take over the duties which I had assigned to him’. Furthermore, Haig was able to 
induce the QMG to instruct his directors to cease their criticisms of Geddes. That such an 
instruction was necessary in the first place indicates the level of hostility displayed within some 
sections towards the encroachment of a civilian into the senior ranks of the army, something 
which Lloyd George would later claim made Geddes ‘by no means eager to go to France’.175 He 
would not, however, be going alone. 
 
Populating the directorates: ‘civilianization’ in London and France 
If the antipathy between soldier and civilian was mutual, Geddes’ treatment of the 
military figures working alongside and beneath him did not immediately convey it. Although 
the establishment of the DGMR called for Stuart-Wortley’s subordination to Geddes, 
‘satisfactory talks’ between the two men resulted in the migration of Stuart-Wortley’s duties 
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being put on hold. Rather than being placed under Geddes, Stuart-Wortley was to remain under 
the supervision of the QMG for ‘as long as matters go smoothly at the British ports’.176 In 
addition, clearly mindful of the necessity for the civil and military elements to work in the 
closest harmony in the new organization, Geddes employed as Director of Docks in France a 
man with whom Stuart-Wortley (as the two positions would come into close contact) would be 
most likely to cooperate.
177
 
The man chosen for the role was Geddes’ colleague from the NER, and his successor as 
Chief Goods Manager, Ralph Wedgwood. As noted above, Wedgwood had been the first 
graduate of the Traffic Apprenticeship Scheme, and Geddes believed that he and Stuart-Wortley 
had ‘always got on well’.178 Wedgwood possessed experience of handling the large volumes of 
freight traffic moved by the railway company both to and from the principal shipping ports in 
the north-east.
179
 In joining Nash and Beharrell (Deputy Director-General and Assistant 
Director-General (Statistics) respectively) in France, Wedgwood was yet another railwayman 
with scant military experience being parachuted into a senior appointment in the newly created 
transport directorate. The trend led Lord Northcliffe to conclude, with some cynicism, that ‘we 
have brought to France a considerable portion of industrial England’.180 
Northcliffe was not the only one dissatisfied by the outflow of railwaymen from Britain 
to take up new posts in France. The departures of Beharrell, Nash and Geddes from the Ministry 
of Munitions were keenly, if melodramatically, felt by Lloyd George’s successor as Minister, 
Edwin Montagu: 
To meet your wishes, and with tears in my eyes, tears which have been flowing ever 
since, Geddes left the Ministry… When Geddes left this Ministry he took with him 
Nash and Beharrell, and since then I can hardly bear to look at War Office 
correspondence, for almost every day, if you will excuse a slight exaggeration, I receive 
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a request for the service of some new man to be sent somewhere or other, sometimes 
China, sometimes France. By a curious coincidence they are nearly always NER men, 
and it looks as though we shall be left without a railway man anywhere about.
181
 
 
Just two days later, and ‘despite the fact that I find it very difficult to spare him’, Wedgwood 
was also released.
182
 The ‘curious coincidence’ was a consequence of the particular skills 
nurtured by the NER’s apprenticeship scheme, and the progressive approach to management 
which the company had fostered prior to the war. These men had proven themselves adaptable 
to the challenge of increasing munitions production, and would now be turned back to a more 
recognizable problem for a transport expert; the reorganization of the BEF’s logistics. However, 
the NER would not be the only British railway company to make a contribution to the senior 
management cohort of the DGT and the DGMR. 
The scale of the task in France was expected to demand the majority of Geddes’ 
attention, therefore it was found desirable to appoint a representative to act on his behalf in 
London. Sir Guy Granet, the General Manager of the Midland Railway, took up the post of 
Deputy Director-General of Military Railways at the War Office, overseeing the British half of 
Geddes’ dual appointment. The two men shared a number of similarities, from both having been 
born outside Britain (Granet in Genoa to a merchant banking family) to the possession of 
business experience obtained outside the railway industry.
183
 Like Geddes, Granet’s rise to 
seniority had been rapid. Unlike Geddes, however, Granet did not join a railway company that 
had benefitted from the long-term input of a man like Sir George Gibb. Instead, despite 
improvements made by his predecessor, upon Granet’s arrival the Midland was ‘an undertaking 
rather living on its past reputation’.184 The Midland had become known for the ‘easy-going 
regard for the virtue of punctuality’ displayed by its 66,000 employees over the 1,400 miles of 
track operated by the company.
185
 The manner in which this deficiency was addressed will be 
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examined further below, for the time being it is suffice to note that Granet’s ‘powers of 
organization, coupled with the work of a good team of officers, rapidly raised the Midland… to 
first class standards of efficiency’. 186  Foremost among Granet’s gifts, as the appreciations 
written after his death testified, were ‘a keen and scientific mind’ and a willingness to consider 
new developments and policies. Like Gibb at the NER, Granet encouraged the Midland to 
abandon precedent and ‘past practice’, and to embrace improved methods and ‘better 
alternatives’.187 
It was this ability to discard the accepted ‘way of doing things’, Granet’s demonstrable 
success in cultivating systemic change (which led to the receipt of a knighthood in 1911), and 
his employment of modern working methods that doubtless encouraged Geddes to request 
Granet’s appointment. As a member of the REC, Granet was well known at the War Office and, 
adding further weight to the case against Lloyd George’s assertion of military insularity, Sir 
John Cowans offered his ‘hearty approval’ to the suggestion that Granet should enter the 
DGMR.
188
 Even Stuart-Wortley found Granet to be a ‘nice fellow’,189 illustrating that it was a 
personal dislike of Geddes rather than a blanket aversion to civilian ‘interference’ which guided 
his earlier antipathy. Despite the reluctance of the Midland’s directors, permission for Granet to 
take up the role was granted by the railway company on 19 October.
190
 The exchange of letters 
between Lloyd George and the Midland’s chairman, alongside emphasizing the impact of 
Granet’s withdrawal upon the company, also highlights the difficulties which the railway was 
experiencing as a result of the ‘absence of so many of our chief and subordinate officers, who 
are either serving in the Munitions Department, or who are fighting’. Lloyd George’s 
appreciation of the company’s ‘patriotic efforts’ can have done little to ameliorate the pressures 
upon the Midland Railway which, alongside the other major British railway companies, was 
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experiencing a significant increase in demand for its services during the war, whilst many of its 
workers had joined the army.
191
 
Whereas the railway companies and the Ministry of Munitions acceded to the release of 
men to serve in the new directorates, the NER even continuing to pay Geddes’ salary 
throughout the war,
192
 not all institutions displayed the same cooperative spirit. The most 
prominent example surrounded Geddes’ desire to employ a ‘man with practical knowledge in 
dock administration and working to act as Deputy Director of Docks to Wedgwood, particularly 
on the mechanical engineering side’.193 From both a ‘technical and personal point view’, Cyril 
Kirkpatrick was viewed by Geddes as the man for the job. Kirkpatrick, described as a ‘very 
strong man and a pusher’, was well known to Wedgwood from the former’s time spent as 
Engineer to the Corporation at Newcastle-upon-Tyne before the war. A request had already 
been sent to Kirkpatrick to ask for his advice on how labour could be obtained for various 
positions within the Docks directorate, and Geddes believed Kirkpatrick to be ‘quite glad’ to go 
to France; however, his employers, the Port of London Authority, refused to release him. 
Geddes was not to be deterred, writing to Lloyd George that ‘if the ports over here are 
to be worked satisfactorily it is essential that we should have not the third or fourth class men 
from the British ports but the best’.194 Geddes’ hope was that Lloyd George could use his 
influence to persuade the Authority to reconsider their position. Lord Devonport, the chairman 
of the Authority, was a former colleague of Lloyd George’s at the Board of Trade, but despite 
their prior relationship and the despatch of a letter in which the national importance of the 
‘valuable public service’ represented by the release of Kirkpatrick was stressed, the Authority 
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resisted.
195
 Kirkpatrick remained in London, overseeing the construction of the King George V 
Dock which would eventually open in 1921. Clearly then, despite the later assertions of the 
official historian, Geddes did not receive everything he desired upon his appointment. 
Edmonds was employed at GHQ during the period of Geddes’ reorganizations, and it is 
highly plausible that he may have contributed to the ‘whispers’ circulating around Haig that 
viewed Geddes as a threat to the autonomy of the military high command.
196
 The abolition of 
the post of IGC and subsequent removal of Clayton, whose vicious criticisms of ‘civilian 
interference’ had so startled Geddes prior to his mission, did nothing to allay such fears among 
the soldiers who remained;
197
 nor did the removal of Brigadier-General Twiss as Director of 
Railways in November, following Geddes’ recommendation that Twiss be relieved of his 
appointment for failing to supply the required quantities of rails and locomotives to satisfy the 
BEF’s needs. 198  Haig, however, whilst acknowledging the concerns within the BEF as to 
Geddes’ unprecedented position, championed the ‘civilianization’ process from the beginning. 
Like Geddes, he believed explicitly in the promotion of the best man for the job, regardless of 
their background: 
There is a good deal of criticism apparently being made at the appointment of a civilian 
like Geddes to an important post on the Headquarters of an Army in the Field. These 
critics seem to fail to realize the size of the Army, and the amount of work which the 
Army requires of a civilian nature. The working of the railways, the upkeep of the roads, 
even the baking of bread and 1000 other industries go on in peace as well as in war. So 
with the whole nation at war, our object should be to employ men on the same work in 
war as they are accustomed to do in peace.
199
 
 
In the context of an industrialized war in which the resources of entire nations were required to 
be mobilized and coordinated, Haig recognized that the inefficient use of the British Empire’s 
human and material resources just to placate the sensibilities of the ‘military trade union’ was 
incompatible with the size of the challenge confronting the BEF. A far more logical approach 
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was to employ a ‘civilian who was unafraid of large-scale planning and had access to the 
necessary resources’ in place of officers handed the work ‘merely because they are generals and 
colonels’.200 
Furthermore, the perceived threat from Geddes was not backed up by his actions. 
‘Civilianization’ did not mean the wholesale replacement of soldiers with civilians as part of 
some kind of ‘old boys’ network at the War Office and in France. Where the incumbent proved 
themselves to be capable of discharging their duties effectively they were, regardless of being 
generals or colonels, retained in position. In London, Colonel Collard retained control of the 
provision of material for IWT,
201
 whilst Colonel Mance’s performance on the transportation 
mission saw him rewarded with responsibility for obtaining the materials required for the 
expanded road, railway and light railway directorates.
202
 The explanation given to Granet (under 
whom Collard and Mance would serve) for the retention of the soldiers in these procurement 
roles demonstrates Geddes’ appreciation of the advantages of retaining a presence of military 
‘specialists’ within the new directorate. ‘Our chief difficulty’, Geddes wrote, ‘will be to get 
things “through” the War Office’. He was referring to bureaucracy – the dreaded ‘red tape’ – 
which could only be avoided by ‘knowing the ropes, and knowing where the snags are, and how 
either to get round them or knock them out of the way’.203 According to Geddes, not only were 
Collard and Mance capable of working without close supervision, but both also knew the ‘minor 
tricks of the trade’ necessary to ensure that requests from the DGT would not get buried in 
bureaucracy and would receive the priority that the situation demanded.
204
 For the major ‘tricks’ 
requiring the direct sanction of the Army Council, direct access to Lloyd George remained 
Geddes’ most prized weapon.205 That he chose to highlight this in his initial observations to 
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Granet demonstrates Geddes’ ongoing concerns at the precarious position of the new directorate 
within the hierarchy of the British war effort. 
Stuart-Wortley was another of those whom Geddes was keen to retain. Despite the 
obvious disdain shown towards Geddes by the Director of Movements, three factors combined 
to persuade Geddes not to immediately replace Stuart-Wortley. Firstly, as noted above, media 
reports were beginning to emerge which questioned the veracity of placing civilians in key 
positions of authority in the army, with the Northcliffe press in the vanguard.
206
 Secondly, and 
on a related note, Geddes was keenly aware of the need to retain the support of senior military 
and political figures in order to ensure a smooth transition while the new organizations were 
‘bedded in’. The king was ‘glad to hear… that General Stuart-Wortley remains as Director of 
Movements, and that he and Sir Eric Geddes are working in complete harmony’.207 On a more 
practical level, the backing of Cowans, Stuart-Wortley’s most fervent supporter, was critical to 
the success of the project. Although Cowans was, as we have seen, by no means ideologically 
opposed to civilian involvement in the war effort, as Sir Sam Fay would discover, the eventual 
removal of Stuart-Wortley elicited an emotional response: 
When I saw General Cowans… he was angry and called me a damn fool. He said I 
could not carry on the job, that it was a military post, that the tentacles of the Director of 
Movements were all over the War Office and could not be moved from the building, 
although they were overcrowded… He reminded me that he had held the position ten 
years before Stuart-Wortley, and knew something about it.
208
 
 
Although Cowans’ outburst was highly uncharitable towards one of the British railway 
industry’s most respected figures,209 it also demonstrated the third reason why Geddes was loath 
to dispense with Stuart-Wortley’s services immediately. Put simply, Stuart-Wortley’s 
experience and understanding of the role made him, temporarily at least, indispensable. 
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Immediate removal ran the risk not only of upsetting the delicate balance in the War Office, but 
also of reducing the efficiency of the Directorate of Movements with potentially disastrous 
results. As Fay himself acknowledged after shadowing Stuart-Wortley for a week prior to taking 
over, nobody could have ‘run the show’ as well as Stuart-Wortley did at that time.210 With 
Geddes more interested in creating efficient, functional directorates than getting involved in 
petty boundary disputes with obstinate soldiers, Stuart-Wortley, as with Maxwell in France,
211
 
gained a temporary reprieve. 
Yet with a number of entirely new departments to staff, and the majority of the army’s 
most skilled administrators already employed either at home or abroad, it was inevitable that a 
large proportion of the personnel required for the transportation directorates would have to be 
found from civilian sources. The wartime career of Company Sergeant Major L.W. Conibear 
illustrates that such experience was not merely required at the ‘senior management’ level either. 
An employee of the GWR at Bristol, Conibear joined the ROD in January 1917 and left for 
France on 4 February. Before the summer he would be responsible for on-board train duties 
(brakesman, guard, signalman), and employed on clerical and operational work (orderly room 
administration, establishing traffic control, organizing traffic). In July 1917, just over six 
months after having signed up, Conibear was responsible for all the administrative work in Fifth 
Army’s Light Railway directorate, a task which involved: 
[dealing] with all personnel questions affecting eight Light Railway Operating 
Companies (over 2,000 men), leave, sickness, promotions, casualties, examinations and 
general routine. Traffic policy, new construction, signalling arrangements, pay, 
accounts... numerous telephonic and telegraphic enquiries in absence of the 
Superintendent of the Line. [Collating] statistics appertaining to the general working of 
light railways as required by the Director of Light Railways.
212
 
 
In the dislocation of March 1918, the abilities of such men were of great benefit to the BEF, 
Conibear finding himself in charge of sixty men attached to the Canadian Railway Troops to 
construct broad gauge railways after ‘considerable roaming’ following the disintegration of 
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Fifth Army. Conibear would remain employed on broad gauge duties until the reconstitution of 
Fifth Army at the end of June, when he took on the role of Central Traffic Controller, 
responsible for the ‘movement of all power, wagons and traffic under the direction of the 
Superintendent of the Line’.213 
The large-scale logistical issues facing the BEF demanded men with the practical 
experience to undertake such varied duties effectively.
214
 Geddes’ pre-war career and contacts 
within the railway industry provided him with knowledge of and access to men like Conibear; 
the ‘patriotic actions’ of companies like the Midland, GWR and the road board, from where the 
new Director of Roads, Henry Maybury, was obtained, provided him with their services.
215
 Far 
from attempting to establish civilian ‘dominance’ over the military, from the outset Geddes 
endeavoured to merge the talents of Britain’s transport experts with the bespoke knowledge of 
talented officers who had acquired two years’ ‘on the job’ training as the BEF expanded.216 
From their inception, indeed even from the constitution of the transportation mission sent from 
London in August 1916, the directorates created by Geddes in Britain and France were hybrid 
organizations, viewed with suspicion by some soldiers, but given the unequivocal support of the 
BEF’s C-in-C. It was a point that, at the time at least, even Lloyd George would concede: 
When I was Secretary of State for War one of my first duties was to appoint a great 
railway manager to take over the question of railway transport. The C-in-C not only 
welcomed his appointment, but instantly appointed him as chief railway representative 
behind the line.
217
 
 
When Lloyd George spoke in Wales, however, the new directorates had yet to face the test of 
active operations. The manner in which they did so would reinforce both the importance of 
logistics to the conduct of modern, materiel-intensive warfare, and demonstrate beyond doubt 
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that ‘total’ warfare required organizational solutions derived predominantly from civilian 
sources. 
  
216 
 
3.3: Remembering the third ‘M’: The application of civilian business 
methods on the Western Front, 1916-1918 
The Battle of the Somme illuminated the shortcomings in the BEF’s logistical support 
network in the summer of 1916. The congested roads of Picardy and the growing mountain of 
supplies at the Channel ports were graphic demonstrations of what occurred when the science of 
transportation was inadequately applied to the conduct of modern, materiel-intensive warfare. 
Yet in 1917 the BEF was able to launch four ‘large offensives’, all of which dwarfed the 
Somme in terms of the quantities of ammunition fired in support of the infantry.
218
 In the final 
year of the war, even the dislocation caused by Germany’s spring offensives was insufficient to 
eradicate the organizational changes developed in the aftermath of Britain’s first great offensive 
on the Western Front. The results of the British reorganization of transportation in the preceding 
two years were played out in the final hundred days of the war. In the eight-day bombardment 
prior to the Somme, the British had fired 1,732,873 rounds.
219
 Eight weeks later, the BEF’s 
transport network was in danger of collapsing in the process of sustaining ammunition 
expenditure of 28,000 tons per week.
220
 By contrast, eight weeks after the opening of the Battle 
of Amiens on 8 August 1918, the BEF was able to fire 943,847 rounds over twenty-four hours 
in the course of the assault on the Hindenburg Line, the culmination of a week in which the 
force expended 83,170 tons of munitions (3,383,700 rounds).
221
 In the final hundred days of the 
war, the BEF pumped 621,289 tons of ammunition into the German defences.
222
 
 In conjunction with the myriad long- and short-term issues which combined to reduce 
the effectiveness of the German Army, the BEF’s supply services were able to provide logistical 
support on a level which would contribute greatly to Ludendorff’s decision to seek an 
armistice.
223
 Yet the importance of these munitions actually being in a position to be fired in the 
autumn of 1918 is largely overlooked in histories of the First World War, particularly among  
(primarily Anglo-centric) ‘revisionist’ historians. Whilst numerous authors have charted the 
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technological and tactical modernization of the BEF between 1 July 1916 and the end of the war, 
few have chosen to document this modernizing process in line with the capacity of the Allies to 
apply those lessons effectively. As Stevenson notes, although the Allies had superior access to 
both human and material resources than the Central Powers, ‘many of those resources were in 
the wrong place: far away in overseas empires or the US’.224 Furthermore, great quantities of 
shells were of no use if the Channel ports could not process them from the ships, nor the 
railways or canals transport them inland to the guns. 
 That a colossal increase in the transport capacity of the BEF occurred in the second half 
of the war is beyond doubt.
225
 By December 1916, Geddes had already secured the release of 
350 locomotives; 20,000 wagons; 320,000 sleepers; and 12,000 railwaymen to improve the 
BEF’s transport position. 226  Such colossal increases on what had been made available 
previously bred resentment among certain officers which pervaded post-war analysis. Within a 
week of Geddes’ appointment as Director-General of Military Railways, Stuart-Wortley 
observed to Henry Wilson that the ‘civilianization’ of the War Office had been accompanied by 
an increase in spending hitherto denied to the military. The departments previously staffed by 
small but willing groups of soldiers within the Directorate of Movements were ‘largely 
increased’ and the officers promoted to higher grades: ‘The way they waste money is awful.’227 
Edmonds and Henniker would take the same line after the war, noting that Geddes employed a 
‘very large staff of civilian engineers and officials’, and that his unique position in the military 
hierarchy afforded him freedom from the restrictions placed on the purely military organizations 
which the DGT and DGMR had supplanted.
228
 Even soldiers with whom Geddes had fostered a 
good working relationship, such as Mance, were susceptible to making comments that 
suggested Geddes and his team had operated with a liberty unavailable to the soldiers. In a post-
war discussion at RUSI, the Director of Roads was described by Mance as having ‘ransacked 
England’, taking away ‘all the skilled men and rollers and everything else connected with the 
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roads and quarries that he could lay his hands on’ in order to improve the quality of roads used 
by the BEF in the second half of the war.
229
 
Table 3.1 illustrates the increase in transport resources provided to the BEF between 
December 1916 and December 1918. Geddes did not view such expansion as ‘extravagance’, 
but merely the logical corollary of the fact that the British were, from September 1916 onwards, 
requested to undertake a much larger share of the transport burden from the French, and a result 
of military ‘cheeseparing’ prior to his arrival. Rather than requesting what was necessary in 
order to provide for the BEF, the ‘soldier’, as a result of ‘the fear he has of the Treasury’, had 
consistently put forward demands on the basis of what they thought could be provided rather 
than based on the real needs of the situation.
230
 Consequently, the BEF had been allocated far 
less in terms of transport resources than were necessary to ensure the effective supply of the 
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31 December 
1916 
31 December 
1917 
31 December 
1918 
Percentage 
increase, 
1916-1918 
Docks  
Cranes working at British 
accommodation 
126 290 369 192.86% 
Broad Gauge Railways  
Locomotives  
Imported 62 753 1,205 1,843.55% 
Hired 198 215 229 15.66% 
Captured 0 0 6  
Petrol Tractors  
Imported 0 7 8  
Wagons  
Imported 3,840 34,845 52,597 1,269.71% 
Captured or built from 
scratch 
0 0 67  
Equivalent in ten-ton 
units 
6,286 46,317 63,146 904.55% 
Table 3.1 Selected increases in transport resources allocated to the BEF, 1916-1918 
Source:  S.D’A. Crookshank, ‘Transportation Report for the Year 1918’, ICE Compendium 
WW1, 1919 
<http://www.icevirtuallibrary.com/upload/WW1_Crookshank_Transportation_Report-
1918.pdf> [accessed 15 October 2014]. 
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troops at the front, particularly during offensive operations. Yet the mere accumulation of 
transport materials was not all that the BEF required in late 1916. Of equal importance to the 
acquisition of resources was the effective application of those resources to the task at hand. It 
was in this arena that the civilian expertise of Britain’s transport managers was able to influence 
the character of the war in its final two years. 
 
The application of modern managerial methods: restoring fluidity to the British 
Expeditionary Force, 1916-1918 
The work undertaken by Geddes and the hybrid organizations he created between the 
autumn of 1916 and the end of the war to rectify these deficiencies has received comparatively 
more detailed scholarship than the contributions of men such as Dent and Holland. Grieves’ 
biography dedicates a chapter to Geddes’ personal contribution to the BEF’s logistical 
organization on the Western Front,
231
 whilst Brown’s British Logistics on the Western Front has 
provided an unchallenged narrative of ‘Geddes’ legacy’ with regard to the proficient supply of 
increasingly large quantities of ammunition to the BEF’s ever-growing number of artillery 
pieces.
232
 Both illustrate that Geddes was able to use his unique position to centralize the 
transport challenges facing the BEF, integrating the various modes of transport in use on the 
Western Front under the supervision of the DGT to realize the ultimate goal of the logistics 
network: supplying what the army required, in sufficient quantities, and at the time and place 
where it was needed. 
As Brown has demonstrated, the shortages of ammunition noted by commanders early 
in the Somme offensive were the result not of insufficient production, but of longstanding 
tactical delivery problems. These issues were exacerbated by the voluminous increases in 
supply from Britain as the offensive got underway.
233
 Three potential solutions existed to 
remove the ‘bottlenecks’ which were reducing fluidity within the BEF’s supply chain. The first 
option, proposed by the IGC in August, was for ships to be sent from Britain at a slower rate, 
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thereby synchronizing their arrival in France with the discharge speeds at the Channel ports.
234
 
Geddes reported the second possibility to Lloyd George in mid-September: ‘the only answer to 
the problem that I have had so far… is that the factories must slow down!’ 235  Both were 
impracticable. The scaling back of munitions production was a ‘moral and physical 
impossibility’ in a nation increasingly geared towards a more ‘total’ form of warfare, whilst a 
reduction in the frequency of deliveries to France would simply shift the storage problem to 
Britain.
236
 Besides which, in the event of a large-scale offensive those munitions would still be 
required to pass through the French ports en route to the front. The outcome in such 
circumstances would be familiar; congestion would inevitably develop at the ports as goods 
could not be removed from the quayside at a quicker rate than they could be discharged from 
the ships, and a similar situation would occur at the opposite end of the railways as the railheads 
struggled to cope with the unpredictable mass of traffic on the network. 
In order for the BEF to undertake offensive operations using more matériel than the 
Somme,
237
 the only remaining option was for the DGT to improve the efficiency of the network 
as a whole, in terms both of the equipment used and the personnel operating it. In coordinating 
the entire process of supply from the ports to the front, rather than splitting the responsibility 
between two officers, Geddes’ new directorate would oversee both the infrastructural 
developments and the introduction of civilian operating methods to ensure the flow of materiel 
required to undertake the colossal offensives recognized as being necessary in the wake of the 
Somme’s failure. Unlike in the previous year, where the BEF’s logistics had been operated by a 
combination of the French and individual, loosely-related units reliant on uninterested and 
inadequate labour provided by the fighting troops, Geddes’ intention was to create a 
comprehensive, interlinked system of transport networks, with the required labour and 
equipment allocated according to the needs and priorities of Haig’s strategic vision. 
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However, despite his unique position within the British state and military machinery, 
Geddes was by no means given the status of autocrat during his tenure as Director-General of 
Transportation.
238
 Between the coast and the railheads, the BEF’s logistical foundations 
continued to be constrained by the requirements and policies of their host and ally. At the docks, 
the continued French reliance on imports of coal restricted the BEF’s options in terms of 
acquiring further port space,
239
 whilst on the railways the divergence between the BEF’s 
demands for traffic and France’s desire, and ability, to provide it formed the backdrop for the 
now infamous conference at Calais on 26 and 27 February 1917. The political machinations 
which saw Haig’s forces subordinated to the command of Robert Nivelle have become 
synonymous with the events of the two day conference, aided by the manner in which the 
meetings were recalled in the works of the key delegates.
240
 Sir William Robertson’s 
autobiography reserves just one sentence for highlighting what was, before the conference took 
place, supposed to be the major topic of discussion at Calais: transportation.
241
 Although Lloyd 
George’s account of the conference does refer to the ‘long delays over questions of transport 
and coordination’ which determined the need for a meeting of Allied political and military 
leaders,
242
 his account of the discussion on transport (which he claimed occupied ‘much of our 
time’) was little more than an attempt to portray Haig as a stubborn and unreliable ally, creating 
the ‘difficulties’ that ultimately caused the failure of Nivelle’s offensive.243 
The provision of railway facilities was ‘the governing factor’ that required 
consideration at Calais according to Haig.
244
 The exceedingly poor weather in France during the 
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winter of 1916-1917 was exacerbated by a severe ‘cold snap’ in late January which saw the 
canals of France freeze over.
245
 As a result, all of the factories in Paris became reliant upon the 
railways for deliveries of coal, reducing the capacity of the Nord system and making the 
complete fulfilment of the BEF’s requirements impossible.246 The Calais conference, despite 
Robertson’s concerns over the wisdom of involving the French and British governments,247 was 
arranged primarily for the two nations to discuss the ongoing construction works on the French 
rail network and to ascertain when the BEF would be in a position to commit to offensive action. 
Whilst the French believed that the British demanded a disproportionate amount of transport for 
the number of men they employed in the field,
248
 the British complained that the Nord railway, 
for which the French were naturally responsible, was being managed inefficiently,
249
 and that as 
much as two-thirds of the traffic being carried on the Nord was for French rather than British 
use.
250
 Lloyd George observed at the conference that the French and British experts ‘did not 
appear to agree on a single figure’, and that continued discussion would therefore be fruitless.251 
His subsequent intervention, for which the conference is ultimately remembered, ensured that 
‘very little progress’ was made on the matter at Calais,252 leading Geddes to ‘question the utility 
of his remaining’ in France under such constraints.253 
The docks and railway network of northern France were thoroughly established 
ingredients of the shared Franco-British logistics chain prior to Geddes’ arrival. Unlike on the 
privately-owned lines of the NER, the development of these strategically vital arteries was 
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therefore understandably subject to a constant process of negotiation and renegotiation between 
the two principal ‘stakeholders’ on the Western Front. Even so, as table 3.1 demonstrates, the 
British were expected to and did supply a range of equipment to increase the capacity of these 
key elements in the overall transport mix following the Battle of the Somme. These 
modifications, combined with increases in the quantity of manpower devoted to transportation 
in 1917; the construction of new engineering projects such as the cross-Channel train ferry;
254
 
and the implementation of the working practices to be discussed further below, were designed to 
ensure a regular supply to the railheads of increasingly large quantities of matériel. In this they 
were successful. The average tonnage discharged from vessels at the French ports in January 
1917 was 12.5 tons per hour. By January 1918 this had risen to 25.8 tons per hour and by July 
1918 had reached a peak of 34.4 tons per hour. As the DGT’s report for 1918 explains, such 
increases would have continued but for the increasing inability of the railways to provide rolling 
stock to the ports as the lines of communication expanded to follow up the advances of the 
hundred days.
255
 
Despite the improvements made between the sea and the ‘head of steel’, the final gap 
between the railheads and the front line remained a concern.
256
 The road network had, during 
the Somme, proven incapable of providing a reliable medium for the transport of supplies 
during an offensive. The winter weather and the devastation wrought by the Germans in the 
withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line merely exacerbated difficulties which had been a constant 
presence on the Western Front.
257
 The utility of light railways as an alternative had already been 
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recognized at GHQ prior to Geddes’ arrival,258 but it would only be upon his appointment as 
Director-General of Transportation that the wherewithal existed to provide a centrally directed 
light railway network in accordance with Haig’s wishes. Furthermore, with the system lying 
entirely within the province of the BEF, it would be largely free of ‘interference’ from Britain’s 
coalition partners. It was upon this network that Geddes would have the opportunity to exercise 
the full range of his organizational talents. Even so, the meteorological and enemy factors noted 
above ensured that the DGT’s light railway operations got off to a faltering start. 
With Haig’s intention at the turn of the year still being to recommence offensive 
operations on the Somme, initial building work on the 60cm network was concentrated in the 
area then held by Gough’s Fifth Army. The existing lines, taken over from the French during 
1916 were in ‘an exceedingly bad condition’ due to the lack of material and motivation to affect 
repairs. The severe weather, added to the lack of available labour as the Light Railway 
Operating Companies were in the process of being raised, further retarded construction. The 
withdrawal of the Germans in late February then rendered much of the work which had been 
completed practically useless.
259
 As a result, the locomotives and rolling stock were loaded onto 
broad gauge railways and sent north towards Arras.
260
 When W.J. Hill arrived at Marœuil with 
the 19
th
 Light Railway Operating Company early in 1917, he and his comrades found ‘no 
motive power of any description, and only a few bogie wagons of French design’.261 Gradually, 
the equipment ordered by Geddes the previous winter (1,000 miles of track; 797 locomotives; 
3,622 double-bogie trucks; and assorted workshop equipment) began to arrive on the Western 
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Front,
262
 allowing for the hitherto theoretical light railway policy to be put into practice. Unlike 
at the docks and on the railway network, where French demands and desires acted as both a 
constraint and a consideration, ahead of the railheads Geddes had an almost ‘blank canvas’ upon 
which to outline the procedures and practices to be followed on the BEF’s expanded light 
railways. 
Auckland Geddes would suggest that his brother had taken inspiration for the BEF’s 
light railway network from the Powayan Steam Tramway he had helped construct in the early 
1900s.
263
 As the records of Eric Geddes’ observations of the French light railway networks 
demonstrate, he was also both familiar with and impressed by operations on the French 
networks. Unsurprisingly therefore, the policy to be followed by the BEF borrowed heavily 
from the example set by the French, where the entire 60cm system was controlled from GQG by 
a special department which allocated all materials and personnel to the ‘réseau’ linked to each 
of the individual army groups. As the armies moved on and the boundaries changed, the ‘réseau’ 
remained in place, ensuring that those responsible for operating the light railway network 
gained a greater knowledge of their portion of the system.
264
 The 60cm system was ‘primarily 
used for heavy gun ammunition, its secondary use being for Engineers’ Stores, and, lastly, if 
there [was] any further capacity available, for supplies, ordnance stores, [and] light gun 
ammunition’.265 Light railways were used by the BEF as the primary distribution system for 
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January 
(Pre-Arras) 
March 
(Messines) 
June 
(Ypres) 
September 
December 
Locos in traffic Unknown 126 342 546 513 
Tractors in 
traffic 
Unknown 68 230 335 434 
Wagons in 
traffic 
Unknown 1,395 2,756 4,332 4,797 
Miles operated 97 164 314 623 717 
Tons conveyed 10,325 25,315 95,180 210,808 165,530 
Table 3.2 Light Railway weekly averages for selected months, 1917 
Source: Davies, p. 74. 
226 
 
bulk goods beyond the railheads, with mechanical transport and trench tramways used as 
adjuncts for the onward delivery of items which the 60cm network could not convey entirely to 
the point of use or storage. Ultimately, roughly half the traffic dealt with by light railways 
would belong to the latter category, including items such as trench warfare munitions and food, 
for which the benefit of light railways was felt in the reduction of road use for such traffic in the 
rear areas.
266
 All heavy gun ammunition, and a small proportion of engineering stores and field 
gun ammunition, the other half of the traffic carried, was delivered direct to gun spurs and group 
stations by the light railway network.
267
 By September 1917, the traffic circulating on the light 
railways supporting the BEF had reached a peak of over 200,000 tons per week (see Table 3.2). 
 To coordinate this traffic, and demonstrating that Geddes was willing to look not only 
beyond the practices employed by the French and by his own domestic railway, the DGT took 
its inspiration from the latest operating systems to be developed by some of Britain’s other 
pioneering railway companies. In Light Railways of the First World War, Davies remarks that 
the control system in place to manage the light railway network on the Western Front resembled 
that of ‘an ordinary railway’.268 Writing in the 1960s, Davies’ statement was correct, as the 
nationalized rail network in post Second World War Britain operated under a system of 
centralized control. At the outbreak of the First World War, however, such methods were the 
subject of intense experimentation among the competing railway companies, with only two 
major British railways, the Midland and the Lancashire and Yorkshire [LYR], operating 
centralized train control systems on their main lines.
269
 In the case of the Midland Railway, 
which rolled out its bespoke Train Control System in 1909,
270
 the primary reasons for instituting 
the new system – efficiency, flexibility, and the economic use of rolling stock to increase 
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fluidity throughout the network – were precisely those governing the BEF’s implementation of 
centralized control in 1917. 
Centralized train control on the Midland began in an experimental form at Masborough, 
near Sheffield, in 1907.
271
 Congestion associated with the use of railway sidings as makeshift 
depots had created a situation in which freight trains on the line could not be unloaded 
efficiently. Similar to the effects of such practices at the Channel ports as identified by Francis 
Dent in late 1914, and by the Royden Commission prior to the Battle of the Somme, 
obstructions on the line routinely led to widespread delays throughout the Midland network. As 
a result of the unpredictable nature of the traffic, train crews were frequently forced into 
working shifts of fifteen hours or more as replacement crews were allocated according to 
timetables rather than the actual positions of the trains.
272
 In the first six months of 1907 alone a 
total of 24,760 cases of extended duty were recorded by the Midland, contributing to numerous 
cases of staff absence due to illness, and ‘agitation’ amongst the railway workforce for a 
reduction in hours.
273
 Met by an almost unanimous refusal from the railway companies to 
receive union officials for negotiation, a threat of strike action was made in October 1907, 
leading to a series of conferences between representatives of the railway companies and the then 
President of the Board of Trade, David Lloyd George.
274
 According to Lloyd George, the 
potential effects of a strike among railway workers would be disastrous for the British economy, 
as ‘there is hardly a country in the world… which demands so much upon the absolute 
promptitude with which goods are delivered’.275 The reliability of the late-Victorian railway 
industry had created a logistical environment in which industries had felt confident enough to 
reduce their levels of stock held on-hand, leading to the prospect that any extended dislocation 
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of the railway service would starve manufacturers of crucial raw materials and customers of 
staple products such as bread and milk.
276
 In 1917, the military practice was also to ensure 
stores were placed far enough away from the front line to reduce their susceptibility to artillery 
fire and the risk of their loss in the event of an enemy advance. This meant that the ‘consumers’ 
at the front line were also wholly dependent upon an effective transport network to deliver the 
required goods when called upon. A cut in supply, whether due to labour withdrawal or enemy 
action, would have the same result. In 1907, Lloyd George was dealing with an economy which 
he feared would lose out on trade to German manufacturers should the transport network fail. A 
decade later, Geddes was faced with the supply of an army which depended upon an efficient, 
reliable, flexible service to ensure it was capable of meeting a very different German menace. 
Regardless of Lloyd George’s laudatory pronouncements on the standards of the 
railway service in Britain (doubtless made to placate his audience and garner their support for 
more conciliatory policies towards their employees), time-keeping was not a great strength of 
the Midland Railway. In 1907, the average weekly delays to freight traffic for the entire year 
stood at 21,869 hours.
277
 It was within this context of labour unrest and punctuality issues that 
the new General Manager of the Midland (and future Deputy Director-General of Military 
Railways at the War Office), Guy Granet, authorized the development of the Train Control 
System which would ultimately be employed on the Western Front. The experiment at 
Masborough was such a success that the Superintendent of the Line, Cecil Paget (who acted as 
head of the ROD on the Western Front), proposed the extension of the scheme to cover the most 
congested section of the Midland network.
278
 Following an equally impressive trial period 
working the goods and mineral traffic between Cudworth and Toton, and despite the 
apprehensive response of many transport managers outside the company, the Midland Train 
Control System was eventually rolled out across the entirety of the company’s 1,400 miles of 
track.
279
 Mirroring the experiences of Sir George Gibb and those advocating the use of detailed 
statistical accumulation as the foundation of operational reforms during the pre-war period, the 
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Train Control Scheme was expected to fail; ‘quite a number of able railway men’ suggested that 
the extant methods of control could not be improved upon.
280
 
As figure 3.1 shows, the system did not fail. Between 1907 and 1913 the weekly 
average hours’ delay to freight traffic on the Midland fell by more than sixty-four per cent, 
despite the tonnage of goods conveyed growing over the same period by over ten per cent. The 
speed of trains on the network also increased, from an average of 4.9 miles per hour to 6.3 miles 
per hour, a twenty-eight per cent rise.
281
 As noted above, ‘in 1907 there were more than twenty 
thousand cases of men working for excessively long hours. Four years later there were no such 
cases’.282 The Train Control System had clearly proven itself a success on the home front prior 
to the outbreak of war, and the opening of a central train control office in Manchester by the 
LYR in August 1915 demonstrated an acknowledgement of the Midland’s innovation in the 
wider railway community. It is therefore little surprise that a similar system was adopted for the 
operation of the BEF’s light railway network in 1917.283 
                                                 
280
 RAIL 491/815 Train Control, pp. 6-7. 
281
 RAIL 491/815 Train Control, p. 72. 
282
 Hamilton Ellis, p. 150. 
283
 Burtt, p. 130. 
 
Figure 3.1 Delays to freight traffic on the Midland Railway, Average Weekly Hours, 1907-
1913 
Source: Edwards, p. 19. 
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The BEF inherited relatively few operable light railways from the French. This meant 
that the French practice of working a given length of line, typically between twenty and thirty 
miles, under the ‘box-to-box’ system of passing trains from one section to another was not 
particularly well established among the British troops.
284
 It was therefore relatively 
straightforward to establish a new control system once the DGT took over responsibility for the 
coordination of the network. Importantly, it also meant that the new lines projected for 
construction could be planned and built with the requisite equipment installed from the outset, 
while the extant lines operating on the old system were gradually converted.
285
 The ‘box-to-box’ 
system remained in place, however, and acted as a back-up operating system during the periods 
in which the telephone network was severed by enemy artillery.
286
 
Fundamental to the operating procedure were the control offices. The five armies of the 
BEF were each served by a self-contained central control office, from which requests from the 
corps attached to the army were collated. Large schematic diagrams (as per the Midland and 
LYR systems) were set up in each control office, showing the army’s portion of the light 
railway network along with the location of all rolling stock and locomotive power within the 
army’s possession.287 This information was constantly updated by reports from the numerous 
‘district’ control offices situated at the marshalling yards from which the supply trains were 
made up for their journey to the front. Each district also contained several stations or dumping 
points, the number of wagons on hand at each being reported back to the district control at 
regular intervals. As had been discovered on the Midland’s system, this process allowed staff at 
the army’s central control office to obtain an almost real-time overview of the precise 
whereabouts of the network’s transport assets.288 Daily conferences among the technical staff 
each morning, another replication of the Midland’s procedures, 289  allowed the responsible 
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officers to discuss the priority movements of the day ahead and to divide up the number of 
locomotives available in the most efficient manner possible to respond to the needs of the army. 
This process of consultation and coordination allowed the central control to gain an 
overall picture of requirements across the army as a whole, and to allocate rolling stock around 
the network as required. This minimized the prospect of a district being left with too few 
wagons on hand to deal with their daily traffic and leaving front line troops without supplies. As 
an example of the system in action, on 31 July 1917, the opening day of the Third Battle of 
Ypres, the 12
th
 Light Railway Operating Company, based at the time in Romarin, received 
orders to ‘transfer as many bogie wagons as could be put together quickly for ammunition work’ 
further north.
290
 Not only did such information create extra flexibility, by allowing for the 
movement of rolling stock to the point at which it was most urgently required, it also allowed 
for the central and district control offices to identify where rolling stock was being held ‘under 
load’ for abnormally long periods. As pointed out by Fayle in relation to the length of time 
spent by ships in dock, the carrying power of the BEF was dependent not only upon the quantity 
of rolling stock or tonnage available, but upon the extent to which that capacity was utilized.
291
 
Wagons left in sidings awaiting an unloading party represented both a reduction in the BEF’s 
overall transport capacity and an indication of uneconomical working. Between March and 
September 1917 the average wagon turnaround time was reduced from 1.7 days to just under a 
day,
292
 supplementing the increases in available stock as deliveries of Geddes’ ‘extravagant’ 
requests arrived in France and facilitating the huge expansion in conveyance illustrated in table 
3.2.  
To guard against such inefficiencies, a ‘wagon register’ containing the location of all 
the BEF’s rolling stock was requested by central control on a daily basis. This was based on the 
‘Train and Engine Shunting Journals’ recorded in each district.293 These journals contained 
information on every train which passed over the light railway network, ‘often compiled in huts 
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or dugouts under artillery fire’ and passed back over the telephone to the district control 
offices.
294
 As will be discussed further below, the data produced from each individual train 
formed part of a comprehensive system of statistical compilation devised by Geddes’ personal 
assistant George Beharrell, whilst the Train Control System allowed for district and central 
officers to keep in close contact with otherwise dispersed and inaccessible subordinates. From 
the information received from each district, summaries were prepared at the central control 
office of each army which, when combined, detailed the entire working of the system for the 
Director of Light Railways. Furthermore, by linking the entire network via a bespoke telephone 
network, traffic could be re-routed almost immediately if (or more correctly when) sections of 
the line were rendered impassable by enemy fire. Such was the assumed importance of the Train 
Control System to the operation of the light railways that each of the Light Railway Operating 
Companies raised during the war consisted of a permanent detachment of telephone operators 
and train control staff which made up sixteen per cent of the company’s establishment.295 
Although initially devised as an alternative to the road system, light railways were 
incapable of replacing road traffic on the Western Front. In fact, despite the increasing mileage 
of light railways in operation in support of the BEF as 1917 unfolded, the volume of road metal 
demanded by the armies continued to grow. In January 1917, Fifth Army received 405 lorry-
loads of road stone; in July the same army required 1,000 lorries, despite the light railway 
network in that sector alone carrying an average of 60,000 tons per week (removing the 
equivalent of 1,350 lorries from the roads).
296
 Without light railways, the colossal 
bombardments which took place in 1917 and 1918 could not have been sustained for anything 
like the same duration or with the same intensity. Artillery ‘was the great destructive force in 
this war’.297 In September 1917 ‘no less than 7,000 tons of ammunition were being carried daily’ 
by light railway in support of the fighting at Ypres.
298
 It was a transport network by and large 
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designed, constructed and operated by civilians, utilizing working methods which had been 
pioneered less than a decade before to meet a challenge related to profits rather than power. Far 
from being obstructed by an insular, self-preserving army, the DGT under the guidance of Sir 
Eric Geddes was able to establish and lay the foundations for the transport system which would 
maintain the BEF during the Materialschlacht. Upon Geddes’ departure for the Admiralty, Haig 
recorded in his diary: ‘Geddes’ organization of the railways (both broad gauge and light) and of 
the roads, ports, etc. has proved a great success. I am very greatly indebted to him for all that he 
has done’.299 Indeed, such was Haig’s appreciation of Geddes’ particular skill set that the C-in-C 
requested that Geddes remain available to him as a ‘consultant on railway questions’ for the 
duration of the conflict,
300
 and Geddes was singled out for particular praise in Haig’s final 
despatch in 1919.
301
 
Yet the result of such concentrated focus upon Geddes has overshadowed the work of 
those who maintained the BEF’s logistical provision in the face both of diminishing support 
from the French and the seemingly inexhaustible increase in demands from the front line. 
Transportation was merely one sector of many within the BEF, all of which demanded a share 
of the Empire’s finite resources of men and materials. With no clear indication as to when the 
war might conceivably come to an end, the more effective use of those resources became of 
paramount importance to the BEF as the war continued. Yet the officers who oversaw the 
‘efficiency drive’ of the final two years of the war have not received the same level of attention 
as Lloyd George’s ‘blue-eyed boy’. The expert knowledge and contacts of Brigadier-General 
Henry Maybury provided ‘10,000 workmen, road engineers, quarry men’ and the modern 
equipment necessary to assure Haig that he ‘need have no further anxiety as regards roads’,302 
whilst it was the responsibility of Brigadier-General Geoffry Harrisson, who was building a 
railway in Brazil when war was declared, to oversee the operations of the Directorate of Light 
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Railways from February 1918.
303
 Geddes drew the disparate transportation providers together 
and gave the consolidated DGT a ‘good start’.304 He restored the concept of ‘movement’ which 
Haig accepted had been ‘forgotten’ amidst the unprecedented logistical demands of the 
Somme,
305
 and he was responsible for obtaining many of the ‘large number of skilled and 
experienced civilians… drawn from the railway companies of Great Britain and the Dominions’ 
that contributed to the ‘general excellence’ of the BEF’s transportation services in the second 
half of the war.
306
 Yet not all of those who contributed to the increasing logistical excellence of 
the BEF were ‘temporary gentlemen’, drafted into the army to provide the knowledge and 
expertise the military professionals sorely lacked. The ability to apply ‘civilian’ methods to the 
operations of Britain’s largest ever military force was far more widespread than has hitherto 
been asserted. 
 
Managing the ‘workforce’: labour distribution in the British Expeditionary Force, 1917-
1918 
The BEF reached its peak strength on the Western Front during the summer of 1917. 
From that moment on, when the number of troops employed in France and Flanders stood at just 
over two million, until the end of the conflict, the British contribution to the northern European 
theatre would, in numerical terms, undergo a gradual decline. That the BEF responded to this 
unavoidable decline in numbers through the more effective use of the available manpower, and 
a higher dependence upon the ‘machines’ of war, has been central to the ‘learning curve’ theory 
of British improvement following the nadir of the Somme.
307
 Britain’s desire to win the war and 
the peace at the lowest possible cost had to be reframed, as a determination to win the war 
before the costs became too great for Britain to withstand whilst also maintaining sufficient 
influence to exert at the post-war bargaining table.
308
 In order to do so, the British government 
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had to ensure that the dwindling manpower resources of the nation were employed, regardless 
of their contribution, in the most efficient manner possible.
309
 
The colossal losses of the Somme in the second half of 1916 could not, without great 
difficulty, be replenished with men of the same physical calibre as the war entered its third year. 
In order to preserve, and even to increase, its fighting potential as the war continued, the BEF 
was compelled to follow the government’s lead. Whereas before, during the two-and-a-half 
years of expansion in which the stresses of wartime exigency and the immediacy of ‘getting the 
job done’ had been the dominant considerations for the BEF’s administrative departments, the 
twin requirements of economy in manpower and efficiency of effort now required a 
fundamental reassessment of the working procedures of the vast operations taking place behind 
the front lines.
310
 Foremost among them was the requirement that infantry troops be relieved of 
duties not linked either to fighting battles, or to the improvement of their fighting abilities. 
As discussed above, the limited number of labour battalions recruited in the summer of 
1916 had done little to alleviate the demand for infantry working parties during the preparation 
phase for the Battle of the Somme. During the transportation mission, Geddes suggested that ‘a 
very considerable saving in the amount of labour required’ to maintain and repair the transport 
network could be effected through the better coordination of the labour supply, in addition to 
the implementation of labour saving devices and the construction of a light railway network.
311
 
In order to coordinate the use of labour however, two things were required: first, a policy for the 
allocation of labour to the myriad departments and services reliant upon manpower both on the 
lines of communication and within the individual armies; and second, an organization capable 
of prioritizing the needs of each of those departments, and ensuring the most efficient use of the 
available manpower for the benefit of the BEF as a whole. 
Geddes, under the terms of his appointment as Director-General of Transportation, 
would be responsible for the administration of the technical units raised from among the 
Empire’s transport workers over the winter of 1916-1917 (such as the Light Railway Operating 
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Companies employing Sapper Hill and Sergeant-Major Conibear). These skilled troops would 
be primarily dedicated to the work for which they were being raised, be that railway 
construction or light railway operations, and therefore would be controlled by the relevant 
department within the DGT. The task of coordinating the wide variety of nationalities, abilities 
and attitudes collected under the umbrella of ‘unskilled’ labour was handed to the newly-
established Labour Directorate on 3 December 1916.
312
 The task of heading this directorate was 
not, however, passed onto a civilian. Despite the fact that, by the end of 1917 the Director of 
Labour would be in charge of a workforce that numbered an average of 209,118 ‘employees’ 
per day,
313
 the job was given to Lieutenant-Colonel Evan Gibb.
314
 Gibb, an ASC officer 
originally commissioned into the West India Regiment, and with active service in South Africa 
behind him, had been part of the QMG’s staff in France since the start of the war. He therefore 
had a thorough understanding of the importance of keeping the transport network flowing. 
With British resources already stretched, the vast majority of the labourers required to 
keep the transport network maintained would by necessity have to be found from ‘foreign’ 
labour sources. As tables 3.3 and 3.4 demonstrate, in January 1917 the directorate was already 
in possession of a cosmopolitan labour pool, and as the year developed that pool would be 
supplemented by the recruitment of men from places as far removed as Fiji, China and Egypt 
among others. The composition of the labour force also meant that the directorate was beset 
from the beginning with a number of complexities related to the manner in which the units 
could be employed. Firstly, the myriad units for whom Gibb now assumed coordinating 
responsibilities were not available for all of the tasks which needed to be performed throughout 
the Western Front. For example, Prisoner of War [PoW] Companies, by stipulation of the 
Geneva Convention, were restricted to tasks far in the rear, and forbidden from being employed  
                                                 
312
 The Labour Directorate ceased to exist in February 1918, the position of Controller of Labour – under 
the QMG – being created to replace the functions of the Director of Labour. For sake of convenience, this 
thesis will refer to the administration of unskilled labour as the ‘labour directorate’ throughout. See 
Starling and Lee, p. 135. 
313
 WO 107/37 Report, pp. 2-3. By November 1918 the Controller of Labour was responsible for the 
administration of over 385,000 men. 
314
 As a clear sign of the importance attached to the role, Gibb was promoted to Brigadier-General three 
days after the directorate was created. See Starling and Lee, p. 101. 
237 
 
 
on jobs such as the discharge of ships to guard against the possibility of sabotage.
315
 Due to the 
nature of the contracts signed prior to their departure for Europe, and the desire within the BEF 
to maintain racial segregation between black soldiers and both their white counterparts and the 
local population, the South African Native Labour Corps were also restricted to service outside 
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Type of unit Number of units Officers Other ranks 
Prisoner of War Company 47 47 18,605 
Infantry Labour Battalion 33 340 31,258 
Labour Company, ASC 29 169 14,637 
R.E. Labour Battalion 11 163 7,044 
Non-Combatant Corps Company 8 8 778 
South African Native Labour 
Corps Battalion 
4 52 8,000 
Naval Labour Company, ASC 2 12 1,903 
British West India Regiment 
(Bermuda RGA Detachment) 
2 42 1,160 
Cape Coloured Labour Battalion 1 11 985 
Canadian Forest Company 1 0 68 
Canadian Labour Battalion 1 15 983 
Total 859 85,421 
Table 3.3 Number of units under the control of the Labour Directorate, January 1917 
Source:  WO 107/37 Report, p. 10; TNA: PRO WO 95/83 General Headquarters: Director of 
Labour, Summary of Labour Units in France, 31 January 1917. 
 
 
Type of unit 
Date first 
contingent raised 
Strength raised 
(approx.) 
Terms of service 
or contract 
Cape Coloured Labour Battalion 13 August 1916 1,100 Duration of war 
South African Native Labour 
Corps 
October 1916 21,000 One year 
Chinese Labour Corps 18 January 1917 95,000 Three years 
British West Indies Regiment 31 March 1917 8,000 Duration of war 
Egyptian Labour Corps 22 April 1917 15,000 Six months 
Indian Labour Corps 26 April 1917 48,000 One year 
Fijian Labour Corps 18 May 1917 100 Duration of war 
Table 3.4 Coloured labour raised in substitution of British personnel by the War Office, 1916-
1917 
Source: TNA: PRO WO 106/33 The Chinese Labour Corps – recruitment and organization – 
history of the Corps, untitled memorandum, 31 December 1918. 
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of ‘dangerous zones’.316 Such constraints ensured that work in the forward areas, in which the 
risk of casualties from enemy action were at their highest, had to be borne almost entirely by the 
remaining British troops.
317
 
Secondly, concurrent with the establishment of the labour directorate in France, 
Lieutenant-General Henry Lawson was directed by the War Office to examine ‘both the 
numbers and the physical categories of men employed outside the fighting areas’ in order to 
identify the extent to which the lines of communication could be mined to provide 
reinforcements for the fighting troops, and to advise on areas in which such men could be 
replaced with those of a lower physical standard, by foreign labour, or by women.
318
 Following 
visits to GHQ, five ports, and three other sites used by the BEF (Abbeville, Abancourt and 
Etaples), Lawson pronounced himself to have been ‘struck from the first’ by the ‘large numbers’ 
employed by the ASC at the depots, by the poor quality of Warrant Officers which led to 
inefficient employment of the men, and the significant proportion of men employed in labour 
companies and as clerks who belonged to the category of ‘fit and under forty years of age’.319 
Lawson’s conclusion into the efficiency of the work being done, even taking into account such 
unavoidable difficulties as the late arrival of railway wagons on their return from the front, was 
that ‘there seemed a considerable wastage of labour, more men being employed on a service 
than were required’.320 
A critical component of the problem identified by Lawson lay in the allocation of labour 
prior to the establishment of Gibb’s directorate, and echoed the criticism of 
‘compartmentalization’ noted by Geddes in his review of the transport network earlier in the 
summer. The actual needs of individual services, such as the docks, varied from day to day (and 
indeed, from hour to hour). However, the various departments for whom unskilled labour was 
employed ‘wanted as much labour as [they] could get’. Ensuring that their individual 
requirements were met was paramount. Therefore such departments were ‘very reluctant’ to 
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release labour to another service during periods in which their own demands were not as 
pronounced.
321
 Whereas in a civilian business during periods of slack the wage costs of 
unproductive workers would compel employers to lay off unnecessary employees to maintain 
profit levels, the absence of a ‘profit margin’ to the departments of the BEF left little inclination 
to individual officers to encourage workers to be withdrawn for use elsewhere. The concern that 
services would not receive ‘their’ workers back when required appeared to supersede all other 
considerations. Rather than result in the ‘cheeseparing’ identified by Geddes in relation to 
demands made for resources and materials, in the case of labour the compartmentalized 
approach fostered an opposite, but equally damaging attitude. 
The absence of a dedicated administrative service for the supply of labour meant that 
individual departmental concerns within the BEF eclipsed the motivation for ‘big picture’ 
thinking. Consequently, the acceptance of any, even temporary, downgrade in the priority of 
departmental requirements was something to be fiercely resisted. The result was the submission 
of ‘extravagant’ demands for labour from individual services, and the development of a 
protectionist attitude towards the reallocation of manpower resources. The observations of A.D. 
Lindsay, a senior officer in the labour directorate from January 1917 onwards, are illustrative: 
I remember hearing a high official... say, “If no ships came into my ports for thirty days, 
I would whitewash all my buildings and relay all my track sooner than let another 
damned department have a single man of mine”. He was no doubt an extreme example, 
but there was a trace of that spirit in most administrative services.
322
 
 
The lack of any central, coordinating body for the allocation of labour meant that individual 
departments were essentially competing with each other for the finite resources available, rather 
than accepting a number of ‘employees’ based on the priority needs of the BEF as a whole.323 
As an anonymous officer with ‘business experience in civil life’ noted to Lawson: 
What struck him most in the Army was that there was not one army but many armies: 
he explained his statement by saying that what he referred to was the separation into 
and the lack of mutual help between the various departments.
324
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Vital to the work of the labour directorate, therefore, would be to centralize the allocation of 
unskilled troops, eliminate the ‘hoarding’ instincts of individual departments, and ensure that 
labour was allocated according to the needs of the BEF, as opposed to the ‘wants’ of its senior 
departmental officers.
325
 
To identify the needs of the BEF required not only the cooperation of the individual 
departments in their labour requests, but would also demand a thorough investigation into the 
skills and aptitudes present amongst the ‘heroic crocks’ of the British labour force and the 
various bands of foreign labour.
326
 The manner in which these challenges were addressed by the 
directorate demonstrates two things: the clear similarities between the problems faced by the 
labour directorate and those of contemporary industrial leaders attempting to maintain and raise 
productivity in large, expanding corporations;
327
 and the depth to which ‘civilian’ business 
methods had infused the administration of the BEF by the midway point of the war. However, 
the labour directorate would continue to run up against the limits of interdepartmental 
cooperation for the rest of the conflict. 
The growth of large-scale business concerns in the second half of the nineteenth century 
created a series of unprecedented difficulties for employers of labour to grapple with.
328
 
Although the BEF was not subjected to restrictions linked to shareholder considerations,
329
 the 
effective coordination and management of men and materials across a widely dispersed 
geographical area would be a critical, and to the managers of Britain’s railway companies an 
immediately recognizable, requirement for ensuring the economical use of the available 
resources. Not only would labour be required to operate in the zones covered by the BEF’s five 
armies, often in close proximity to the front line, but as the records of the directorate 
demonstrate, ‘employees’ were also scattered from the ports on the Channel coast to Marseilles, 
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and in the case of one half company of the Cape Coloured Labour Battalion, to Bayonne on the 
Spanish border.
330
 At the formation of the directorate, however, it was found to be 
extremely difficult to discover where all the labour was, under whom it was working 
and how it was employed. Returns of labour were rendered monthly by Armies to the 
QMG and similar returns were rendered by some Directorates [on the lines of 
communication]. These returns were however very inaccurate and were not made on a 
common basis.
331
 
 
Furthermore, despite being collected under the epithet of ‘unskilled’, the units of the Labour 
Corps were in fact home to a wide range of talents and abilities. In the language of the day, the 
post-war report of the labour directorate characterized the Chinese contingent in three groups: 
‘pukka coolies’ with ‘no greater ambition than to haul loads; adaptable ‘village tradesmen or 
handy men’ capable of learning new techniques and therefore able to carry out semi-skilled 
work; and around 450 skilled tradesmen ‘trained by Europeans according to western ideas’ and 
therefore proficient at handling modern tools and repairing complex machinery.
332
 The 
existence of these skilled workers within the corps was largely the result of it having been raised 
(under the direction of the War Office) by Thomas J. Bourne, Chief Engineer of the Pukou-
Hsin-Yang Railway.
333
 Yet prior to the arrival of the first tranche of Chinese workers in 
February 1917, a conference among staff officers at the War Office ‘agreed that the coolies 
ought to be confined to the performance of the most fundamental tasks; trench-digging, 
quarrying, loading in ports, railway-track laying, burying the dead, and stacking ammunition’.334 
Such duties were undoubtedly suitable for the unskilled labourers who made up the 
largest proportion of the Chinese workforce, but to use those with experience in construction 
and on the railways was to waste skills in which the British labour pool was deficient. In order 
to identify skilled Chinese labourers from among the thousands departing Wei-hai-wei with 
little more than a brass identity ring and a copy of their contract, upon arrival in France each 
draft was subjected to a viva voce examination. A classification of each man’s capabilities was 
made, and throughout the war periodic trade classifications were rendered by the Chinese 
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Labour Corps to catalogue the skills available within the corps.
335
 As soon as the first units 
disembarked, Geddes claimed 7,000 for work within the DGT, with men ‘of suitable trades’ (or 
likely to be capable of learning such roles) being allocated to work under the Chief Engineer 
Port Construction, Alexander Gibb.
336
 
Whilst further skilled Chinese units also found work in areas as diverse as forestry and 
tank maintenance, the remainder were distributed into the general labour pool for allocation to 
the ‘fundamental tasks’ referred to above. Yet even the classification of ‘unskilled’ was by no 
means permanent. As Theodore Stewart, part of one of the earliest labour battalions to arrive in 
France, noted after the war, men for whom the duties of road making and repairing were 
‘entirely new’ in July 1916 had, through repetition and training, by November ‘gained quite a 
reputation in this class of work’.337 Although Stewart’s battalion would be removed from road 
work to concentrate on railway construction (‘a new mystery’) in preparation for the Battle of 
Arras, the general principle at work in the labour directorate was to retain men on the same class 
of work to help improve their skills and efficiency.
338
 By the end of the war, at ports such as 
Dieppe, Dunkirk and Rouen, the vast majority of cranes used to unload ships were operated by 
Chinese labour trained in France.
339
 
Vital to this efficiency drive was the attachment of the most suitable officers to the 
various units of the Labour Corps. White supervision, ‘and as much of it as possible’, was 
deemed to be ‘absolutely necessary if the best results were to be obtained from any form of 
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coloured labour’.340 In the case of the South African Native Labour Corps, it was found early on 
that the men were prone to ‘slack’ unless competently supervised by officers fully aware of the 
capabilities of the men, a particular problem when the young, physically fit troops from South 
Africa were working alongside white labour of a ‘lower physical category’ and therefore only 
capable of relatively low levels of output. The fear that such comparisons would also lead to 
‘the native working alongside [white labourers having his] ideas of the position of the white 
man disturbed’ ensured that a programme of segregation was followed as often as possible.341 
For the Egyptian Labour Corps a thorough knowledge of the country was emphasized as being 
the primary consideration upon which to select officers. If insufficient men from the Egyptian 
Army were available, it was recommended to source the remainder of those required ‘from past 
or present officers who have served either in the Egyptian Army or in some other Egyptian 
service, e.g., police, coastguards, etc.’ as many of those in France were ‘handicapped by a lack 
of military experience, and some also by a complete ignorance of the Arabic language’.342 
Not only was the Labour Corps expected to undertake a wide range of tasks across a 
number of industries, but it was also a multicultural, multilingual force demanding a significant 
degree of empathy and understanding towards the particular habits and requirements – 
especially in relation to diverse social and cultural practices such as those required by different 
religious faiths – to be evinced by the corps’ commanders. The global reach of the recruitment 
process, coupled with the speed with which the units had been raised, created further difficulties 
for the new directorate. A significant degree of local autonomy in the enlistment of men meant 
that labour units were arriving in France with officers and NCOs from a wide range of 
backgrounds. Within the Indian Labour Corps alone, units arrived on the Western Front with 
officers drawn from the Indian Army, from the Indian government and civil service, and from 
among plantation owners, many of whom possessed the necessary language skills but had no 
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prior experience of military command.
343
 The Chinese Labour Corps was found to include 
officers and NCOs drawn from among ‘missionaries, consuls, merchants, authors, journalists 
and “office men”’.344 Even within the British ‘pool’, which consisted largely of combat soldiers 
passed unfit and officers disqualified from front line service by dint of their age or medical 
category, a variety of vocations ‘of considerable value to the technical supervision of labour’ 
were evident.
345
 Ascertaining what such men would be physically capable of, which units they 
could handle effectively, and identifying any skills in their possession which could be applied to 
particular trades was a prerequisite for ensuring the most profitable distribution of officers 
within the Labour Corps. 
Upon arrival for duty with the corps, therefore, every officer was required to fill in a 
form ‘giving full particulars of his education, civil and military qualifications’, and details of 
any known languages.
346
 Before such a mass of factors could be harnessed effectively, however, 
the BEF required the creation of an ‘infrastructure’ to govern the process of storing the provided 
information in a methodical, usable manner. In order to catalogue the data on each individual 
officer, the labour directorate drew upon one of the emerging tools of efficient business 
administration in the early twentieth century: the card index. Although a ‘ubiquitous’ presence 
in industrial organization systems in the period between the wars, the growth in popularity of 
the card catalogue was simultaneous with the emergence of large-scale industry in the decades 
prior to the First World War. Derived from the methods used by libraries to organize and 
maintain vast book collections, the indexing system became increasingly recognized (and 
marketed) as the perfect method for ensuring that expanding businesses were administered 
along efficient and systematic lines. The card index exemplified the transfer of early scientific 
management ideas from the factory to the office.
347
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In essence, the Labour Corps developed a process of ‘systematizing’.348 And as the list 
of files destroyed by German bombing during the Second World War attests, they were by no 
means the only department within the BEF to establish card indexing systems on the Western 
Front.
349
 The required information, in this case the skill sets of the available officers, were 
recorded upon standardized forms which encouraged consistency and made the extraction of 
relevant data more straightforward.
350
 As Higgs has shown, paper forms were a key component 
of the bureaucratic systems created to deal with the colossal information flows generated by 
government policies in the Edwardian era, the administration of the Old Age Pension providing 
a notable example.
351
 Once completed, the forms were sent to the labour directorate at GHQ 
where the information was entered into a card index which, constantly updated as new arrivals 
or casualties entered and left the labour pool, gave the directorate an efficient, flexible, 
centralized record of the available officers. With such a system in place, the directorate was able 
to locate and select officers with the requisite qualifications for specific tasks based on a 
comprehensive overview of the situation.
352
 The result was a more intelligent, systematic 
allocation of staff than in the first two years of the war, and far less reliance on the process of 
recruiting specialists through the placing of what amounted to job advertisements issued 
through Orderly officers.
353
 Such adverts relied upon both the ‘perfect candidate’ seeing and 
applying for the post, and the existence of a system whereby that candidate could be readily 
identified from amongst the potentially voluminous number of applications. The card index 
made the information on all the available officers immediately accessible, thereby eliminating 
the need for a time-consuming and inefficient application process.
354
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Whilst the implementation of the card index system demonstrates the extent to which 
the BEF was able to devise strategies to cope with the huge quantities of information being 
created by the force in a pre-computer age, the success of such strategies was dependent upon 
the effective collaboration at the highest level between the ‘insular’ professional soldier and his 
colleague from the business world.
355
 As with the DGT, the labour directorate was from the start 
a hybrid organization. Men of considerable military experience such as Gibb and his successor, 
Colonel Edmund Wace,
356
 were assisted by a staff ‘equally divided between big business men 
and typical Oxford men’.357 A.D. Lindsay was one of those ‘Oxford men’ and, in much the 
same way that Geddes perceived misgivings towards himself as an ‘outsider’ during the 
transportation mission, Lindsay initially felt the ‘suspicion’ of the army towards him as an 
academic and insatiable reader (both of which drew assessments that he must be a ‘vague, 
unpractical creature’).358 Yet with practice, and despite occasional arguments with his superiors 
over political differences, even a philosopher such as Lindsay was able to adapt to the 
requirements of the BEF and contribute to the evolving organization of the labour directorate.
359
  
This evolution was necessary due to the ambiguous nature of the directorate’s position 
in the organizational hierarchy of the BEF. Instructions issued by the QMG on 5 January 1917, 
notifying the establishment of the directorate, stated that Gibb would be responsible for the 
‘allotment... of the necessary unskilled labour required [by the various departments] to 
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supplement such technical or specialized labour as may be provided from other sources’.360 
However, these instructions did not clarify the question of upon whom the responsibility of 
arranging those labour requests would fall. Instead, officers from the labour directorate would 
be attached to formations and departments as ‘advisors’, capable of offering observations as to 
the ‘proper employment and economical working’ of the labour allotted to their unit, but 
‘subject to the proviso that labour allotted for work under a department will during working 
hours be distributed and controlled under the orders of [the] department’.361 In other words, the 
Labour Corps’ officers fulfilled a consultancy role rather than an executive function; no 
machinery existed to stop the individual departments from simply ignoring the advice of their 
attached labour officer and continuing to submit unnecessarily large demands for manpower.
362
 
Furthermore, requests for manpower within a corps were sent to the corps HQ rather than to the 
labour directorate, thereby removing the opportunity for senior labour officers to query requests 
which appeared to be excessive.
363
 The filtering out of such demands and overseeing the 
constant fluctuations in the local labour situation were, unsurprisingly, not treated as a priority 
by the majority of corps commanders already overburdened with duties related to the 
prosecution of the war.
364
 
The result was a tendency for individual departments, referred to by the labour 
directorate as ‘employers’, to regard labour companies as reinforcements to their own technical 
units. Unskilled workers were frequently ‘shifted about irrespective of the chain of command of 
the Labour unit’, and employed according to the wishes of the department regardless of the 
advice offered by their attached labour officers.
365
 The ‘old habits’ of the first half of the war 
were not easily eradicated, and far from being alleviated by the influx of civilians into positions 
of authority in the wake of Geddes’ reorganization, the entrenched attitudes of the departments 
were in fact heavily reinforced. Men such as Ralph Wedgwood, the Director of Docks, had been 
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recruited specifically because of their working knowledge of port operations, honed by years of 
experience at the NER, to pilot the directorate which had been set up to oversee the ‘proper 
control and coordination of dock working at the ports… allotted for the use of the British 
forces’. 366  Unsurprisingly, such individuals rarely felt the need to consult labour officers, 
particularly when those officers (Lindsay being a perfect example) possessed little or no 
experience of the work. This element of the civil-military relationship has previously been 
overlooked, with concentration falling almost entirely upon recording examples of military 
insularity and the acerbic criticisms of the soldiers. It has created an impression that the 
civilians introduced to the war efforts were the ‘innocent victims’ of spiteful comments from 
vindictive soldiers, when in reality the dynamic between the two groups was far more 
complex.
367
 
Consequently, in the first year of the labour directorate’s existence the combination of 
inexperienced officers and the ambiguous nature of the directorate’s position within the BEF 
meant that the importance of establishing fluidity in the labour pool was not sufficiently 
appreciated within the army. ‘Employers’ were still wedded to the notion that labour allotted to 
them was essentially ‘theirs’ for the duration of the war. However, as the data from Third Army 
illustrates, far fewer infantry troops were being employed on ‘fatigues’ as the new global 
workforce began to arrive in France in huge numbers. In January 1917, the total number of men 
employed on labour duties in Third Army amounted to 25,000. Of those, 19,000 had been 
recruited from the fighting formations. The following month the figure rose to 23,000, all of 
whom had been occupying the front line over the winter and therefore had little time to devote 
to training. Yet by 9 April, when the Battle of Arras opened, the number of fighting troops 
employed on labour duties had plummeted to just 2,000 out of a total of 27,000. The Labour 
Corps provided the rest.
368
 
                                                 
366
 ‘Inland Waterways and Docks’, pp. 338–9. 
367
 Grieves, ‘The Transportation Mission’ provides a notable example of such works. The specific 
difficulties encountered between Wedgwood and the labour directorate will be discussed further below. 
368
 WO 107/37 Report, pp. 69-70. 
249 
 
Ensuring that the labour troops were utilized in the most effective manner possible, 
rather than being allowed to ‘soldier’,369 was the next challenge the labour directorate was 
required to address. However, as noted above, the ‘advisory’ nature of the directorate’s position 
in relation to the ‘employers’ of labour meant that it was a task which Gibb’s subordinates 
lacked the authority to change.
370
 Although some departments chose to ‘sub-contract’ the work 
of ensuring the economic application of their manpower to the local representatives of the 
labour directorate, the practice was neither universal nor compulsory.
371
 During the winter of 
1917-1918 the issue became acute for three reasons: firstly, the BEF was required to undertake 
large-scale construction projects to create the defences deemed necessary to withstand the 
anticipated German offensive of the following spring; secondly, as due to the terms of the 
contracts signed by South African and Indian labourers, plus the repatriation of Egyptian men, 
there resurfaced the very real possibility of a labour shortage on the Western Front;
372
 and 
finally, the colossal struggle at Passchendaele had further eroded the available manpower 
resources in Britain. As Lloyd George recognized, ‘it was essential that there should be no idle 
men in France’.373 
The culture of self-interest which had saturated individual departments in the first half 
of the war continued to dominate the allocation of labour within the administrative services, 
however. There was a ‘distinct inclination, either through want of knowledge [of the wider 
implications of the labour situation] or in view of the risk of demands being cut down, for more 
men to be requisitioned than could be usefully employed’.374 According to the Minister of 
Shipping, ‘labourers... were badly supervised with four men doing the work of one’.375 The 
consequence of these observations was that the Labour Directorate was abolished, and replaced 
by the position of Controller of Labour under the authority of the QMG. The Controller, 
Colonel Wace, was made responsible for the allotment and distribution of unskilled labour to 
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the armies and departments on the lines of communication. Furthermore, Wace’s subordinates 
would be charged with the task of inspecting labour parties at work and providing advice to 
‘employers’ on matters of organization which affected the ‘working efficiency of labour’.376 
But what was the work of ‘one’ man in a Labour Corps comprising a multitude of 
nationalities, skillsets, ages and abilities? As Sir Edward Pearson, a civil engineer, noted in a 
report on labour organization, ‘the average [age] of one company we heard of was fifty-five 
years’. 377  How could the ‘working efficiency’ of such disparate groups be assessed and 
improvements made? As individual units received better quality tools and equipment, to what 
extent could they be expected to improve their daily output? And how could labour officers 
whose responsibilities covered a wide geographical area be assured that their ‘employees’ were 
not soldiering in a situation where constant visual supervision was an impossibility?
378
 The 
solution to these questions, so Colonel Wace (and, it is worth noting, Geddes also) believed, lay 
in the science of statistics, and in the creation of the type of information infrastructure 
recognized as being a crucial ingredient of the growth in large-scale, complex businesses in the 
late nineteenth century.
379
 
 
Data capture in the British Expeditionary Force, 1916-1918 
The process of information-gathering commenced immediately upon the formations of 
the DGT and the labour directorate. In the latter, individual platoon commanders were asked to 
render a daily report of their platoon’s work which included a column for ‘measures of work 
done’. Although not universally adopted due to the inapplicability of converting many of the 
tasks undertaken by the Labour Corps into quantitative values, the recording of accurate output 
results and the maintenance of reports was actively encouraged by Wace.
380
 The daily returns 
were sent to the Deputy Assistant Directors of Labour attached to each corps or base, where 
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they were consolidated, average numbers were calculated, and a weekly return forwarded to the 
Assistant Directors of Labour in each army. The assistants would compile a summary from the 
consolidated weekly returns, from which the staff at GHQ could extrapolate the key information 
without being submerged underneath the mass of raw data being collected ‘on the ground’.381 
Within the DGT each individual directorate was issued with a bespoke, elaborate system of 
statistics to take account of the fixed nature of their work, all created by Geddes’ assistant 
George Beharrell.
382
 The process of filtering out data as it passed up the chain of command was 
the same as in the labour directorate, with weekly compilations ‘affording a panoramic view of 
the entire situation... [and representing] the mountaintops upon which the general may stand and 
study in perspective the movements of his army below’.383 As had taken place on the NER 
under the guidance of Sir George Gibb, the ‘workforce’ of the BEF, in the final two years of the 
war, increasingly became the subjects of relentless measurement in the pursuit of economy and 
efficiency. As a result of prolonged statistical investigation, ‘coloured labour was moved 
[between various tasks at the docks] until the most suitable form of work and the supervision 
necessary to secure the best results were ascertained’.384 
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  April 1917 August 1918 Improvement 
Kilometres per locomotive in 
steam per day 
69.5 89 28.06% 
Hours per locomotive in steam 
per day 
14.3 10.9 23.78% 
Lbs. of coal per 
locomotive/kilometre 
62 42 32.26% 
Table 3.5 Comparison of locomotive fuel-efficiency figures, 1917-1918 
Source: Beharrell, ‘The Value of Full and Accurate Statistics’, p. 38. 
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The use of statistics as a management tool to improve efficiency was not restricted to 
the deployment of manpower either. The need to conserve coal also drove the BEF towards a 
reassessment of the manner in which horsepower was deployed, particularly in the form of 
broad and narrow gauge locomotives. As table 3.5 illustrates, between April 1917 and August 
1918 the DGT was able to increase the distances worked by each locomotive, whilst 
simultaneously reducing both the length of time spent ‘in steam’ each day and, as a corollary, 
the quantity of coal required to power the BEF’s railway operations. With shortages affecting 
not just men, but matériel also, every item that could be preserved or utilized more extensively 
increased the length of time the Allied forces could continue to ‘stick it out’ on the Western 
Front. The philosophy which had suggested that ‘the Government is rich and can afford it’ was 
no longer; an ethos of thrift, salvage and economy was now paramount.
385
 
Statistics also played a prominent role in the establishment of another ethos within the 
logistical and labour units of the BEF. Unlike the fighting formations of the army, for whom the 
historical traditions of the unit were used as a tool for fostering regimental pride amongst new 
recruits, the newly created units at work in the DGT and the Labour Corps had no past folklore 
upon which to draw for inspiration. Furthermore, the men of the Labour Corps were forced to 
accept the prefix ‘unskilled’, a ‘negative qualification’ unlikely to engender a sense of pride 
within the hearts of those to which it was attached.
386
 Although essential to military operations, 
‘labour units were regarded as an inferior species in the military hierarchy’. 387  Appeals to 
patriotism were also of limited use. PoW companies for example had no vested interest in 
ensuring the British won the war. Such units had little reason to perform their work with 
‘smartness, cleanliness and discipline’.388 In these cases, statistical records were used as an aid 
to the generation and maintenance of esprit de corps within and amongst the newly-formed 
units. 
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Although the raw data has since been destroyed, many of the surviving war diaries of 
the Light Railway Operating Companies acknowledge days on which previous records were 
broken, for example: 
The ammunition tonnage handled today – highest on record – 2,250 tons. Every man 
doing splendid work and the system working perfectly.
389
 
 
This entry was submitted in the same week as several references were made to enemy shelling 
which caused damage to the company’s yard and camp. Clearly, therefore, the act of recording 
respectable statistics, in spite of the enemy’s best efforts, played a significant role in motivating 
the troops of individual companies. Simple targets such as a higher figure for ammunition 
handling, or the construction of more yards of road, gave the men something tangible to focus 
their efforts upon. The somewhat abstract notion that building a road was directly contributing 
to the ultimate goal of Allied victory was superseded by the very real, recognizably attainable 
benchmarks naturally created by the daily recording of standards. Furthermore, the 
achievements of each unit created targets for their colleagues in neighbouring units, fostering a 
sense of competition between companies as each were encouraged to outperform their 
‘rivals’.390 
Yet as the implementation of organizational tools such as the Train Control System 
demonstrated with regard to the accumulation of resources, the generation of statistics was one 
thing, the application of the information contained within was another story. As Lindsay noted, 
‘mere information is nonsense’.391 Senior officers were unable to invest time in the perusal of 
reports supplied by individual units, therefore in order for the voluminous quantity of raw data 
from the front to be of value required the conversion of a mass of figures into an unambiguous, 
accessible comparison tool. That tool was the graph, which had ‘exploded’ into widespread use 
in the late nineteenth century.
392
 Plotting the results of units alongside one another illustrated 
clearly the different levels of performance within the category under investigation, allowing 
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commanders to distinguish at a glance where output was satisfactory and where there was cause 
for concern. Clerks drew up graphs based on the statistics provided by the departments for the 
consumption of senior officers and as an immediately intelligible visual aid to assist companies 
to chart their own progress. As the author of a report on the work of the Chinese Labour Corps 
put it: 
by that ingenious method of making statistics intelligible to those who have no 
mathematics in their souls, the whole situation can be seen at a glance. [I] was shown 
one graph which dealt with the comparative results produced by the different types of 
labour in France, and another which compared, month with month, the total output of 
each type of labour in all the great dumps and workshops. In the first the little blue strip 
which denoted the Chinese was more than holding its own, in the second there was a 
steadily increasing blue strip everywhere. A terrific amount of toil had gone into the 
making of those little strips, and the tale they told was cheering indeed.
393
 
 
As the DGT became responsible for new tasks, such as in June 1917 when the directorate took 
over the supply of ballast, the quantity of statistics recorded and the number of graphs created 
within the sections began to proliferate.
394
 As Beharrell emphasized, the graphs ‘told each 
responsible officer what he was doing, whether he was going back or going forward, and how 
he compared with his opposite number in other places’.395 The constant flow of data from the 
‘workshop’ to the ‘boardroom’ played a prominent role in allowing senior administrative 
officers to ascertain the levels of output which could be expected of their units on particular 
tasks, and to identify inadequacies. The knowledge that senior figures would investigate 
sustained returns of poor performance was a further stimulus to encourage ‘junior managers’ to 
take a closer interest in their working methods, to reflect on their contribution and to ensure that 
standards within their own unit were rigorously maintained and improved.
396
 The importance of 
this process had been recognized by the railway companies prior to the war, as they themselves 
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had already faced the challenge of motivating and overseeing a dispersed workforce over which 
close supervision was impracticable.
397
 
The above discussion demonstrates that working practices with recognizably ‘scientific’ 
elements were promoted by senior officers in both the labour directorate and the DGT. The 
desire within the BEF to apply the latest methods and technologies to the pursuit of success 
were not restricted to battlefield applications. Men such as Sergeant-Major Conibear displayed a 
clear aptitude for the task of collating statistics appertaining to the work performed by his unit, 
which led to a series of promotions and increased responsibilities,
398
 whilst A.D. Lindsay 
recorded his enjoyment of ‘making the most lovely graphs of tonnage in coloured pencils; a joy 
to behold’.399 The records they (and many others) amassed were used as a foundation for the 
introduction of task work,
400
 emphasized in two civilian reports into labour organization in 1918 
as being critical for ensuring the effective employment of the BEF’s diminishing manpower.401 
Task work helped increase the output of units with no vested interest in the outcome of the war, 
such as Chinese and PoW labour companies, with the incentive of shorter working hours used to 
stimulate higher productivity to convincing effect.
402
 
The similar methods by which information was fed up the respective chains of 
command in both the labour directorate and the DGT would suggest a degree of collaboration 
took place in the creation of their ‘statistics systems’. However, neither Wace’s account of the 
methods employed by the labour directorate, nor Beharrell’s discussion of DGT procedures 
make any reference to the input or experiences of their colleagues having been used to inform 
the development of the other’s arrangements. 403  Sir Edward Pearson’s recommendation in 
March 1918, that a ‘ready system by which an exchange of ideas’ between departments 
concerned with the economic employment of labour should be introduced, indicates that a 
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degree of ‘compartmentalization’ remained an issue within the BEF. Regardless of the levels of 
cooperation between the two branches, however, the establishment of such systems, and the 
uses to which the results gained from those processes were put, illustrates the applicability of 
contemporary industrial management techniques to the administration of the BEF. 
The importance of sustaining the ‘spirit’ of the troops, especially among those who 
could not be subjected to close and constant physical surveillance, was no different to the 
challenge of enforcing efficient working practices among industrial workers. Establishing ‘right 
relations’ between workers and managers was viewed as an essential ingredient in the 
establishment of an efficient factory, just as the preservation of officer-man relations occupied a 
prominent place in the training of those destined for positions of military command.
404
 However, 
as Taylor had discovered at the Midvale Steel Works in the 1880s, the introduction of scientific 
management was by no means universally welcomed.
405
 Despite ‘civilianization’, the 
organization and working practices of the BEF would continue to be a subject of disagreement 
between those charged with ensuring the supply of Britain’s largest ever field army. 
 
The application of ‘civilian’ working methods 
Although officers such as Lindsay would reflect upon the war as the laboratory for an 
‘elaborate experiment in the organization of labour’, 406  to many of those charged with 
implementing the bureaucratic system of ‘carefully prepared… forms, [and] adherence to 
graphs’, the scientific approach taken by the labour directorate was seen as an unnecessary 
additional burden in the middle of a war.
407
 The precise recording of statistics, fundamental for 
ensuring the accuracy of the policies decided upon as a result of data analysis, remained in 
many cases a low priority for officers still under instruction to ensure that the work ‘got done’. 
Lindsay himself would list his duties as a justification for not having responded to a letter from 
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his wife,
408
 whilst Lieutenant-Colonel Bryan Fairfax, commander of the Chinese Labour 
Corps,
409
 simply condemned the labour directorate’s ‘repeated requests for graphs 
demonstrating job performance’ as irksome and futile. For Fairfax ‘the war… was not an 
exercise in scientific labour management, but a life and death struggle in which men must be 
exploited regardless in order to secure a victory’.410 
Furthermore, a lack of experience in quantitative assessment inevitably led to a degree 
of imprecision in the data recorded. Even an educated man like Lindsay struggled to attain the 
necessary precision required to submit accurate returns, and battled with the intricacies of the 
task throughout his period attached to the labour directorate.
411
 Consequently, as noted by Frank 
Baines in his report on labour organization in June 1918, the urge to ‘present the best aspect’ of 
a company’s work in the official records rather than the complete picture was an ever present 
temptation to officers lacking both the time and staff to thoroughly discharge such duties.
412
 The 
result of such inaccuracies was that task work was frequently set upon the basis of unsuitable 
targets. Despite a nine hour day being recommended as ‘normal’ for labour troops,413 Baines 
found that Chinese and PoW companies were regularly set tasks which could be accomplished 
within six-and-a-half hours. The loss of up to two-and-a-half hours labour each day was 
‘conclusive evidence that the labour is not being employed efficiently’.414 The inexperience of 
officers in the labour directorate, allied to the difficult relationship between the labour officers 
and the ‘employers’ of labour in various departments, led to a series of problems.415 
The Chinese labourer, Wace’s final report reflected, ‘will not do more than he thinks he 
is expected to do; if he sees that what is actually a moderate daily output will satisfy his 
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employer, he will time his effort accordingly’.416 In other words, he would ‘soldier’. The failure 
to accurately assess the capacity of the workers led to the imposition of task work which the 
men could complete in a relatively short period, so short that employing branches would often 
insist on further work being undertaken that day. To the Chinese, such commands were viewed 
as a breach of faith and, particularly in view of the better treatment offered to British labourers 
employed in the same areas, contributed to a loss of morale and discipline among some units.
417
 
Among other companies, the developing skill of the men as they became accustomed to their 
work meant that what had been a ‘fair day’s work’ would, after a short while, become 
comfortably achievable within an ever-diminishing period of time. This led either to the troops 
attempting to ‘soldier’ (deliberately modifying their pace to ensure that what had been a day’s 
work remained a day’s work) or to completing their tasks well within the allotted time and 
creating ‘trouble’ for any employers who sought to extend the working day. PoW companies 
subjected to such treatment were described as looking upon themselves as ‘strikers’ rather than 
soldiers.
418
 
In essence, the men were practising a form of worker resistance reminiscent of that 
identified by Whitston in his study of methods by which industrial labourers responded to the 
spread of ‘Taylorist’ ideas in Britain.419 Although unable to materially alter the managerial 
procedures of the labour directorate, the companies were sufficiently powerful (and important) 
to force the BEF to modify the employment conditions under which they provided their labour. 
Despite belonging to an institution with access to its own form of physical, occasionally lethal, 
punishments, the senior officers of the labour directorate and the DGT were not in possession of 
a ‘free hand’ in the imposition of output rates and disciplinary measures against those unwilling 
to meet such targets. The withholding of rations from PoW companies considered to be 
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underperforming was dismissed as ineffectual on the grounds that malnourished workers would 
be incapable of performing as efficiently as well-fed troops.
420
 The number of inexperienced 
officers acting as supervisors, utilizing the ‘old methods of suasion and force’, remained a 
constant problem for the labour directorate throughout the war, demonstrating the limitations of 
scientific management.
421
 For men like Fairfax, the potential benefits of the labour directorate’s 
attempts to coordinate and distribute the BEF’s resources in the most efficient, systematic 
manner were overwhelmed by the bureaucracy and ‘paper-mongering’ that their methods 
demanded.
422
 
If Fairfax’s remonstrations could be dismissed as those of a ‘production-oriented 
traditionalist who preferred only to see the “bottom line” without dwelling on the means of 
reaching it’,423 the animosity displayed towards the labour directorate by the Director of Docks 
was quite another. The first graduate of the NER’s Traffic Apprenticeship Scheme, Ralph 
Wedgwood had spent his entire professional career within a company dedicated to 
implementing the most modern statistical and organizational methods available in the pursuit of 
efficiency. Yet far from taking an open-minded and sympathetic approach to the aims of the 
labour directorate, Wedgwood would offer ‘no encouragement’ to the Labour Corps to share 
their observations of working practices at the ports, despite the employment of men with 
‘practical experience of dock labour in civil life’ as labour officers at the ports.424 The twin 
pressures of the unrestricted German submarine campaign and the provision of ships for the 
transport of American troops exacerbated a situation in which the quick turn-around of shipping 
at the ports was already critical to the sustenance of the Allied war effort. Ships discharging in 
port were effectively removed from service; the longer they remained under anchor, the less 
carrying capacity was available throughout the supply chain.
425
 Under such circumstances, the 
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throughput of goods at the docks, a fundamental problem for the BEF since 1914,
426
 attained an 
even wider significance. 
Under the terms of reference issued to the labour directorate upon its foundation, labour 
officers were unable to directly address examples of what they considered to be inefficient 
working practices at the docks. Instead, they were to record their observations and submit them 
to representatives of Wedgwood’s directorate for consideration.427 Despite the production of a 
series of scathing memoranda which recommended the consolidation of labour allocation under 
the control of labour officers at each of the ports, rather than allowing the docks directorate to 
make decisions over the numbers employed on each task, Wedgwood refused to entertain the 
notion of a change in policy.
428
 Consequently, ‘friendly liaison’ between officers of the two 
organizations at a subordinate level was a prerequisite for safeguarding against mutual 
recriminations at individual ports; the Director of Docks able to fall back upon the ready-made 
excuse that not enough labour was available to fill their requirements (something Lindsay 
ascribed in part to the ‘bad competitive habits’ of the ‘capitalists’ drawn into the BEF following 
Geddes’ appointment),429 the labour organization to the ‘wasteful’ employment of the allocated 
resources by Wedgwood’s men.430 
Furthermore, the restriction of the labour directorate’s jurisdiction to the administration 
of those troops under the banner of ‘unskilled’ workers meant that the skilled men employed by 
the DGT were not part of the labour ‘pool’. Therefore, all attempts to restrict the ‘hoarding’ of 
labour within individual departments could only have a limited impact simply because vast 
quantities of men were beyond the jurisdiction of the labour directorate. Although the 
introduction of a number of unofficial ‘systems of liaison’ between individual officers saw 
skilled units being transferred from one department to another (possibly the result of the 
personal connections which existed between many of those populating the DGT), the procedure 
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was by no means universally practised. ‘To shut up this labour… in water-tight compartments’, 
Baines observed, ‘certainly appears to be lacking in economy’.431 Alleviating the Director of 
Docks of the responsibility for ensuring the economical distribution of labour therefore seemed 
a reasonable suggestion, and a trial period at Havre was proposed for August 1918.
432
 
Wedgwood blocked the proposal, agreeing only to the constitution of a committee 
comprising himself, Wace, a representative of the QMG (by this point the superior officer to 
both men) and the Principal Naval Transport Officer (responsible for the naval aspects of 
docking and unloading the ships). The terms of reference emphasized that no ‘fundamental 
changes’ to the overall policy of labour distribution, such as those recommended by Wace, 
would be considered. However, providing the platform for the representatives of both 
directorates at each of the ports to air their views, and to discuss the particular issues militating 
against harmonious working relations between the two departments did, in Wace’s view, lead to 
‘undoubted good’ in what remained of the war.433 The committee agreed that statistics compiled 
by each directorate should be made available to the other (the fact that there appears to have 
been a degree of confidentiality attached to the circulation of statistics within the BEF 
demonstrates the continued existence of compartmentalized thinking throughout the war); the 
navy consented to the release of labour from ports at ‘slack’ times for employment elsewhere; 
and each port was ordered to hold weekly meetings at which the heads of departments could 
gather together and review the existing situation at their own base.
434
 
The committee had made sound, intelligent recommendations designed to facilitate 
communication and thereby encourage better cooperation and coordination of effort at the ports. 
Wedgwood’s ‘demarcation’ of his own responsibilities, however, limited the effects that such a 
committee could have had even before its constitution. Cooperation and coordination of effort 
were laudable aims, but what was actually required was the consolidation of labour questions 
under one man, in the same way that Geddes had been required to centralize transport in the 
autumn of 1916. The investigations of Pearson and Baines had recommended it. Wace strove to 
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achieve it. Wedgwood actively refused to comply. ‘Civilianization’ was not the panacea to the 
organizational difficulties faced by the BEF that Lloyd George would later proclaim it to have 
been. The treatment of individual departments as personal ‘fiefdoms’ was not an accusation 
which could be levelled only at professional soldiers. The civilian experts drafted in to provide 
technical support and direction to the logistical administration of the force were just as 
susceptible to being drawn into ‘boundary disputes’ over the scope of their duties as their 
military counterparts. 
Through the application of innovative, modern approaches to management, the 
successive labour directorates attempted to ‘foster’ what Geddes would describe as an ‘orphan’ 
issue; the complex problem of directing and employing a vast and varied labour force in the 
final two years of the First World War.
435
 As Edward Pearson concluded in his investigation of 
the BEF’s labour organization in early 1918: 
Viewed in the light of a wide and varied business experience, I may state that from what 
I have seen this question of improved labour efficiency in the army can be broadly dealt 
with by the same methods as experience has shown to be successful in the majority of 
large business undertakings. The matter, however, cannot be dealt with satisfactorily 
piecemeal.
436
 
 
Gibb and Wace created and sustained a directorate which was ‘proficient in extracting, 
retrieving, analysing and storing information’ in order to develop a more intelligent application 
of the BEF’s manpower resources.437 Through the implementation of a card indexing system 
they created an accurate, frequently updated catalogue of the officers available for duty with the 
Labour Corps, allowing for the most suitably qualified men to be posted to the units in which 
their talents and experience could be most beneficially exploited. Similarly, the provision of 
performance charts and graphs became a regular, visual mechanism for simplifying a colossal 
amount of raw data into neat, unambiguous statements of performance. 
Although these men were professional soldiers, the methods they employed did not 
emerge from within the supposedly insular army. They were the products of an industrialized 
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society in which the complexities of large-scale administration had been addressed both by the 
state and by a larger number of companies than in any other European nation in the early 
twentieth century.
438
 The ‘nation of shopkeepers’ was not short of ‘numerical nous’, nor the 
tools with which to harness, manipulate and analyse complex organizational data as a 
foundation for policy decision-making. Turn-of-the-century Britain had embraced the 
‘quantifying spirit’; the BEF’s labour directorate was, like the BEF as a whole, a reflection of 
British society.
439
 It engaged with the controversial and novel methods of management most 
famously promoted by Taylor in much the same manner as Whitston’s assessment demonstrates 
British firms did in the decade prior to the outbreak of the war.
440
 Indeed, Taylor’s most 
prominent post-war advocate in Britain, Lyndall Urwick, first read Taylor’s Shop Management 
in a dugout on the Western Front; not at the recommendation of a civilian, but on the advice of a 
‘dugout’ Captain who had retired from the army following the South African War.441 Innovation 
and modernity were not the sole preserve of Lloyd George and his men of ‘push and go’. 
How much the improvements in efficiency and output of the Labour Corps in 1918 
were simply down to the increasing proficiency of the men as they became accustomed to their 
work, rather than the result of Wace’s organizational changes and the widespread introduction 
of task work, is impossible to assess without the raw data. Certainly, as the surviving records 
demonstrate, the esprit de corps generated by posting record-breaking results could act as a 
boon to productivity, and the unequivocal clarity of numerical representations of ‘work done’ 
made the identification of inefficiency across a wide geographical area far easier. But 
eradicating that inefficiency proved much more difficult, and was reliant upon the honesty, 
accuracy and shared commitment of those tasked with providing the necessary information. In 
the stresses of war, such dedication was not always forthcoming. Even in the final weeks of the 
conflict the labour directorate was embroiled in a dispute over the ‘proper’ allocation of 
manpower in the docks directorate. Individual departmental concerns and self-preserving 
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tendencies continued – as they had done throughout – to supersede holistic considerations of the 
BEF’s overall priorities. 
The attitude of Ralph Wedgwood, Director of Docks following the establishment of the 
post in October 1916, undermines Lloyd George’s ‘rhetoric that the great feats of wartime 
organization were achieved by civilian experts’,442 unaided (if not actively hindered) by insular 
and self-preserving soldiers. Wedgwood demonstrated that civilian experts were also prone to 
become ‘protective’ of their working methods when faced by observations and criticisms from 
‘outsiders’. Such obstructions operated on both sides of the traditionally identified fault line of 
civil-military relations. In the final months of the war, the position of Director-General of 
Transportation was officially subordinated, against Haig’s wishes, to that of the QMG. The 
incumbent director-general at the time, Major-General Sidney Crookshank, was a regular 
soldier with a Royal Engineers background including colonial service in India. The majority of 
his staff, however, were civilians drawn into the army by Geddes in late 1916. Geddes himself 
perceived the decision to subordinate the DGT to have been a ‘military conspiracy’, whilst Fay 
was suitably concerned by the effects of re-establishing military control over the directorate to 
warn that the officers and men within the DGT may become ‘mulish and difficult to handle’.443 
With Crookshank considered by London to be incapable of handling the position, Wedgwood 
was proposed as a suitable replacement. He had the required experience of docks and railway 
operations, and had been involved with the war effort since its earliest days. However, when 
Fay raised the suggestion: 
[Wedgwood] said he would have nothing to do with it. ‘The army got into a mess 
before, and were going to get into another now, let them get out of it in their own way’. 
He was deaf to any argument, although I urged him to reconsider.
444
 
 
In the event, the European Agent for the Canadian Pacific Railway and Assistant Director-
General of Military Railways, George McLaren Brown was despatched to France in order to 
shadow Crookshank ahead of taking over the DGT. His appearance caused a ‘commotion’ at 
GHQ, with Fay recounting that – echoing reports from Maxwell’s department when Geddes 
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arrived in 1916 – that some of the directors declared they would not work with McLaren Brown. 
However, on this occasion such attitudes were not merely the result of self-preserving 
tendencies among the military. The most vociferous critic of McLaren Brown’s appointment 
was not a professional soldier but Brigadier-General John W. Stewart, head of the Corps of 
Canadian Railway Troops. Like McLaren Brown, Stewart was a railwayman by trade. To 
Stewart, however, McLaren Brown was ‘only a ticket agent [who] knew nothing about 
railways’. Fay put such comments down to a personal grudge and Stewart’s desire to attain the 
position of Director-General of Transportation for himself.
445
 Ultimately, the end of the war 
thwarted Stewart’s ambitions, but the entire episode demonstrated that self-interest and faction 
persisted throughout the conflict. The senior command both at home and in France were unable 
to eradicate such issues, they could only ameliorate them. 
Yet the existence of those who put ‘ambition or jealousy’ first, whether civilian or 
soldier, should not be allowed to overshadow the majority of actors on both sides for whom 
‘self-interest was a long way behind duty to their chiefs and their nation’s need’ during the First 
World War.
446
 By 1918, the armies of Western Europe 
were the most efficient human machines the world has ever seen. There was less waste 
of effort, less friction in their working, better adaptation to the end in view, than can be 
discovered in any other form of human organization.
447
 
 
Despite Lloyd George’s post-war assertions, this process was not the result of civilian 
‘imposition’ upon a reticent, reactionary, backward-looking army. It was in fact the 
consequence of a widespread acknowledgement of the applicability of contemporary business 
methods to the conduct of modern industrial conflict, combined with an increasing acceptance 
of the financial and resource implications of waging warfare on a more ‘total’ scale than had 
hitherto been understood by both soldiers and statesmen alike. 
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Conclusion 
Whilst the acquisition of the extra resources required to improve the BEF’s transport 
capacity owed much to Geddes’ dual position; his contacts; and the increasing 
acknowledgement of the fundamental importance of logistics within the British Army, the 
effective use of those resources was influenced by working methods and practices developed 
outside the cauldron of war. Although he would fall foul of the specific requirements of military 
secrecy whilst in France,
448
 Geddes was able to create and install an integrated logistics 
organization that supplied the military needs of the BEF for the rest of the war. However, 
Geddes’ most important achievement as Director-General of Transportation in 1916 and 1917 
was, following Taylor’s aphorism, to put ‘the system first’ rather than ‘the man’. 449  From 
October 1916 onwards logistics provision in the BEF, overseen from ‘Geddesburg’ near GHQ, 
would be dominated by a civil-military partnership which relied on the application of 
management systems and operating procedures rather than upon the constant presence of a 
dominant ‘driving force’. 
However, Auckland Geddes’ assessment that ‘until experts, with experience of the 
transport problems – both rail and road – of crowded industrial England, were on the spot in 
charge of supply movement, fully adequate provision for the fighting men had proved 
impossible’,450 misrepresents the civil-military dynamic within the DGT and the BEF as a whole 
in the second half of the war. Furthermore, it underplays the importance of the evolution of 
Franco-British relations. Prior to the Somme, when the total extent of the necessary British 
contribution to the Western Front remained unclear, it was both impossible and undesirable for 
the ‘extravagant’ quantities of resources and time required to realise these large-scale 
engineering and transport commitments to be redirected from the immediately obvious and 
ever-growing demand for munitions and weapons of destruction.
451
 Only in late 1916 did the 
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need for railway material become so urgent that a compelling argument could be made to 
subordinate the supply of other items to ensure stocks of railway track were improved.
452
 This 
was the consequence not only of the BEF’s first experience of mass offensive operations, but 
also of the sustained effects of two years of attritional warfare upon the human and material 
resources of Britain’s host and ally. 
The military character of the Western Front, in particular the Materialschlacht of 1917 
onwards, was a product of industrialization. Once the French relinquished overall control of 
transportation and British experts became entwined in the logistics network underpinning this 
type of warfare, the quality of British transport management came to have a significant impact 
upon the type of war the BEF could fight on the Western Front. War had, in the words of one 
contemporary American theorist, ‘become a business... vast and comprehending many 
departments’ of army and state. 453  The Allied victories of late summer and autumn 1918 
demonstrated the by then irresistible difference in the opposing sides’ resource bases, and the 
ability of the Allies to direct adequate quantities of materiel to the battlefield over a long enough 
period of time to erode the capacity and spirit of the German Army. In understanding and 
harnessing their human and material assets, and directing them to their destinations with an 
efficiency that was – at the very least – ‘good enough’ to bring the war to a successful 
conclusion in 1918, the civilian experts drawn from British industry played a crucial role.
454
 
This was not a role performed in isolation, or in opposition to a recalcitrant military leadership 
as Lloyd George would later claim, but in combination with an army which had fostered, 
encouraged and developed working partnerships with industry both in war and peace. 
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Conclusion 
 
The armies have outgrown the brains of the people who direct them. I do not believe 
that there is any man living big enough to control these millions. They will stumble 
about, and then sit down helplessly in front of each other thinking only of their means of 
communication to supply these vast hordes who must eat.
1
 
Major-General Ferdinand Foch 
 
War is too serious a matter to leave to soldiers.
2
 
Georges Clemenceau 
 
Throughout the First World War, the trade press of the railway industry acknowledged 
and recorded the scale of the conflict, and the railways’ contribution to its continuation. In the 
opening months, as men streamed to the Colours, the numbers enlisting from each of Britain’s 
railway companies were recorded in league tables denoting the proportions of each workforce 
that had answered Kitchener’s call.3 As the war expanded, the increasing responsibilities and 
official recognitions of men like Francis Dent and Eric Geddes were reported on with familial 
pride.
4
 After the fighting had ceased, the Railway Gazette marked the occasion with a special 
issue, exclaiming that although ‘transport has always been an important factor in war… never in 
the history of the world has it played such a great part as in the war now terminated’.5 The 
combination of colossal numbers of men, the global spread of operations, and the ability of 
modern armies to consume materiel at ‘staggering rates, [had] placed unparalleled challenges in 
front of the logisticians of all nation-states’ during the First World War.6 Unfortunately however, 
the belief of NER Magazine in February 1916, that ‘when the history of the present war is 
written it would be found that our railways and railwaymen had taken a very large share in the 
operations’, has not proven to be the case.7 In this, as in so much of the popular memory of the 
First World War, the influence of Lloyd George’s War Memoirs continues to be felt. 
                                                 
1
 Quoted in Seely, p. 150. 
2
 Quoted in S. Förster, ‘Civil-Military Relations’, in The Cambridge History, ed. by Winter, II, 91–125 (p. 
91). 
3
 ZPER 9/19 ‘Railwaymen and the War’, Railway Gazette, 6 November 1914, pp. 493-7. 
4
 TNA: PRO ZPER 39/38 ‘Another Railway Knighthood. A New Year Honour for the South-Eastern and 
Chatham General Manager’, Railway Magazine, 38 (1916), p. 105; ZPER 39/41 ‘British Railway Service’, 
Railway Magazine, p. 123. 
5
 ‘The Organization of War Transportation’, Railway Gazette: Special War Transportation Number, 21 
September 1920, p. 1. 
6
 Brown, II, p. 222. 
7
 ‘The Romance of Railways in Peace and War’, North-Eastern Railway Magazine, 6 (1916), p. 38. 
269 
 
In order to bring together the unprecedented quantities of combatants, non-combatants, 
animals, machines, fuel, and fodder required to engage with and defeat their opponents, the 
armies of the Western Front were dependent upon organization and management systems on a 
scale not encountered in previous wars.
8
 However, the contribution of Britain’s transportation 
experts to the establishment of these processes and procedures has been largely airbrushed from 
the historical record. Although the 20,000 employees from within the railway industry who died 
during the conflict have merited commemoration,
9
 only Sir Eric Geddes has been the 
beneficiary of significant historical study. The work of Geddes, prominent in both Lloyd 
George’s own memoirs and in general accounts of the war, has all too frequently been referred 
to in the historiography of the Western Front within a vacuum.
10
 Such a tendency has implicitly 
reinforced Lloyd George’s assertion that the Geddes mission was pioneering. This thesis has 
challenged this trend, by placing Geddes’ transportation mission in late 1916 within the wider 
narrative of logistical developments in France and Britain both before and during the war. This 
thesis has argued that the creation of the DGT and DGMR should not be considered, as is the 
case in Lloyd George’s memoirs, as the triumph of civilian ingenuity and innovation over 
hidebound military insularity and intransigence. Instead, it has demonstrated that Geddes’ work 
must be placed within two contexts: that of a pre-existing professional relationship between the 
army, the government, and the technical experts prevalent in Edwardian Britain’s largest 
companies; and that of a growing comprehension of the logistical necessities of the evolving 
business arrangement between Britain and France, one in which the British were required to 
shoulder a far more substantial proportion of the burden of supplying the BEF than had been 
prepared for prior to the outbreak of war. The transportation mission was part of an established 
process of consultation and experimentation as the nature of the war, and the scale of effort 
required to win it, slowly revealed itself to the belligerents. The nuanced picture of logistical 
                                                 
8
 W. Funnell and S.P. Walker, ‘Accounting for Victory’, Accounting History Review, 24:2-3 (2014), 57–
60 (p. 57). 
9
 J. Higgins, Great War Railwaymen: Britain’s Railway Company Workers at War 1914-1918 (London: 
Uniform Press, 2014). 
10
 Stevenson, 1914-1918, p. 330; W. Philpott, Attrition: Fighting the First World War (London: Little, 
Brown, 2014), p. 245; G. Corrigan, Mud, Blood and Poppycock: Britain and the First World War 
(London: Cassell, 2004), pp. 316–18; R. Holmes, The Western Front (London: BBC Books, 1999), pp. 
167–8; Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 207; Sheffield, The Chief, pp. 149–50; Foley, pp. 293–6. 
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developments presented above, both prior to and following Geddes’ involvement, are a 
fundamental component of understanding how the BEF functioned within the Allied coalition – 
too often overlooked as a factor in ‘learning curve’ interpretations of the First World War – and 
how the French and British interpreted and re-interpreted their roles, and responsibilities to each 
other, as the conflict developed. 
The longstanding association of the army, government and railway companies 
underpinned Britain’s preparations for the First World War. Logistics were a thoroughly 
recognized factor in pre-war discussions, acting in concert with political, diplomatic and purely 
military considerations to guide and shape British strategic decision-making towards the ‘W.F.’ 
scheme. The continuation of the ERSC following Haldane’s reforms, where moribund 
formations were eliminated in the Secretary of State for War’s quest for efficiency, coupled 
with the creation of the REC to centralize army-state-railway connections, solidified the 
organizational links between these groups that stretched back to the very dawn of the railways 
themselves. The senior managers of Britain’s railway companies were an important element of 
Britain’s imperial preparations which culminated in the production of the War Book. At a more 
practical level, the railways provided the rolling stock and engine crews that allowed the 
military to rehearse mobilization procedures when on manoeuvres, whilst the timetabling 
experts of the largest railways grappled with the complexities inherent in the movement of a 
modern, well-equipped army to the coast. It was not as a result of the personal ‘drive’ of any 
figure, political or military, that the BEF was harmoniously propelled to the continent in the 
opening weeks of the conflict, but the culmination of a multitude of plans and preparations 
(many of which were ongoing when the July crisis began to sweep across Europe) involving 
both technical and military experts. 
The ‘Lloyd Georgian’ image of the insular army, unwilling to countenance outside 
‘interference’, and dedicated to outdated, narrow-minded traditions suited only to defeating 
poorly armed colonial opposition, cannot survive detailed examination. Before the war began, 
and throughout the conflict itself, the language of ‘big business’ was used to conceptualize the 
work and structure of the British Army. From Esher’s championing of a ‘Board of Directors’ in 
the War Office to Mackinder’s equivalence of ‘profits’ and ‘power’, the structures of large, 
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complex institutions were utilized as a model upon which the organization of the pre-war army 
was based. Far from being resisted by military figures, the languages and concepts of civilian 
industry were embraced. Lieutenant-Colonel Edward May’s observations which open part one 
of this thesis demonstrate how military figures conceptualized the challenges facing the British 
Army in ‘business terms’, whilst Douglas Haig’s diaries from his period as Inspector-General of 
Cavalry illustrate the extent to which ‘efficiency’ and ‘economy’ had been imbued by the future 
C-in-C of the BEF.
11
 As the syllabus of the administrative course at the LSE set up in 1907 
demonstrates, the future leaders of the BEF’s supply echelons were being taught the skills 
required to operate a large, data-intensive business rather than a colonial police force.
12
 Such 
concepts were not resisted. As a review of the course noted approvingly, in direct contradiction 
to Lloyd George’s later condemnation of the narrowness of vision in the British Army, it was 
‘widening the field of view’ of the soldiers who participated.13 Unfortunately, however, only 
less than 250 officers had passed through the course before the war began. The conflict 
intervened before the lessons of ‘big business’ could be diffused more widely throughout the 
army, and the officers who had gained their ‘e’ in the Army List would, by necessity in a global 
war, be diluted to such an extent that, in conjunction to their comparative lack of seniority, they 
were unable to exert pronounced influence over the direction of the BEF’s administrative 
development. 
However, as the BEF grew, and became more and more reflective of the society it was 
formed to protect, practices familiar to the British workman manifested themselves. By late 
1916, after Geddes had created the DGT, Lord Northcliffe reflected that ‘a considerable portion 
of industrial England’ had crossed to France.14 Their methods came with them. Whilst Bourne’s 
essay has previously demonstrated how the overwhelmingly working class soldiers of the BEF 
                                                 
11
 ‘Efficiency for war must be the standard… It is perfectly certain that by a well-thought out system and 
methodical employment of time the highest standard of efficiency will be reached by the time of the 
inspection. But time must be economized’. See Haig Papers, Acc.3155/2C Notes on Inspection, 1903. 
12
 For example, the lectures given by Arthur Bowley on statistical methods ‘covered methods of 
collecting statistics; their uses and limitations when collected; the presentation of statistics in tabular and 
diagrammatic form; the drafting and arrangement of statistical forms; [and] the danger of false deductions, 
with explanations of common errors’. See Gwynn, p. 233. 
13
 Gwynn, p. 234. 
14
 Quoted in Grieves, ‘The Transportation Mission’, p. 68. 
272 
 
adapted industrial practices to their military existences,
15
 those with pre-war experience of the 
railway industry also remarked on the manner in which the support systems behind the army 
resembled peacetime transport operations. W.J. Hill, employed by the LNWR prior to the 
conflict, noted how much Fosseux resembled ‘an English railway yard… on, of course, a small 
scale’ by the end of 1917.16 The yard contained locomotive and wagon sheds for the repair and 
maintenance of equipment, and the drivers were detailed for duty through a time office ‘by 
similar methods as adopted by the English railway companies’.17 The similarities went even 
further; the BEF’s light railway network, a core component of the transport infrastructure 
powering the Materialschlacht, was operated by a train control system developed to improve 
punctuality on the Midland Railway. It was adapted to create flexibility in the space between the 
railheads and the front line, whilst the same principles were used to monitor the whereabouts of 
the BEF’s increasing IWT capacity. Although he would institute the necessary organizational 
reforms during his time as Director-General of Transportation, this thesis has demonstrated that 
Sir Eric Geddes was not solely responsible for introducing this ‘science of transportation’ to the 
BEF. The recalibration of Franco-British relations as the war developed was also crucial. 
Despite sharing the same strategic goal, reluctance to formalize the hypothetical 
agreements developed over the preceding decade meant that Britain and France went into 
coalition in August 1914 without an adequate managerial framework to ensure that national 
initiatives were subordinated to the shared aim of expelling German forces from invaded soil. 
The pre-war agreement was not suited to the provision of a BEF numbering over two million 
men. The absence of a centralized, inter-Allied command structure manifested itself at the 
outset in the relegation of British logistical requirements to those of the larger French Army. 
Until the Somme (or more broadly speaking the cumulative effects of the fighting in the first 
half of the war), the French were the dominant partner in an unequal coalition on the Western 
Front. France took on the lion’s share of the organizational and coordinating responsibilities for 
both Allied forces. During 1915, Francis Dent and Gerald Holland found their contributions to 
the expanding British war effort constrained by the limitations of British authority over the 
                                                 
15
 Bourne, ‘The British Working Man’. 
16
 Hill Papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0767 Recollections of France, p. 22. 
17
 Hill Papers, LIDDLE/WW1/GS0767 Recollections of France, pp. 32-3. 
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logistical infrastructure in existence on French territory. As hosts, senior partners, and the 
suppliers of the vast majority of the machinery and personnel required to operate the 
interlocking transport networks behind the armies, the wholly understandable desire for the 
French army and state to retain overall control of the supply apparatus overrode all other 
considerations. In attempting to install a bespoke telephone communications system, or in 
pressing to open up a new route for waterborne traffic, Dent and Holland bumped up against the 
limits of what French hospitality was, at that stage in the war, willing to offer. Even after the 
vast battles of 1916 when the pre-war agreement was acknowledged to be unsustainable, the 
French were reluctant to relinquish control to their partners (as Geddes himself discovered at 
Calais). 
However, it was not merely French reluctance that acted to impair the effectiveness of 
‘civilianization’ in the BEF prior to autumn 1916. It was not until 1916, when the Battle of the 
Somme underscored the sheer scale of effort that would be required to remove the Germans 
from their trenches, that the implications of organizational decisions taken at the onset of trench 
warfare would make their presence felt within the upper reaches of the BEF. The 
decentralization of responsibility within the administrative services, followed as a result of the 
unprecedented expansion of the force, helped to prevent the development of a coherent, 
integrated transport network in rear of the British troops. Logisticians were compartmentalized, 
sealed off in watertight departments and only able to make adjustments to their own link in an 
increasingly complex supply chain. The civilian experts engaged at this point in the war, and 
their military counterparts, were effectively trying to solve Rubik’s cube whilst only able to 
view one face. Within this restricted organizational structure, the contributions of transport 
experts such as Francis Dent and Gerald Holland could by necessity only be peripheral. This, 
however, does not mean that they should be overlooked. The establishment of the ‘civilianized’ 
Directorate of IWT in particular illustrates that the BEF was not resistant to the input of 
outsiders. The manner in which Francis Dent’s suggested improvements to the working 
procedures employed at the Bassin Loubet were discussed by the BEF’s senior administrative 
officers, indicates an army willing to interact with, and obtain the advice of, those with 
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recognized experience in dealing with the complexities of large-scale distribution services. The 
BEF was learning to make modern war long before 1 July 1916. 
The irony of Lloyd George’s claims of individual infallibility, which run throughout the 
War Memoirs, is that the many avenues in which the Prime Minister’s claims can be discredited 
overshadow the area in which his foresight was proven to be absolutely correct.
18
 In September 
1915, it was Lloyd George who raised doubts as to the ability of the extant French railway 
network to keep pace with the intensifying production effort in Britain. The Somme illustrated 
comprehensively that Lloyd George had been right in his misgivings. Too much had been asked 
of a transport network incapable of sustaining the intensity of supply required in order to fight a 
successful offensive against a well-trained, highly motivated enemy. French desires to retain 
overall control of the logistical infrastructure that both armies depended upon reduced the level 
of priority given to the development of transport projects within the BEF. The Somme 
demonstrated the unsuitability of Britain’s hitherto uncoordinated response to the war as it 
developed in Europe, and the fundamental need for long-term planning to supersede the reactive, 
ad hoc policies of 1914-1916. Until this lesson had been understood, Geddes’ mission could not 
have succeeded. 
The resistance of officers such as Clayton, Maxwell, and Stuart-Wortley, prevalent in 
historical accounts of the ‘civilianization’ process, demonstrates that this lesson took time to 
filter through. However, previous assessments which have stressed the individualistic, self-
preserving tendencies of certain prominent figures on the military side, have created an 
imbalance in representations of the civil-military relationship at play within the BEF. The 
technical experts were not immune to the temptations of ‘boundary disputes’, nor did they 
entirely embrace the customs of the military machine. Ralph Wedgwood’s antagonism of the 
various labour directorates, whilst not directly causing inefficiencies at the docks, did nothing to 
alleviate existing problems either. Thus, Lloyd George’s presentation of obstinacy as an almost 
uniquely ‘military’ trait that prolonged the war and reduced the effectiveness of altruistic 
civilian interventions deserves to be refined in light of the evidence. Furthermore, this study has 
argued that the adversarial tone of such comments requires substantial amendment. 
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 Suttie, pp. 198–200. 
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To conclude, this thesis has stressed the key role played by British technical experts in 
the evolution of the BEF’s transportation system during the First World War. It has 
demonstrated that the ‘flower of British youth’ was not, as Lloyd George would claim, ‘mown 
down’ as a result of the ‘professional rigidity, narrowness and lack of vision’ of the British 
Army.
19
 In fact, it has argued that the BEF was a reflection of the rapidly evolving society from 
which it came. It was an industrial machine forged from an industrialized society and sustained 
by many of the same techniques, methods and expertise that powered a world-leading economy, 
temporarily harnessed and adapted away from the pursuit of profits towards the production of 
military power. From the very outset, and indeed for over a decade before the war broke out, the 
army sought out and actively engaged with civilian experts to ameliorate the logistical 
challenges to be addressed in the prosecution of a modern conflict. Between them they planned 
for war, enlarged the scope and scale of the BEF’s operations on the European mainland, and, 
ultimately, sustained the full implications of modern, material-intensive warfare on the Western 
Front at sufficient intensity and with enough efficiency to secure victory. Far from being the 
result of having unwanted civilian experts ‘forced’ upon an obstinate military, the Armageddon 
fought by Britain during the First World War was the outcome of conscious choices to 
contribute and cooperate made on both sides of the civil-military divide. 
                                                 
19
 Lloyd George, I, p. 215. 
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Appendix 1: List of officers holding commissions in the 
Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, August 1914 
 
Name 
Railway or Dock 
Company* 
Occupation 
Date 
Commissioned† 
A. Ross 
Great Northern 
Railway 
Railway Engineer 16/06/1897 
A.J. Barry   Engineer 11/08/1897 
Sir R. Turnbull 
London and North-
Western Railway 
Railway Operator 04/11/1899 
Sir W. Forbes 
London, Brighton and 
South Coast Railway 
Railway Manager 04/11/1899 
W.B. Worthingon 
Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway 
Railway Engineer 18/04/1900 
Sir W.D. Pearson 
(Viscount Cowdray) 
  Contractor 11/07/1900 
D.A. Matheson Caledonian Railway Railway Engineer 18/07/1900 
C.A. Harrison 
North-Eastern 
Railway 
Railway Engineer 11/08/1900 
Sir J.A.F. Aspinall 
Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway 
Railway Manager 11/08/1900 
H.W. Williams 
London and India 
Docks 
Dock Manager 15/09/1900 
H.C. Baggallay   Engineer 28/11/1900 
Sir P.C. Tempest 
South-Eastern and 
Chatham Railway 
Railway Engineer 26/02/1902 
B.H. Blyth   Engineer 23/04/1902 
Sir G.L. Eyles   Engineer 28/05/1902 
Sir S. Fay 
Great Central 
Railway 
Railway Manager 04/06/1902 
Sir A.C. Lucas   Contractor 25/06/1902 
A.G. Lyster   Engineer 16/07/1902 
Sir J. Aird   Contractor 13/09/1902 
C.B.H. Dent 
Great Southern and 
Western Railway 
Railway Manager 14/05/1904 
O. Hawkshaw   Engineer 01/05/1905 
D.C. Rattray 
Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway 
Railway Engineer 21/08/1905 
Sir W.G. Granet Midland Railway Railway Manager 29/10/1906 
C.S. Dennis Cambrian Railway Railway Manager 09/01/1907 
Sir E.D. Jones   Contractor 16/10/1907 
Sir M. Fitzmaurice   Engineer 01/04/1908 
H. Holmes 
London and South-
Western Railway 
Railway Operator 01/02/1909 
F.F. Scott 
London, Brighton and 
South Coast Railway 
Railway Operator 10/07/1909 
W.J. Grinling 
Great Northern 
Railway 
Railway Operator 10/07/1909 
E.F.C. Trench 
London and North-
Western Railway 
Railway Engineer 01/01/1910 
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Name 
Railway or Dock 
Company* 
Occupation 
Date 
Commissioned† 
H. Jones 
Great Eastern 
Railway 
Railway Engineer 16/03/1910 
H.S. Wainwright 
South-Eastern and 
Chatham Railway 
Railway Engineer 07/05/1910 
W. Clow 
Great Central 
Railway 
Railway Operator 17/09/1910 
W.A. Paterson Caledonian Railway Railway Engineer 13/10/1910 
L.P. Nott   Contractor 26/10/1910 
M.F. Wilson   Engineer 27/10/1910 
F.G. Randall 
Great Eastern 
Railway 
Railway Operator 17/01/1911 
C. Aldington 
Great Western 
Railway 
Railway Operator 12/05/1911 
Sir F.H. Dent 
South-Eastern and 
Chatham Railway 
Railway Manager 05/07/1911 
E.C. Cox 
South-Eastern and 
Chatham Railway 
Railway Operator 25/10/1911 
J.P. Bagwell 
Great Northern of 
Ireland 
Railway Manager 03/02/1912 
Sir J.B. Ball 
Great Central 
Railway 
Railway Engineer 24/02/1912 
Sir H.A. Walker 
London and South-
Western Railway 
Railway Manager 28/02/1912 
F. Potter 
Great Western 
Railway 
Railway Manager 06/03/1912 
W.W. Grierson 
Great Western 
Railway 
Railway Engineer 09/10/1912 
Sir C.L. Morgan 
London, Brighton and 
South Coast Railway 
Railway Engineer 05/11/1912 
Sir E.C. Geddes 
North-Eastern 
Railway 
Railway Manager 27/01/1913 
E.A. Neale 
Great Southern and 
Western Railway 
Railway Manager 06/03/1913 
C.J. Brown 
Great Northern 
Railway 
Railway Engineer 10/12/1913 
A.W. Szlumper 
London and South-
Western Railway 
Railway Engineer 02/04/1914 
Sir F. Palmer   Engineer 11/05/1914 
S. Williamson Cambrian Railway Railway Manager 19/05/1914 
Notes: 
* Indicates employer on date of commission, not as of 4 August 1914. 
† Indicates date of first commission, not promotion to rank as of 4 August 1914. 
      Indicates officer commissioned to represent the General Manager’s office. 
 
Source: C.E.C. Townsend, All Rank and No File: A History of the Engineer and Railway Staff 
Corps RE, 1865-1965 (London: The Engineer and Railway Staff Corps RE TAVR, 1969). 
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Appendix 2: The Development of Inland Water Transport 
Resources, 1915-1918 
 
 
 
 
* Dumb barges contained no engine and required a tug for propulsion. 
† Self-propelled barges possessed engines in addition to space for cargo. 
 
Source: TNA: PRO WO 158/851 Director General of Transport: History of Inland Water 
Transport, Appendix B2: Schedule showing development of inland water transport resources 
in France month by month, 1915-1918. 
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Appendix 3: Map of railways behind the British front, 1916 
 
 
 
Source: J.E. Edmonds, History of the Great War. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 
1916, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1932), I, p. 270. 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
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Appendix 4: British Railway lines in the Somme Battle Area, 
1916 
 
 
 
Source: J.E. Edmonds, History of the Great War. Military Operations, France and Belgium, 
1916, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1932). 
This image has been removed by the author of this thesis for copyright reasons. 
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Appendix 5: Britain’s largest employers, 1907 
 
Rank Employer Employees 
1 General Post Office 212,310 
2 London and North-Western Railway 77,662 
3 Great Western Railway 70,014 
4 Midland Railway 66,839 
5 North-Eastern Railway 47,980 
6 Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway 34,900 
7 Great Northern Railway 32,422 
8 Fine Cotton Spinners and Doublers 30,000 
9 Great Eastern Railway 29,289 
10 Royal Dockyards 25,580 
11 Great Central Railway 25,469 
12 Armstrong (Sir W.G.) Whitworth & Company 25,000 
13 North British Railway 24,063 
14 Vickers Sons & Maxim 22,500 
15 Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds 21,710 
16 Caledonian Railway 21,545 
17 Calico Printers Association 20,500 
18 Brown (John) & Company 20,000 
19 South-Eastern and Chatham Railway 18,837 
20 Bolckow, Vaughan & Company 18,000 
21 Co-operative Wholesale Society 16,982 
22 United Collieries 16,000 
23 Royal Ordnance Factories 15,651 
24 London, Brighton and South-Coast Railway 15,095 
25 Gas Light & Coke Company 15,000 
 Indicates railway companies  
 
Source: D.J. Jeremy, ‘The Hundred Largest Employers in the United Kingdom in 
Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing Industries, in 1907, 1935 and 1955’, in The Rise of 
Big Business, ed. by B.E. Supple (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1992), pp. 414–35 (pp. 417-8). 
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Appendix 6: Information requested from the transportation 
mission, August 1916 
 
Requirement Statistics 
The following information to be obtained in quantities per week for each month up to 30 June 
1917, in respect of the details set out below. 
Tonnage and numbers to be conveyed, and number of railway, road, and canal vehicles or craft of various 
kinds required: 
From point of origin to home ports and vice versa 
From French ports, and vice versa 
From ports in other theatres of war, and vice versa, for: 
 
 Officers and men 
 Sick, wounded and 
leave men 
 Horses and mules 
 
 Motor vehicles 
 Horse-drawn 
vehicles 
 Spare parts for 
vehicles and guns 
 
 Numbers of guns and 
weights 
 Gun ammunition  Machine-guns 
 
 Rifles 
 Small arms 
ammunition 
 Bicycles 
 
 Trench warfare ammunition 
(including gas cylinders) 
 Salvage  Food supply 
 
 Clothing, boots and other 
equipment 
 Harness  Petrol 
 
 Mails, parcels and private 
consignments 
 General stores  Railway material 
 
 Building material  Other RE stores  Medical supplies 
 
 Munitions and raw materials 
for French government 
 Fuel 
 Voluntary Aid 
Detachments 
 
 Red Cross  YMCA  Blue Cross 
 
 Church Army 
 Any other large 
traffics  
Units of requirement of each item, e.g., per Corps, or per Division, per 1,000 men etc. where possible. 
 
Provisions for strategic reasons and to meet requirements about today’s railhead 
 
Construction, repair etc. of: 
 
 Railways  Docks  Canals or roads 
Necessary in the event of an advance, for the movement of troops, ammunition, stores etc., or to feed civil 
population 
Provision of: 
 
 Railway material  Girders  Dock equipment: 
o Gates 
o Power 
o Cranes 
o Rails 
o Dredgers 
 
 Locomotives  Road material 
 
 Carriages and wagons 
 Road transport 
vehicles 
 
 Barges 
 Material for repairs 
of canals 
 
 Labour (repair, maintenance, 
operating and workshops) 
 Fuel 
 
 Stores 
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Special Memoranda required on: 
 
1 Existing organisation in this country 
2 Existing organisation in France 
3 French organisation and arrangements for working BEF traffic, including relationship with French 
government Authorities and railway, dock or canal officials. 
4 Relation of British military traffic to French traffic (military and/or civilian) 
5 Relation with Belgian government qua Railways and ports in the future 
6 Present position of Belgian railways rolling stock 
7 Repairing facilities for locomotives and rolling stock in France and Belgium, including supply of 
labour and material 
8 Proposals in hand or contemplated for provision of additional lines in France or arrangements with 
French railways 
9 Relations with REC, with any existing memorandum on the subject 
10 Relations and procedure with Admiralty in France, on the sea, in England, and in other theatres of 
war. 
11 Relations with Admiralty – Army Medical Service, etc., as to the evacuation of sick and wounded 
12 Reports made or any special instructions issued during the period of the war 
 a. Labour at home or abroad 
 b. Dock facilities at home or abroad 
 c. Rail facilities at home or abroad 
 d. Canal facilities at home or abroad 
 e. Road transport at home or abroad 
 f. Evacuation of sick and wounded 
13 Position as regards 
 a. Railways 
 b. Sea Transport 
 c. Docks 
 d. Canals 
 e. Roads in France 
With maps and plans where available. Memorandum to give details as to all difficulties which are being 
experienced: all probable tight places being specially marked on the maps and plans. Details of steps in 
progress or in contemplation to counteract the difficulties. 
14 General flow of traffic at home and abroad, through various ports and by the different routes. 
Descriptions of traffic generally forwarded by rail, canal and road. 
15 Storage depots in France and in this country so far as transport questions are affected. 
16 Requirements of special capacity wagons and numbers available 
17 Armoured trains 
18 All special regulations as to despatch and storage or loading on railways of mixed cargoes, 
ammunition, guns, men. Any restrictions against bulk cargoes of any kind. 
19 Memorandum with specimen forms of all traffic returns submitted to WO or IGC 
20 Statement of all railway, dock or canal works, rolling stock, craft accommodation and equipment 
generally provided by the British government in France. 
284 
 
21 Extent to which railway telegraphs and telephone circuits are used for the business of other 
departments. 
 
Source: TNA: PRO WO 32/5164 Travelling and Transport: General (Code 9(A)): Facilities and 
arrangements for Sir E. Geddes in conducting his investigation on transport arrangements in 
connection with the British Expeditionary Force at home and overseas, 9 August 1916. 
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Appendix 7: Record of Total Output of Ballast, July to November 1918 
 
 
Source: REMLA, MO 678 Ballast History, 1914-1919. 
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Appendix 8: Examples of Increased Output at Workshops due 
to Scientific Management by Labour 
 
Article 
Previous 
best per 
man (per 
day unless 
otherwise 
stated) 
Output at 
time of new 
task 
Tasks per man set to get 
off 
Output secured on 
new basis 
5pm 4pm 3pm 
Army Ordnance Department Workshop 
Studs Fire Boxes 15 15 30 35 40 40 per man 
Ashbin Handles 27/28 27/28 50 55 60 60 per man 
Dixie Handles 45/50 45/50 100 110 120 120 per man 
Ring Nuts (Pumps) 20 20 40 44 48 48 per man 
Shackles 25 25 36 40 44 44 per man 
Eyebolts 30/40 30/40 60 66 70 70 per man 
Boot Shop 
Hobnailing (pairs) 
 
9.5/10 13 14 15 14 per man 
Carpenters Shop 
Stretchers 6 6 17 19 20 20 per man 
Shovel handles 360 360 1,100 1,200 1,300 1,300 per man 
Shovel handles 
(repairing) 
18 18 44 48 52 52 per man 
Drum Shop 
Food containers 
(soldering) 
4 4 66 72 76 66 per man 
Petrol cans 
(soldering) 
20 20 300 330 360 300 per man 
Food containers 
(greasing) 
6 6 132 144 156 132 per man 
Petrol cans (testing) 150 150 550 600 650 550 per man 
Paint Shop 
4.5" Howitzer 
carriage (per 2 men) 
6 (per 
week)     
10 per week (to get 
off Saturday 
afternoon) 
13, 15 and 18 Pdrs. 
Carriage (per 2 men) 
6 (per 
week)     
10 per week (to get 
off Saturday 
afternoon) 
60 Pdr. Carriage (per 
4 men) 
6 (per 
week)     
10 per week (to get 
off Saturday 
afternoon) 
8" Howitzer carriage 
(per 4 men) 
6 (per 
week)     
9 per week (to get 
off Saturday 
afternoon) 
Field Kitchens 1 
 
3 
  
3 per man 
Water carts 1 
 
3 
  
3 per man 
Running posts 30 
 
36 44 48 44 per man 
Tinning Shop 
Camp Kettles 30 10 39 43 46 46 per man 
Travel boilers 25 10 33 36 39 92 per man 
Mess Tins 250 110 275 300 325 325 per man 
 
Source: TNA: PRO WO 107/37 Work of the labour force during the war, Report, Appendix Y, 
1919.  
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